Fulfilling the NPT Bargain
for Disarmament and Non-Proliferation:
The Role of Middle Powers
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The 13 Practical Steps
Summary

The Second Nuclear Age has begun and the danger of the use of a nuclear weapon is growing. The only guarantee against use is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Though such a goal seems far off, the security architecture for a nuclear weapons-free world must be built. Both non-proliferation and disarmament must be addressed to effect a balanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On June 1, 2006 at the United Nations, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix released its final report, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*. The report states: “There is an urgent need to revive meaningful negotiations, through all available intergovernmental mechanisms, on the three main objectives of reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation, and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all.” The Middle Powers Initiative strongly concurs. At the core of MPI’s mission is the belief that the safety and moral integrity of present and future generations depends upon initiating, achieving, and sustaining the *universal* elimination of nuclear weapons.

This Brief outlines five priority measures: a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty; verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals; reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and strengthening assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon states. These measures would decrease risks of use, diminish the access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states, and generate support for strengthening the non-proliferation side of the regime and resolving regional crises. They would make for a safer world now and create the pre-conditions for elimination of nuclear arms.
A. Background

1. The Middle Powers Initiative (http://www.middlepowers.org) was started in 1998 as a consortium of eight prominent international non-governmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament issues. Since then, MPI has sent approximately 20 delegations to middle power governments encouraging them to use their access to the nuclear weapon states to urge them to fulfill their commitments to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. On two occasions (2000 and 2005), MPI held strategy consultations at the Carter Center, Atlanta, addressed each time by former President Jimmy Carter. Referring to these consultations in his book, Our Endangered Values, President Carter commended the goal of exerting leverage on the nuclear powers to take the necessary steps to save the NPT. MPI’s recommendations have been fed directly into the NPT review process. The recommendations are:

1. Balanced implementation of the NPT.
3. U.S. and Russia to solidify and enlarge reductions under the Moscow Treaty.
4. Further reductions and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons.
5. U.S. and Russia to take their weapons off “alert” status.
6. Diminishing role of nuclear weapons: no new nuclear weapons; legally binding security assurances to be given by nuclear weapon states.
7. Negotiations on a fissile materials ban to be concluded; multilateral controls on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing.
8. IAEA’s Additional Protocol to become universal standard.
9. Subsidiary body at the Conference on Disarmament to deal with nuclear disarmament.
10. Early entry-into-force of Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; present moratorium on testing to be maintained.
11. Deeper consideration of the legal, political and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

B. The Situation Today

2. A time traveler from the Cold War would find today’s world familiar in that nuclear weapons are very much part of the landscape, but strange in that there is no longer a veneer of a grand confrontation of ideologies, only the brute assertion of overwhelming power. A Second Nuclear Age has begun. In the First Nuclear Age, nuclear weapons were rationalized by the policy of mutually assured destruction. Now, there is a new emphasis on their war-fighting role. In January, President Chirac signaled that nuclear weapons could be used against a state responsible for a large-scale terrorist attack on France. In April, there were credible U.S. media reports that the United States is giving serious attention to options for use of nuclear weapons to attack buried nuclear facilities in Iran. The problem of nuclear weapons is re-emerging in other new ways: heightened concern about terrorist acquisition; the DPRK’s declaration that it has a nuclear deterrent; Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability that would enable it to fuel nuclear reactors or, should it decide to do so, build nuclear bombs. The nuclear weapon states refuse to give up their arsenals and feign surprise that other nations, seeing that nuclear weapons have become the
currency of power in the modern world, are trying to acquire them. So are terrorists. No major city in the world is safe from the threat of nuclear attack.

3. The intensity of new nuclear dangers has led International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who won the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, to state: “If we wish to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience and no role in our security.” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan well articulated the urgency of the present situation in a recent speech in Tokyo. “We seem to have reached a crossroads,” he said. "Before us lie two very divergent courses. One path can take us to a world in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons is restricted, and reversed, through trust, dialogue and negotiated agreement, with international guarantees ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, thereby advancing development and economic well-being. The other path leads to a world in which rapidly growing numbers of States feel obliged to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, and in which non-State actors acquire the means to carry out nuclear terrorism.” The Secretary-General continued, “The international community seems almost to be sleepwalking down the latter path - not by conscious choice but rather through miscalculation, sterile debate and the paralysis of multilateral mechanisms for confidence-building and conflict resolution.”

4. In Weapons of Terror, the Blix Commission calls for commencement of “preparations for a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction to generate new momentum for concerted international action.” The Middle Powers Initiative endorses this call, as well as the thrust of the Commission’s analysis and recommendations. The Commission observed: “Nuclear weapons must never again be used – by states or by terrorists – and the only way to be sure of that is to get rid of them before someone, somewhere is tempted to use them. Today, we are in a dangerous situation…. Proliferation has not been halted and serious steps to outlaw nuclear weapons have not been taken.” Quoting the International Court of Justice’s unanimous holding that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament,” the Commission stated that the obligation “requires that states actively pursue measures to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the importance of their role in military force structures. Yet, even though nuclear-weapon states ask other states to plan for their security without nuclear weapons, they do not themselves seem to be planning for this eventuality.” The Commission added, “A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures. Benchmarks should be set; definitions agreed; timetables drawn up and agreed upon; and transparency requirements agreed…. It is time to move from the present stalemate and revive the discussion and negotiations about such steps.” Among the steps identified by the Commission are all of the priority measures set forth in this Brief and virtually all of the MPI recommendations summarized above.

5. Most of the world – including allies of the nuclear weapon states – is united in seeking implementation of concrete steps towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Freed of the constraints of consensus that stymied the 2005 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) Review Conference, in fall 2005 the UN General Assembly once again adopted several resolutions to that effect. Perhaps most important was the “Renewed Determination” resolution sponsored by Japan and nine other countries from both the North and South. It passed overwhelmingly, with 162 countries voting for it and only two against, the United States and India, with seven abstentions. Its adoption means that nearly all governments in the world are now on record as favoring application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification “in the process of working towards the elimination of
nuclear weapons.” This is a ringing endorsement of the principles embedded in the 13 Practical Steps for disarmament agreed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. (See Appendix for text of the Practical Steps.) The resolution wisely singles out two other commitments from the Practical Steps, “the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies,” and reduction of “the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.” It also calls for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The 2005 resolution put forward by the New Agenda Coalition, the pioneering cross-boundary group, and adopted by a vote of 153 for, five against, and 20 abstentions, directly affirms the continuing force of the Practical Steps.

C. Critical Assessment

6. On the disarmament side of the ledger, little of value can be counted. It can be said that reductions are proceeding slowly in the overall number of warheads, now about 27,000. In the case of the United States, the current total arsenal of about 10,000 will be an estimated 6,000 in 2012. Defenders of the U.S. record observe that this will be the smallest arsenal size since the Eisenhower administration and that there has been roughly a four-fold reduction since the end of the Cold War. However, a negative development is that the United States, with Russian acquiescence, has rejected application of the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency to the nuclear arms reductions memorialized in the 2002 Moscow Treaty. Absent accounting for the warheads and their verified dismantlement, achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world will be impossible. Another disturbing development is that nuclear weapons have been given a new prominence in security postures, rather than a diminishing role as promised in the 13 Practical Steps. On the non-proliferation side of the ledger, in large part due to the refusal of the Bush administration to countenance reference to the Practical Steps, the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to reach agreement on a program of action. The lack of progress on compliance with the disarmament obligation thus precluded movement on addressing multiple non-proliferation challenges. There was no endorsement of more robust inspections by the IAEA under its Additional Protocol. Nor were there steps taken to regulate the acquisition and operation of technologies for production of plutonium and enriched uranium. As the failure of the Review Conference demonstrates, attempting to strengthen non-proliferation constraints while upgrading the political currency of nuclear weapons is contradictory and not sustainable.

7. Outside of multilateral forums, the United States and India are seeking to create an arrangement under which India, a nuclear-armed, non-NPT party, would accept safeguards on civilian but not military nuclear facilities in return for access to civilian nuclear fuel and technology. While the proposed deal would partially engage India in the non-proliferation system, it undermines a core bargain of the NPT, that countries renouncing nuclear weapons are promised access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology. MPI therefore opposes it. If the two countries insist on going forward, India at a minimum should be required to match disarmament steps already taken by all NPT nuclear weapon states, stopping production of fissile materials for weapons, signing the CTBT, and assuming the Article VI obligation of good-faith negotiation of cessation of the nuclear arms race and nuclear disarmament. In regional non-proliferation crises, the DPRK’s nuclear weapons program has been off the public radar screen for months now as the six-nation talks flounder, and prospects for resolution of the Iran crisis are highly uncertain. Both crises, MPI strongly believes, must be addressed diplomatically, not militarily. A solution in the Iran case possibly could be based on indefinite suspension of construction of an industrial-scale enrichment
plant in return for a pilot plant closely monitored by the IAEA plus assurances of supply of nuclear fuel. Fundamentally, if we expect the DPRK, Iran, and other potential proliferants to play by the rules of the NPT, so too must the major nuclear powers. This means at a minimum a demonstrated commitment to implementation of the 13 Practical Steps for disarmament. That would establish an environment in which the world’s states could be effectively mobilized to create and support solutions to particular crises and to strengthen the regime generally.

D. Priority Measures

Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty

8. An FMCT would permanently end production of fissile materials, primarily separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium, for use in weapons. It would affect most directly the countries possessing nuclear weapons; NPT non-weapon states already are subject to a verified ban on diverting materials to weapons. Achievement of an FMCT would restrain arms racing involving India, China, and Pakistan, cap Israel’s arsenal, and establish ceilings on other arsenals as well. A verified FMCT also would help build a stable framework for reduction and elimination of warheads and fissile material stocks; help prevent acquisition of fissile materials by terrorists; meet a key NPT commitment; and institutionalize one of the basic pillars of a nuclear weapons-free world. FMCT negotiations have been stalemated in the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva for more than a decade, primarily due to U.S. refusal of linkages to negotiations or even discussions regarding weaponization of outer space, nuclear disarmament, and guarantees of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon countries. To take advantage of the opening discussed below, middle power countries should explore creative ways to overcome the stalemate. The Conference has already shown flexibility in 2006 by undertaking “structured discussions” on these topics under the leadership of the six presidents, including the Republic of Korea earlier this year. Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden proposed last year that the General Assembly, bypassing consensus procedure at the Conference, establish ad hoc committees on topics that the Conference is not addressing. It is important not to allow the potential weaponization of space to go unaddressed; among other things, deployment of space weapons would make progress on nuclear disarmament more difficult.

9. On May 18, the United States tabled a draft FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament along with a draft mandate for negotiations. While the draft treaty contains no verification requirements, the draft mandate does not preclude proposing them. It is not necessary that a mandate require that a treaty be verified, so long as this is subject to negotiation. If negotiations do begin, middle power countries should hold to their position that verification is imperative and feasible. As the International Panel on Fissile Materials has observed, a verification system could initially focus on declared enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the weapon possessing states. They could be monitored just as the same kinds of facilities are monitored through IAEA safeguards in non-weapon countries Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. Later stages of verification could focus on the more difficult task of confirming the absence of clandestine activities. The U.S. draft is also deficient because it does not prevent the conversion of civilian materials to weapons use and is silent on existing stocks. Those stocks, both military and civilian but weapons-usable, are very large. These problems can be solved, as demonstrated in papers by Canada, South Africa and other countries as well as the International Panel. Due to the enormity of the risks posed by the nuclear
fuel cycle, states should also support renewable energy sources and energy conservation, and to this end should consider establishment of an international sustainable energy agency.

Verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals

10. President Reagan repeatedly invoked the Russian dictum, “trust but verify.” It is essential to bring the principle of verification symbolized by that dictum back to center stage. The Moscow Treaty requires Russia and the United States to deploy no more than 2200 strategic warheads by 2012, but includes no provisions for verification of reductions or dismantling of warheads or delivery systems. The two countries declared that they would make use of monitoring mechanisms under START. But START expires in 2009, and the Moscow Treaty does not provide any schedule for reductions prior to 2012. A high priority therefore is to press Russia and the United States to agree on means to verify and make irreversible the reductions. The Blix Commission recommends negotiation of a new treaty that would further cut strategic forces and also provide for verified dismantlement of warheads withdrawn under the Moscow Treaty. More broadly, all nuclear-armed states must initiate processes to apply the principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility to reduction and elimination of their arsenals. Declarations of fissile materials contained in military stocks and warheads, as recommended by the International Panel, is one of the first steps that could be taken. Countries with nuclear weapons owe the rest of the world greater proof of compliance with the disarmament obligation. To that end, verification processes should involve international monitoring.

Reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces

11. The United States is now estimated to have more than 1600 warheads ready for delivery within minutes of an order to do so, and Russia more than 1000 warheads similarly ready for launch. It should be an absolute scandal that, every moment of every day, the two countries remain locked in a Cold War-style nuclear standoff. Non-governmental experts have explained that the standoff can be defused through separation of warheads from delivery systems and other measures that lengthen the time required for a nuclear launch, from days to weeks to months. The 2000 Review Conference committed to reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces, and the anti-nuclear movement has endorsed it under the banner of “de-alerting.” While most urgent with respect to Russia and the United States, it is also important that other weapon states, which to various degrees already maintain their forces in a de facto de-alerted condition, adopt and affirm de-alerting as an entrenched, declared policy and practice. De-alerting would help alleviate risks associated with mistakes, coups, attacks on nuclear weapons facilities, false warnings, unauthorized launches, hacking into command and control systems, and developments that cannot now be anticipated.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

12. After four decades of discussions and partial test ban agreements, negotiations on the CTBT were completed in 1996. Although 176 states have ratified the treaty, ten of the 44 states whose ratification is required for entry into force have yet to do so. Of the ten, three nuclear-armed states, the United States, China, and Israel, have signed but not ratified the treaty; India and Pakistan, both nuclear-armed, as well as North Korea, have not taken the first step of signing it. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has made great strides in developing the International
Monitoring System, which will likely be completed in 2007. The CTBT would help to check the spread of nuclear arms and to constrain refinement of advanced arsenals; protect the environment; and have a substantial organizational and technical infrastructure. It would be an indispensable part of the architecture of a nuclear weapons-free world. Its entry into force must remain a high priority. As the Blix Commission said, “While no nuclear-weapon tests have been carried out for many years, leaving the treaty in limbo is a risk to the whole international community.” Also crucial is maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear test explosions that has held since the 1998 tests by India and Pakistan and continued support for the Preparatory Commission.

Strengthened assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon states

13. Particularly in France and the United States, doctrine and preparation for nuclear strikes against non-weapon states is a central development in the Second Nuclear Age. That trend gives a special urgency to the long-standing demand of non-weapon states party to the NPT for a legally binding instrument barring such use. NPT weapon states have already given such assurances in the form of declarations, and they are also legally codified in protocols to the regional nuclear weapon free zones. There is an excellent argument that the declarations are binding, notably because they were reiterated in connection with the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT. However, the declarations and protocols contain loopholes, and the legally binding status of the declarations should be confirmed.

E. The Role of Middle Powers

14. The Middle Powers Initiative is grateful to the Republic of Korea for holding the June 8 luncheon meeting, and recognizes the contributions its diplomats have made by chairing the First Committee in 2005 (Ambassador Choi Young-jin) and the 2006 Disarmament Commission (Ambassador Oh Joon). Believing that the NPT cannot withstand another failed review conference in 2010, MPI urges middle power countries to undertake multilateral diplomacy to save the NPT. This work begins in 2007 at the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 Review. Also important is determined and strategic intervention in the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. Middle powers can bridge the gulf between the nuclear and non-nuclear states. By voting for the 2005 New Agenda resolution, 14 NATO states backed the NPT 2000 commitments: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, and Turkey. Other significant affirmative votes came from Asia and the Pacific, including Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea. The seven states in the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) have consistently pressed the nuclear weapon states to live up to their obligations. Other states have joined in the Seven Nation Initiative (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, along with the United Kingdom) and sponsored the Renewed Determination resolution in the General Assembly (Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Nicaragua, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine).

15. In addition to the normal governmental negotiating forums, many civil society institutions stand ready to support shared concerns regarding non-proliferation and disarmament. One example is MPI's Article VI Forum. The Forum, examining the legal, political and technical requirements for a nuclear weapons-free world, aims to build international cooperation to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons and to fulfill existing NPT commitments. It is engaged in organizing a series of
consultations with middle power countries. After garnering positive responses from over 20 countries that attended its opening session at the UN on October 3, 2005, it hosted a two day conference on March 2-3, 2006 along with the Clingendael Institute in The Hague. Twenty-one invited states participated: Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Costa Rica, Germany, the Holy See, Hungary, Ireland, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, The Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Republic of Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, and Turkey. Two former Prime Ministers - Rudd Lubbers of The Netherlands and Kim Campbell of Canada - addressed the gathering. As part of this ongoing effort, the third meeting will be held September 28-29, 2006 in Ottawa. Here a planned dialogue between like-minded states and representatives of the nuclear weapon states party to the NPT will be held on several of the practical measures recommended in this Brief.

16. To build the political will necessary to sustain a process leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, civil society organizations, publics around the world, and officials such as heads of state, mayors and parliamentarians must be intensely engaged. Middle powers should strive to support civil society participation in the NPT review process, engage in regular consultations with NGOs, and promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. A fusion of strength of an informed civil society and like-minded governments holds great potential for reducing nuclear dangers.
13 PRACTICAL STEPS
EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapons-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
   * Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
   * Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
   * The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
   * Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
   * A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
   * The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

MPI, which started in 1998, is widely regarded in the international arena as a highly effective leader in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The work of MPI includes:

a) **Delegations** to educate and influence high-level policy makers such as Foreign, Defense and Prime Ministers, and Presidents. Delegations focus on leaders who have great impact on nuclear weapon policy making, both domestically and internationally. MPI Delegations are planned to coincide with significant political events such as the NPT Review Conferences and their preparatory meetings, NATO and other summits;

b) **Strategy Consultations**, which serve as “off the record” interventions designed to provide a working environment in which ambassadors, diplomats, experts, and policy makers can come together in an informal setting at pivotal opportunities, in order to complement the ongoing treaty negotiations at various forums such as the United Nations or the European Parliament; and

c) **Publications**, such as Briefing Papers, that examine whether or not the nuclear abolition agenda is progressing and make corresponding recommendations to governments and activists. MPI Briefing Papers serve as intellectual catalysts for the MPI Delegations and MPI Strategy Consultations, and are widely read.

The Global Security Institute, founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000), has developed an exceptional team that includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats, effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace Laureates, and concerned citizens. This team works to achieve incremental steps that enhance security and lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. GSI works through four result-oriented program areas that target specific influential constituencies.