“NATO’s Nuclear Weapons Policy: relationships to the 2000 and 2005 NPT Review Conferences, the paragraph 32 process and future Canadian policy”

Draft Paper

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A. Introduction

A1. In the post-Cold War era, debate over the role of nuclear weapons in the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has intensified. While some argue that the Alliance should move its posture toward nuclear disarmament rather than deterrence, nuclear weapons still play a prominent role in NATO’s strategy and thinking. My research analyses the reasons for the Alliance’s continued reliance upon nuclear weapons and the arguments against its current nuclear policy. Accordingly, I investigate the systemic-, state- and individual-level factors that interact with one another to produce longstanding policy and divisive debate about NATO’s nuclear weapons. I am interested in the struggles between regions, nations, institutions, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and policy-makers over the need for nuclear stockpiling, the utility of deterrence strategy, and the nature of the threat.

B. NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence, 1991-2004

B1. My current research focuses on the post-Cold war time period, 1991-2004. This period is especially interesting because the Alliance reaffirmed its commitment to relying upon nuclear weapons in its 1991 “New Strategic Concept.” Paragraph 38 of this document states: “Nuclear weapons make a unique contribution in rendering the risks of aggression against the Alliance incalculable and unacceptable. Thus, they remain essential to preserve peace.” While there has been considerable pressure on NATO from the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), and the Non-Nuclear Weapon States (NNWS), particularly from key policy-makers in Canada, Germany, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, and Sweden, to change NATO’s nuclear policy, the Strategic Concept has hardly changed.

B2. NATO barely mentioned nuclear weapons in its “New Strategic Concept” of 1999 (in fact, paragraph 46 repeated paragraph 38). But paragraph 62 emphasized “The supreme guarantee of the Allies is provided by the strategic nuclear forces of the Alliance,
particularly those of the United States; the independent nuclear forces of the United Kingdom and France, which have a deterrent role of their own, contribute to the overall deterrence and security of the Allies.”6 A June 2002 meeting of NATO’s Defence Planning and Nuclear Planning Groups reaffirmed the ‘great value’ placed on these nuclear forces and noted that in this regard, “deterrence and defence, along with arms control and non-proliferation, will continue to play a major role in the achievement of the Alliance’s security objectives.”7

B3. Notably, the historical record shows that many NATO defenders express considerable faith in deterrence, a faith they retain even as nuclear strategy evolves and technology advances. While some changed their minds about what was necessary to signal a credible deterrent posture, others remained beholden to NATO’s declared strategy until it eventually came to their attention that another permutation of the doctrine needed to be defended. In short, each permutation of deterrence doctrine—mutual assured destruction, flexible response, minimal deterrence—seemed sensible at the time.8

C. Canada helps initiate a review of NATO doctrine, 1999-2000

C1. After NATO’s Strategic Concept was declared, it was left up to non-NATO governments, like New Zealand, commissions like the Canberra Commission, and NGOs such as the Nuclear Age Peace Foundation to question nuclear doctrine. The Canadian government played a key role in reopening the question at NATO headquarters nearly ten years later in April 1999. In a development that was lost sight of in the media’s focus on the Kosovo crisis, the NATO Summit in Washington announced a broad-ranging review of NATO’s nuclear weapons policy. At a news conference on April 24, Canadian Foreign Affairs Minister Lloyd Axworthy confirmed the willingness of NATO “to have a review initiated.” Explaining that this was the thrust that came out of a report by Canada’s Foreign Affairs Committee, Mr. Axworthy added: “It’s a message that the [Canadian] Prime Minister took [to] certain NATO leaders…. I think we have now gained an acknowledgement that such a review would be appropriate and that there would be directions to the NATO Council to start the mechanics of bringing that about.”9

C2. In Canadian journals and news editorials, Foreign Minister Axworthy was criticized by NATO defenders for being a ‘nuclear nag’, ‘anti-American’ and for engaging in ‘pulpit diplomacy.’ Others argued that, on the contrary, he was carrying on in the Canadian tradition of questioning nuclear doctrine and criticizing NATO policy, just as John Diefenbaker, Lester Pearson, and Pierre Trudeau had done before him.10 Evidently Axworthy strongly pressed his Ambassador David Wright and Deputy Ambassador Rob McCrae to initiate changes but in the end, they failed to garner support from the other delegations. The German government’s foreign minister Joschka Fischer had signalled his government’s support initially but by the completion of the review process, the Canadian government was left, symbolically-speaking, alone at the altar.11

C3. In interviews at NATO headquarters, members of the Canadian delegation put a brave face on the 20-month review, what was called ‘the paragraph 32 process’.12 In December 2000, NATO released its report reaffirming the central tenet of the Strategic
Concept—nuclear weapons are “essential”. While the NATO document made it clear that the paragraph 32 process was finished, in response to strong Canadian insistence, NATO included specific commitments to further public and internal engagement on the question. While NATO promised further engagement on the question, it was clear that the main partner NATO civil servants wanted to engage with was the US. They were waiting for the US to decide upon its Nuclear Posture and until that was decided upon, there would be no change in NATO’s doctrine.13

D. The contradiction between NATO’s Strategic Concept and the NPT treaty

D1. It was in this context that the Alliance’s offer to “broaden its engagement with interested NGOs, academic institutions and the general public”14 was taken by some NGOs and member governments to mean that efforts should continue and accelerate to bring NATO policy and intention in line with the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).15 During the NPT negotiations of April 24-May 2000, the very same countries that pledged an “unequivocal undertaking” to the total elimination of nuclear weapons, reaffirmed in the December 2000 NATO document that nuclear weapons are “essential”.16 The “contradiction” between NATO’s completed arms control review and the NPT treaty (that not only explicitly forbids the transfer of nuclear weapons to non-nuclear weapons states, but includes an unequivocal commitment to nuclear disarmament) immediately provoked debates in the Belgian, Canadian, and Dutch parliaments.17 In Canada, for example, the chairman of the MPI, Senator Douglas Roche, argued that since all the states in attendance had endorsed the NPT, including all NATO member states, NATO could no longer claim its nuclear weapons to be “essential”.18

E. The possibility of re-igniting another debate about NATO’s nuclear policy

E1. Can we conclude from these debates and from the 2000 NPT negotiations that there is considerable public interest in re-igniting another debate about the contradiction between NATO’s nuclear policy and the NPT treaty? The fact is that the debates in Belgium, Canada and Holland were reported only in passing in their own national newspapers. NATO is hardly the stuff of breathless news reports.19 As has been said before, “NATO is a subject that drives the dagger of boredom deep, deep into the heart.”20

E2. It is conceivable that NATO nuclear doctrine could be criticized given the disturbing aspects of the US Nuclear Posture Review and US spending on nuclear weapons research and development. Many Canadians and Europeans fear that the Bush administration will resort to using nuclear weapons in a future conflict. Although Russia, China, France, and Britain officially retain the use of strategic nuclear weapons, American development of new theatre and battlefield nuclear weapons (including the ‘robust nuclear earth penetrator’) is frightening many because of the US administration’s apparent willingness to resort to their use. As the Bush administration declares:

Given the goals of rogue states and terrorists, the United States can no longer solely rely on a reactive posture as we have in the past. The inability to deter a
potential attacker, the immediacy of today’s threats, and the magnitude of potential harm that could be caused by our adversaries’ choice of weapons, do not permit that option. We cannot let our enemies strike first….To forestall or prevent such hostile acts the US will, if necessary, act pre-emptively.21

The development of nuclear weapons-related technology and possible acquisition by terrorist groups or “rogue states” means the use of nuclear weapons seems more ‘credible’ now than it has been since the Cuban missile crisis. Whereas it is certainly true that the Americans cannot sit idly by while their security is undermined, the route they are taking—asserting nuclear credibility—could become controversial. But it is doubtful that the general public in North America and abroad will rise up to demand change. In my opinion, the issues surrounding Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) and the weaponization of space—not NATO strategy—will dominate in the forthcoming American and Canadian elections. My assessment is that we cannot expect ordinary citizens and grassroots movements to raise sufficient public furore to make any changes in NATO’s nuclear policy. Unless there is an imminent threat of a small-scale limited nuclear war or credible use by terrorists of ‘suitcase bombs,’ there will continue to be too much inertia.

E3. Let me emphasize, however, that I do think elite policy-makers can be lobbied; it is possible for NGOs, like Pugwash and the MPI, and coalitions of governments, such as the NAC, to change elite opinion with a modicum of success. For example, the contradiction between NATO’s nuclear policy and the NPT treaty is worth highlighting in hearings before standing committees and ministerial briefings. NGOs could register their disapproval of the current U.S. administration’s explicit and implicit repudiation of many of the 13 Steps. Furthermore, coalitions can express strong dismay about the United States’ preemptive strategy that was announced in the 2002 Nuclear Posture Review and the current administration’s intent to design new ‘usable’ nuclear weapons and test nuclear weapons. While the Canadian government can be praised for being the sole NATO member to support the New Agenda resolution at the UN in 2002 and 200322, some explanation as to why there was not more support for the NAC resolution from among the other NATO allies is necessary.

E5. Finally, governments could be pressured to seek agreement within NATO to undertake a full-fledged review of alliance nuclear policies, and publicly advocate the elimination of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, withdrawal of nuclear weapons to NWS territory, and pursuit of arms control and disarmament measures leading to the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons.23 Could there be a sea-change in NATO policy due in part to public pressure? NATO decision-makers assert that the “paragraph 32” process is finished, but the door can be re-opened to further engagement on the larger questions surrounding US nuclear doctrine.24

**F. Lessons learned from the para 32 process for further re-engagement of the question**

F1. The Pugwash/MPI draft strategy recommends NATO NNWS place NATO nuclear policy reform at the top of their nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agendas.
Governments could ask for a conceptual debate either within NATO’s Senior Political Committee (the body tasked with overseeing and integrating work on the last review) or within the Nuclear Planning Group. Accordingly, what are some of the lessons learned from the last paragraph 32 process?

F2. NATO policy-makers argued in 2000 that they had little time to deliberate on NATO’s arms control policies given Balkan issues. Next time, governments need to ensure that discussion is not reduced to a mere mention in some kind of historical statement, similar to NATO’s 2000 document. Most of that document was devoted to describing the history of arms control and disarmament and NATO’s current policies. While NATO’s out-of-area deployments in Afghanistan and Iraq are newsworthy, governments (in cooperation with other NNWS) should strive to keep the focus on NATO’s nuclear strategy.

F3. Since 1999, efforts to harmonise the Alliance’s nuclear weapons policy with disarmament and arms control commitments made by the member states in other fora such as the NPT negotiations have proven to be just rhetoric. NGOs and NATO member states need to remind all 25 NATO allies that at the May 2000 Review Conference of the NPT, all 19 NATO states adopted the final document calling for the “unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear weapons states to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all states parties are committed under Article VI [of the NPT].” This time, NATO countries must make plans to harmonise their nuclear policies with the NPT and radically reduce the value of nuclear weapons in their common defence strategy.

F4. During the last review, public versions of the reports from various NATO committees that were tasked with reviewing NATO’s policy were not made available. While the international community cannot expect to see reports and papers that are circulated within the High Level Group that reports to the Nuclear Planning Group, only Canadian pressure in 2000 resulted in any kind of open document. Next time it should be possible to post more reports on NATO’s website. After all, NATO says it values transparency in that it aims to “foster public and political support by explaining the rationale of NATO’s nuclear policy and posture.” If some delegations fear, again, that the documents are not ‘meaty enough to warrant public disclosure’, then NATO can be criticized for not undertaking a thorough discussion of nuclear policy or even a conceptual debate.

F5. During the para 32 review, suggestions that NATO consider a ‘no first use’ of nuclear weapons policy or that it might announce tactical weapons withdrawals from Europe were ‘not even on the radar screen.’ Next time a serious discussion of NATO’s own nuclear posture should be made, if only so that the allies have a clearer idea of what NATO can and will do in this arena. One of the main assumptions the allies need to ask themselves in their reconsideration of doctrine is whether nuclear weapons do protect the alliance by deterring potential aggressors from attacking. During the Cold War, strategists assumed that by threatening nuclear retaliation, nuclear weapons could credibly prevent an enemy from attacking. September 11th demonstrated there are no guarantees that the threat of retaliation will succeed in preventing an attack—indeed, it
will be difficult to retaliate against a sub-state opponent, like a terrorist group. Traditional arguments against deterrence also still hold true. There are many ways that deterrence could fail, including misunderstanding, miscalculation, poor communication, irrational leadership, and accident.

G. NATO’s current preoccupations do not include reform of its nuclear doctrine

G1. One significant obstacle to bear in mind is that reform of NATO’s strategic doctrine, particularly in light of the NPT, is not a pressing issue. There are many other issues engaging NATO policy-makers from the war in Kosovo to the war in Bosnia to the war in Afghanistan to the war in Iraq. NATO troops are deploying more and more ‘out-of-area’. The new NATO Secretary-General Jaap de Hoop Scheffer’s first speech in the United States (with President George Bush at his side) focused entirely on the need for NATO to achieve success in Afghanistan and provide more support to Poland, which is leading a multinational force in Iraq.25

G2. During his first visit to Ottawa in Ottawa, Mr. de Hoop Scheffer met with Foreign Minister Bill Graham and Defence Minister David Pratt. Reportedly, their talks focused on the situation in Afghanistan, where NATO is leading an international peacekeeping force (ISAF) to which Canada is currently the largest troop contributor. The Secretary-General also welcomed the ongoing review of Canada’s defence and foreign policy, saying that he hoped it would result in an increase in spending on key military capabilities and an active role for Canada in the world.26 There was no mention of Canada’s prospective role in reforming future NATO policy—but internal divisions are rarely aired in public.

H. NATO’s tendency to paper over internal divisions

H1. Immediately after September 11, NATO declared its full backing for the United States in its war against terrorism and invoked Article 5 (essentially an attack against one of us is an attack against us all). NATO member states had never expected the alliance leader would be attacked on its own soil. But there were few, if any public concerns about how NATO would translate Article 5 into operational action. Would NATO reserve the right to use tactical nuclear weapons if necessary? What were the implications of Article 5 for interoperability in Europe? These were uncomfortable questions that the Alliance glossed over.27

H2. It was thought, too, that the issue of NATO expansion would heat up in 2001 in advance of the November 2002 summit in Prague, where member states were to decide on admitting any or all of the nine candidates to the Alliance—and whether to extend to them the privilege of NATO’s "nuclear umbrella."28 As some analysts pointed out, Russia could view an expanded NATO as threatening and a disincentive to reducing its strategic- and intermediate-range nuclear forces.29 But in the final analysis, the US government decided NATO would expand to 26 countries and continue to operate by consensus. That was the end of the public debate.
H3. The questions NATO policymakers had about the implications of the EU’s headline force of 60,000 men versus the NATO Response Force (NRF) were similarly glossed over. It is far from clear how the nascent NFR (a tool for NATO’s global outreach?) and the EU’s Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) will interact.\textsuperscript{30} While some NATO ambassadors were angry about American admonitions to spend more on NATO’s conventional forces and personnel, the divisions within NATO and between the EU and NATO were aired behind closed doors.

H4. In short, a display of unity is part of the culture of NATO. Decision-makers indicate that they are satisfied with NATO’s strategic concept (\textit{e.g.} it is a good ‘stepping stone’); their discussions \textit{in camera} or behind-the-scenes will probably continue to be polite, diplomatic, nuanced—ever-respectful of the US—but not all divisions can be papered over successfully.

I. NATO’s display of unity was weakened prior to the attack on Iraq

I1. In March 2003, Belgium, France, and Germany imposed a veto on the commencement of military planning to defend another member state, Turkey, in the event of hostilities with Iraq. The effects of the Franco-German ‘dovishness’ were considerable. For example, the former members of the Warsaw Pact that either have joined or hope to join the alliance asked whether France and Germany might be prepared to veto NATO countermeasures to help them in the event of a crisis? These countries are particularly dependent on NATO’s collective security guarantee because they are being asked to give up much of their ‘all-round’ and ‘outdated’ defensive capabilities in order to contribute ‘specialist’ skills. The Alliance was unable to quell concerns about whether these countries need to engage all the allies in a discussion about the extent to which Article V provisions will protect them during a crisis.

J. Perceptions of increasing American heavy-handedness

J1. Moreover, one fall-out of the war against Iraq relates to perceptions about America’s increasing heavy-handedness. To give two recent examples, US Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld recently threatened to pull NATO headquarters out of Brussels unless Belgium agreed to repeal a law which gives its courts universal jurisdiction to try cases of genocide, war crimes and human rights violations. While Belgian parliamentarians did agree to change the law (to cases in which either the victim or the accused were residents of Belgium), war crimes lawsuits had already been filed against US President George Bush, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair, US Secretary of State Colin Powell, General Tommy Franks, and Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld.\textsuperscript{31}

J2. The new US propensity to threaten others with extreme measures is, perhaps, most telling in the United States’ recent decision to suspend military assistance to six nations seeking NATO membership because they failed to exempt US citizens from prosecution in the new International Criminal Court (ICC). As the deadline passed for governments to sign exemption agreements or face the suspension of military aid, Bush issued waivers for 22 countries but he did not include Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovakia, and
Slovenia. It is not yet clear whether these countries will sign bilateral waivers in order to obtain military aid; but what is clear is that the Bush administration is taking a more aggressive approach than has ever been seen in NATO corridors.

**K. Influential world figures oppose NATO’s reliance on nuclear deterrence**

K1. Adding to the debate about NATO’s nuclear policy, some distinguished world figures continue to argue that the risk of retaining nuclear arsenals in perpetuity far outweighs any possible benefit imputed to nuclear deterrence. They see initiatives, like the NAC and the MPI, as bold attempts to encourage NATO leaders to break free from their Cold War mindsets and move rapidly to a nuclear weapon-free world. Conversely, many defence ministers, parliamentarians, and bureaucrats believe that to protect peace and prevent war or any kind of coercion, the Alliance must maintain, for the foreseeable future, an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces.

**L. Influential American figures disagree on nuclear deterrence**

L1. There is a debate within the US that has been ongoing since well before the 2000 NPT conference pitting Critics (or ‘doves’ or ‘reformers’) like General Lee Butler, Jonathan Schell, and Sir Josef Rotblat, against ‘Defenders’ (or ‘hawks’ or ‘counter-reformers’), like Richard Perle, Dick Cheney, and Donald Rumsfeld. George Bush’s government is on record, going into the Presidential election, saying:

> Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives.

On the other hand, Democratic front-runner candidate John Kerry says:

> George Bush is taking the world in the wrong direction. He is poised to set off a new nuclear arms race by building bunker-busting tactical nuclear weapons—smaller and more usable nuclear bombs. I don't want a world with more useable nuclear bombs. I don't want America to turn its back on half a century of effort by every President to reduce the nuclear threat. I'm running to put America where we rightfully belong—leading the way to a new international accord on nuclear proliferation to make the world itself safer for human survival.

L2. While most Americans could not care less about NATO, they do care about US nuclear strategy. One question being posed in the United States is whether its continued reliance upon nuclear deterrence enhances or undermines American security? For instance, does its possession of a huge arsenal of strategic and tactical nuclear weapons decrease or increase the likelihood of a terrorist strike? Does its threat to possibly resort to pre-emptive nuclear warfare increase or decrease the credibility of deterrence? The
same question can be taken and writ larger: Does NATO’s continued reliance upon nuclear deterrence enhance or undermine the Alliance’s security?  

M. Multilateral initiatives by NATO member states and coalitions of middle powers

M1. Secondly, and just as importantly, I am interested in what multilateral initiatives by NATO member states, or coalitions of middle powers, help maintain or change longstanding nuclear policies? There are many reasons why it may be possible—although exceedingly difficult—to change NATO’s deterrent strategy. But practically speaking, where should national governments, NGOs, and individuals aim their efforts? Should they focus their efforts on the kinds of recommendations made in the Pugwash Canada/MPI draft report? Should they focus on other less-specific strategies that target different audiences? Or should they forego a focus on NATO, for instance, and concentrate instead on promoting a worldwide culture of peace?

N. Using different levels of analysis to understand NATO’s nuclear policy

N1. To address these questions, it is helpful to conceptualize three ways of understanding NATO’s nuclear strategy. Three bodies of scholarly literature are relevant: system-level analysis; state-level analysis; and individual-level analysis. Each of these theoretical frameworks provides insights into the factors that explain NATO’s continued reliance upon nuclear weapons and the debate surrounding the Alliance’s nuclear policy.

N2. For example, we can increase our understanding of the problem by adopting a system-level analysis of relations between NATO (a regional military alliance), the NWS (such as Russia), and the NNWS (such as the members of the NAC). Alternatively, we can clarify the problem by focusing upon a state-level analysis of individual government policies toward NATO’s nuclear posture and the role and interaction of key NGOs within each state. Or we can adopt an individual-level analysis of influential world leaders and opinion-makers, for instance by trying to understand the arguments of those who either defend or criticize NATO’s nuclear strategy, and by promoting debate about their shared or competing belief systems.

O. Different levels of analysis shed light on different factors

O1. Beginning with the broadest method, a system-level analysis tends to suggest that NATO’s nuclear policy can be explained by factors that influence the system as a whole and by the characteristics and proclivities of the system itself. For example, those who take a system-level approach might focus on the allocation of tactical nuclear weapons among NATO member states. They may draw attention to dependencies promoted by extended deterrence relationships. The distribution of strategic and tactical weapons worldwide and within NATO’s regions will attract their attention. Or some may argue that the P5’s possession of nuclear weapons is at the root of the problem. These are some of the general factors used in system level analysis. In short, it is the dynamic created both within and by the system that then shapes the relations of states and individuals. Without systemic-level change, there can be no progress.
O2. On the other hand, a state-level analysis emphasizes the nature, characteristics, and history of individual countries in determining NATO’s nuclear policy. Thus, for example, one person might argue it is the nature of American unilateralism or isolationism that is the problem. Someone else might point to the history of Canadian diplomacy to explain change. Subsumed under the state-level, domestic factors affecting nations’ international behaviour include the type of government and how it operates, levels of NGO and citizen participation in shaping NATO policy, and the adaptability of the state to both internal and external pressure and change. At this level of analysis, the characteristics of the bureaucratic machine can also affect a nation’s defence policy, which in turn can affect NATO’s policy.

O3. The third and final level of analysis addresses the role of the individual in shaping NATO’s policy. An individual-level approach to understanding NATO’s posture might seek, for example, to understand the common beliefs and assumptions of many policy-makers, referred to as ‘belief systems’, and to explain the impact that particular individuals have on shaping NATO policy-making or on the strategy of NGO coalitions such as the MPI.

O4. Each of the above frameworks operates at a specific level of analysis, giving priority to particular relationships and dynamics in explaining NATO’s nuclear policy. However, it is crucial to appreciate the interdependence of systems, states, and individuals operating at different levels. Accordingly my theoretical approach now tries to blend the insights of these three approaches, although previously I focused my research agenda primarily at the individual level of analysis. From the systemic-level literature, I take a concern with structural constraints on NATO’s policy, and equally an awareness of the international trends accompanying global disarmament and globalisation. From the literature on state-level approaches, I draw a focus on interactive bureaucratic learning processes, as well as the reciprocal influence of allied countries and cultures of cooperation in shaping defence policy. From the individual-level literature, I take a focus on belief systems which coalesce to support the nuclear option—‘NATO defenders’—and underlying assumptions and values that propel powerful individuals to question NATO’s policy—‘NATO critics’.

P. Combining levels of analysis increases understanding

P1. I think it is necessary to combine these levels of analysis if we want to understand how NATO strategy is shaped—and changed. Instead of taking a reductionist approach—focusing on one or two levels of analysis—it is crucial to understand the interdependence of system-, state- and individual-level factors operating to shape and constrain NATO’s nuclear policy. A multi-level, multi-variate explanation that ties together many levels of analysis blends the insights of three approaches and can result in a stronger explanation.

P2. In other words, it is important to understand the inter-relatedness of key actors, institutions, and leaders. One of my concerns about existing scholarly and policy-oriented
approaches is that academics and policy-makers tend to concentrate on either a specific government’s defence policy toward NATO or a particular NGO concerns about changing NATO’s defence posture. If we want to understand NATO’s nuclear policy and its continued emphasis upon nuclear deterrence, as well as questions surrounding the role of NGOs and individuals in effecting change in deeply-institutionalised policy, then we need to take a multi-level approach.

P3. My research agenda over the last two years—and over the next two years up until 2005—explores NATO’s reasons for retaining an emphasis on nuclear weapons. A systematic analysis will, I hope, capture both the reasons for changing NATO’s policy and the potential of various states and NGOs to transform longstanding policy over time.

Q. Steps that could be taken to reduce the nuclear danger: a draft strategy

Q1. To conclude, individuals, NGOs, countries, and international organizations can play a valuable role in strengthening the centre of the debate about the contradictions and dangers inherent in NATO’s nuclear weapons policy. A draft strategy for the steps that individuals, organizations, states, and the international community might take is offered below. At first glance, there is much work to be done in the next decade. Individuals, NGOs, states, and international coalitions could begin with disseminating timely information (e.g. about the current status of NATO’s deterrence doctrine and the implications of the NPR); proceed to strengthening efforts to reform US deterrent policy (e.g. by Pugwash, NAC, the MPI); follow it up with discussing the implications of BMD and space weapons deployment; move on to consider the advantages and dangers of continuing tactical nuclear weapon deployment in Europe; and end with debating the merits and demerits of negative security assurances. Where should they begin?

Q2. There is no right answer to this sort of question. As an individual, the efforts you make will necessarily reflect your view of ‘reality’ and the world we live in. If you think a problem stems mainly from systemic factors, you will work on different initiatives and projects than someone who thinks the problem is mainly related to individual-level factors. Those who do not have a strong opinion one way or another—or those who think the problem is multi-faceted and multi-level—may have to tackle the problem from all types of angles. The draft strategy below is a template, not a map. It illustrates a way to think about what should or might be done. But every individual’s own draft strategy must necessarily reflect what they think lies at the root of the problem.
R. Draft Strategy or Template: Various Ways Forward for Individuals, States and the International Community

R1. Individual Level
1. Build analytic knowledge base on nuclear strategy and disarmament. For example, an individual might choose to develop an expertise on:
   • Utility and dangers of nuclear deterrence strategy (e.g. mutual assured destruction versus minimal deterrence)
   • Effect of nuclear disarmament (e.g. tactical and strategic) on NATO military missions and NATO’s conventional force structures
   • Effect of space weapons on civil uses of space and implications for nuclear sharing

2. Develop inner peace and teach others to be peaceful and non-violent. For example, an individual might:
   • pray or meditate on peace
   • teach children non-violent methods of solving conflict
   • join other religious denominations engaged in opposing war

R2. State Level
3. Engage state’s agencies (e.g. cabinets, congress’s, parliaments and ministries of defence and foreign affairs) in dialogue. For example, write letters, lobby, and present proposals
   • to reduce NATO’s reliance on nuclear weapons prior to a critical debate within NATO

4. Increase attention of public/media/policymakers
   • Use existing arguments for change in doctrine and increase their visibility
   • Describe nature of problem and possible solutions for assuring security for all NATO members
   • Prepare high-profile spokespersons for public attention
   • Sponsor or attend international summits and treaty negotiations using informed national representatives and delegations

R3. International System
5. Target Audiences
   • Canadian/US and NATO militaries, Parliament/US Congress/UK/EU, the Martin/Bush administrations
   • International academic community engaged in studying international security, arms control and disarmament
   • Delegations to national governments in NATO and the European Union
   • International NGOs and international movements
   • General public (e.g. using videos, television programs, radio, brochures, etc.)

6. Promote a Culture of Peace
   • Eschew violence at the family-, domestic-, state- and international levels
   • Promote methods of non-violent conflict resolution and conflict management
   • Encourage inter-state morality and ethics based on inter-faith principles


Final Communiqué, June 6, 2002, para. 8 It should be noted that the paragraph goes on to say, “We reaffirmed our determination to contribute to the implementation of the conclusions of the 2000 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference and welcomed the full discussion of issues at the Preparatory Conference for the 2005 Review Conference in April this year. We continue to support the existing moratoria on nuclear testing.” http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2002/p02-071e.htm.

For more information, see Erika Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb: Canadian Defenders Confront Critics*, (Kingston & Montreal: McGill-Queen’s University Press), 2001, pp. 63-65

Lloyd Axworthy quoted in Douglas Roche, “Analysis of NATO action on nuclear weapons,” April 28, 1999. Notably, the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Trade which produced this report, *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-First Century* was chaired by Member of Parliament (M.P.) Bill Graham who was later appointed Minister of Foreign Affairs by Prime Minister Jean Chretien. Indications are that, after the Canadian election in April, Graham will continue to be Canada’s Foreign Minister under Paul Martin’s leadership (off-record interview with a senior foreign policy-maker in DFAIT, January 2004). But it is not evident whether Graham will tackle the issue of NATO reform (email correspondence with a senior DFAIT official, February 21, 2004).

Erika Simpson, *NATO and the Bomb*, ch. 1. Axworthy claimed at the time that he had the full support of Prime Minister Chretien and his Cabinet in this initiative.

Interview by the author with Canada’s Deputy Ambassador to NATO, Robert McCrae, February 2001 and off-record comments by senior members of the US Delegation to NATO, February 2001. Paragraph 32 in the 1999 Strategic Concept was the first time NATO had outlined a section on arms control and disarmament of both conventional and non-conventional weapons.

Interviews, NATO headquarters, January 2002


Douglas Roche and Ernie Regehr, “Canada, NATO, and Nuclear Weapons”.

For example, the *Globe and Mail*’s Washington correspondent Graham Fraser wrote a front-page news article on the costs for Canada of NATO expansion. It garnered the biggest headlines NATO had received for decades. Fraser expected a debate in Parliament, questions from the opposition parties, public furor, letters to the editor but there was no reaction. A few months later, he said I was the only person who phoned him to inquire.

Jack Beatty, “The Exorbitant Anachronism,” *The Atlantic*, June 1989 quoted in Jam M. Shafritz, ed., *Words on War*, New York: Prentice Hall, 1990. Beatty goes on to write that, “Perhaps in elite circles in Europe people pay attention to its workings; some few may even feel an improbable tingle of transnational patriotism over ‘the Alliance.’ But in the United States NATO is the exclusive property of academics who hold conferences at European resorts, or at the kind of American resort that should be in Europe, where they read turgid reports on why the United States must spend more tax dollars on an alliance to which not one American in ten has ever given a moment’s thought.”


For further analysis, see Pugwash Canada’s presentation to DFAIT, “The Only Absolute Guarantee”, April 2003, pp. 4-6. Based on recommendations made by the Middle Powers Initiative, this report builds on elements of existing Canadian policy, the recommendations of the New Agenda Coalition, and the
priorities outlined in the “13 practical steps” agreed in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference of the NPT.


31For more information, see The Sunflower, July 2003, No. 74; New York Times, 14 June 2003; Wall Street Journal, 13 June 2003

32The first round of NATO expansion took place in the spring of when the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland were invited into NATO. Notably, all the Russian parties and most Russians were opposed to NATO’s enlargement from 16 to 19 nations. The second round of expansion, agreed upon in 2002, also runs the risk of inciting old hatreds and new insecurities. The seven former Soviet bloc nations due to join the alliance by May 2004 are: Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia. At 26 members, will NATO have difficulty forging a consensus? The US has already expressed interest in working closely, if necessary, with a few close allies, not the entire unwieldy apparatus.


36Quoted by David Krieger, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation in a mass email on President’s Day Nuclear Perspectives, February 13, 2004 and taken from the Nuclear Posture Review, 2002, op. cit.

37Ibid. And Democratic front-runner John Edwards says, “Making nuclear weapons more 'usable' will not make Americans more secure. Reversing the ban on developing these weapons is both unnecessary and irresponsible. This would send exactly the wrong message to the rest of the world.”

38On the utility of threatening possible pre-emptive nuclear war to deter chemical or biological attack, see U.S. National Security Strategy: Prevent Our Enemies From Threatening Us, Our Allies, And Our Friends with Weapons of Mass Destruction, September, 2002, p. 1 available at www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/wh/15425.htm

39For excellent examples of works that tackle this precise question, see: John Baylis and Robert O’Neill, eds., Alternative Nuclear Futures, Oxford University Press, 1999; Stephen Cimbala, Military Persuasion—Deterrence and Provocation in Crisis and War, Pennsylvania University Press, 1994; Robert Jervis, Richard Ned Lebow, and Janice Gross Stein, eds. Psychology and Deterrence. Baltimore, Johns...


43 Among those who have contributed to our understanding in this respect are: Bruce G. Blair, *Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces*, Washington, D.C., The Brookings Institute, 1995; Harald von Riekhoff, *NATO:


