Building Bridges:

What Middle Power Countries Should Do To Strengthen the NPT

April 2004

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI), founded in 1998 as a coalition of eight international non-governmental organizations specializing in nuclear disarmament issues, is a highly effective global catalyst in promoting practical steps toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. MPI educates policy-makers around the world about the importance of nuclear disarmament by sending formal delegations to capitals, organizing strategy consultations for diplomats at the UN and in other fora, and disseminating briefing papers. Two of its founding members, the International Peace Bureau and International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, have been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. MPI operates as a program of the Global Security Institute (http://www.gsinstitute.org) and works closely with parliamentarians and NGOs in key middle power countries. MPI's website is http://www.middlepowers.org.

MPI wishes to thank Bill Robinson, principal author of the original Policy Paper for the Canadian Government, and Dr. Urs Cipolat, who authored this Policy Brief.
“...[W]e must abandon the traditional approach of defining security in terms of boundaries — city walls, border patrols, racial and religious groupings. The global community has become irreversibly interdependent, with the constant movement of people, ideas, goods and resources. In such a world, we must combat terrorism with an infectious security culture that crosses borders — an inclusive approach to security based on solidarity and the value of human life. In such a world, weapons of mass destruction have no place.”

Executive Summary

Continuing failures to effectively implement the NPT’s disarmament and non-proliferation obligations have thrown the Treaty, and with it the entire arms control regime, into a profound crisis. Middle power countries urgently need to develop effective policy responses to this crisis.

The disarmament policy of several key middle power countries is hindered by their membership in NATO, a military alliance that asserts the need to retain nuclear weapons for the “foreseeable future.” However, their membership in NATO also represents an opportunity, to the extent that these middle power countries can help build a bridge between the nuclear-weapon States and other non-nuclear-weapon States, thus working to preserve and strengthen the NPT at the forthcoming 2005 NPT Review Conference and to achieve progress toward a nuclear-weapon-free world through the reinforcement of the commitments made at the 1995 and 2000 NPT Review Conferences, in particular the 13 Practical Steps.

In support of these objectives, the Middle Powers Initiative recommends that middle power governments, in particular those that are members of NATO, take a leading role to energize the global dialogue on nuclear weapons, work to build bridges in the nuclear arms debate, and minimize the negative consequences of missile defense deployment.

Among other initiatives, middle power countries should:

• Insist that the 13 Practical Steps be fully implemented;

• Support the call for an international conference at the Heads of State and Government level to identify ways to eliminate nuclear threats;

• Encourage NATO to reform alliance nuclear policies, adopt a no-first-use policy, eliminate nuclear-sharing arrangements and withdraw nuclear weapons to national territory, and work toward the reduction and early elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons;

• Help organize regular meetings between NATO States, New Agenda Coalition States, and other key non-nuclear-weapon States in an effort to build political bridges and develop common positions conducive to moving forward the nuclear disarmament agenda;

• Decide against participation in the U.S. missile defense system because it is not configured in a manner consistent with overall disarmament and non-proliferation interests and the prevention of weaponization of space; and

• Pursue an accidental nuclear war prevention initiative, including a No-Launch-on-Warning agreement or pledges, physical de-alerting/accidental launch prevention measures, and global missile launch warning/false alarm prevention measures.
A. Introduction

1. The future of nuclear weapons is intimately tied to the future of security policy. Will states continue to treat security primarily as a zero-sum game, governed by unilateral, national interests and selfish, short-term calculations? Or will security increasingly be seen as a global, co-operative endeavor, to be pursued within the framework of international law, universal rights, and global responsibilities? The first approach views nuclear weapons as the “supreme guarantee” of security – at least for those states that possess them. The second approach, which is based on a model of security generally advocated by middle power countries, considers nuclear weapons to be the antithesis of security, standing in fundamental contradiction to international and humanitarian law and threatening the indiscriminate destruction of human life and the natural environment.

2. The most promising instrument for ridding the world of nuclear weapons is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which in Article VI commits its parties to “pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament.”

3. The continuing failure of states to act on this commitment has created a global nuclear crisis that threatens to undermine and ultimately sweep away the NPT and the broader arms control regime. Middle power countries urgently need to develop a policy response to this crisis, in order both to preserve and strengthen the NPT and to secure progress toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

4. This paper identifies a number of policy responses conducive to such goals. As a core recommendation, it advocates building a bridge between the member states of NATO and those of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC) to strengthen the center in the nuclear weapons debate. A strengthened center would allow for the building of a bridge between the nuclear-weapon states and the non-nuclear-weapon states, which in turn would open the road to substantive disarmament and non-proliferation progress at the 2005 NPT Review Conference and beyond. There can be little doubt that humankind is in urgent need of a bridge leading toward a nuclear-weapon-free future – a bridge, in other words, that enables all of humanity to cross the abyss of nuclear holocaust. Middle power countries can and should play a central role as builders of such a bridge.

B. The Global Nuclear Crisis

5. The central challenges facing the NPT include:

   a) Non-compliance by the Nuclear-weapon States (NWS): The five NPT-bound NWS have taken no direct steps toward fulfillment of their primary obligation as stated in Article VI, the negotiation of effective measures related to the elimination of their nuclear arsenals. Worse, three of them have indicated that such negotiations will not be pursued “for the foreseeable future.” Important elements of the 1995 bargain for the permanent extension of the NPT and of the
commitments made in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference remain unfulfilled and have in some cases been repudiated by some of the NWS. The START II Treaty is dead, the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty has been scrapped, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty is not yet in force (and one NWS, although a signatory, has stated that it “will not become a party” to the treaty), and no progress has been made on new measures such as a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty. Though both the U.S. and Russia are committed to reducing their nuclear arsenals under the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty of 2002, the planned reductions will occur in a non-transparent, reversible, and non-verifiable fashion. Even if the reductions are fully implemented, thousands of weapons will remain in the U.S. and Russian arsenals, including hundreds deployed on high alert. At least three of the NWS also continue to engage in forms of vertical proliferation, including the deployment of new or modernized nuclear weapons, development of new nuclear weapon technologies (e.g., “mini-nukes” and “bunker busters”), and/or modification of nuclear doctrines to expand the role of nuclear weapons. Finally, the proposed deployment of missile defenses/space weapons threatens to halt further reductions and even spur increases in the nuclear arsenals of the NWS.

b) **Non-compliance by Non-nuclear-weapon States (NNWS):** In recent years, a small number of NNWS parties to the NPT have violated the Treaty by pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapons. These States include Iraq (which had its secret nuclear program dismantled after the first U.S.-led Gulf War), Libya (which recently agreed to disclose and dismantle its clandestine program), and North Korea (which is thought to already possess nuclear weapons, and which recently withdrew from the NPT). Serious concerns also have been raised about a possible secret nuclear weapons program in Iran.

c) **Contradictory Policies:** Despite being signatories of the NPT, the 23 NNWS members of NATO implicitly rely on nuclear weapons in their defense policy and formally support the retention of nuclear weapons “for the foreseeable future.” Six of these States participate in nuclear-sharing arrangements, under which they host U.S. nuclear weapons during peacetime and are prepared to use them in accordance with NATO policy. Forty-four parties to the NPT have thus far failed to conclude safeguards agreements with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and only 39 have brought into force additional protocols on the basis of the IAEA’s Model Protocol Additional to Safeguards Agreements. Many nuclear supplier States have failed to implement effective national export controls and/or physical security over nuclear-related technology and materials. Supplier States continue to reject the establishment of a legally binding, universal export control regime. The IAEA is insufficiently funded, and its role in monitoring and verifying compliance with NPT-related obligations is being undermined by some States. Meanwhile, unilateralist efforts to use coercive and even pre-emptive measures such as the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) to enforce the compliance of some States but not others threaten to undermine the institutional and normative framework necessary for long-term success of the NPT.

d) **Non-membership:** Three States – Israel, India, and Pakistan – remain outside the NPT, having never undertaken any nuclear disarmament treaty obligation. All three possess nuclear weapons. In 2003, North Korea, which is also suspected
of having a nuclear weapons capability, announced its withdrawal from the
Treaty.

e) Institutional Weaknesses: The NPT lacks a permanent secretariat, and the
documentary record of its review proceedings is scattered and incomplete. The
Treaty’s accountability mechanisms are embryonic; review proceedings lack
interactivity; reporting of compliance-related activities by most States parties
remains inadequate; and implementation of the Treaty is undermined by
terminological imprecision and disagreement with respect to what constitutes
compliance and how compliance should be ensured. Opportunities for civil
society oversight and participation are inadequate. The NPT also suffers from
weaknesses of the broader arms control and disarmament regime.

f) Global and Regional Conflicts: Chronic global and regional conflicts have
created strong nuclear proliferation pressures in northeast Asia, South Asia, and
the Middle East. If left unresolved, these problems could lead to further horizontal
and vertical nuclear proliferation.

g) Technological Advances: Long-term advances in, and diffusion of,
technological capabilities may have the effect of progressively lowering the bar to
acquisition of nuclear or possible future nuclear-scale weapons of mass
destruction (WMD), thus threatening to further destabilize the nuclear non-
proliferation regime.

C. Recommendations

6. The global agenda for action on nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation is spelled
out in the decisions made at the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and in the
unanimous commitments made by all NPT States parties in the Final Document of the
2000 NPT Review Conference, most notably the 13 “Practical Steps” for systematic and
progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty.³

Insist on Full Implementation of the 13 Practical Steps

7. While full implementation of the 13 Practical Steps must remain the long-term goal of
international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation efforts, the Middle Powers
Initiative proposes the following specific priorities for action:

a) Strategic Arms Reductions: Middle power countries should insist that the 2002
U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) be implemented in
a transparent and verifiable manner, and that nuclear warheads and their
delivery systems be irreversibly dismantled. Further, middle power countries
should promote the immediate de-alerting of all remaining deployed U.S. and
Russian nuclear forces, in accordance with the 2000 NPT Review Conference
commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons
systems. Financial contributions to the Global Partnership Against the Spread of
Weapons and Materials of Mass Destruction (“10 plus 10 over 10”) should be
made contingent on de-alerting and transparent, verifiable and irreversible
dismantlement.
b) **Tactical Arms Reductions**: Middle power countries should call for the immediate removal of all U.S. nuclear weapons deployed under NATO auspices in European NNWS. In addition, they should help create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through reporting on the 1991 and 1992 Presidential Nuclear Initiatives. They should also ask that these initiatives be formalized and equipped with verification and transparency mechanisms. In accordance with NATO proposals, middle power countries should support the reciprocal exchange of information regarding readiness, safety, and number of sub-strategic forces. Finally, they should encourage the initiation of U.S.-Russian negotiations on the reduction and elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons.

c) **Non-use of Nuclear Weapons**: Middle power countries should call upon the NWS to reverse trends toward the expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review. To the extent that they are partners of the U.S. in multilateral or bilateral security alliances, they should refuse to participate in or support the first use of nuclear weapons or any preparations for such first use.

d) **Ban on Nuclear Testing**: Middle power countries should call upon the NWS to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing and help achieve the early entry into force of the CTBT. They should ask the NWS to renounce the development of new or modified nuclear weapons, as such developments are contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation to stop the nuclear arms race.

e) **Control of Missile Defenses and Non-proliferation of Missiles**: Middle power countries should work to prevent missile defense deployments that harbor the danger of triggering a new nuclear arms race or leading to the weaponization of space. They should help prevent missile proliferation through the establishment and effective enforcement of a universal, multilateral export control regime, which would replace the existing ineffective ad hoc arrangements. Middle power countries should also promote a universal missile flight test moratorium and the adoption of a comprehensive universal missile control treaty that would combine disarmament and non-proliferation objectives. In this context, middle power countries should organize preliminary discussions on the contents of a treaty on the prevention of an arms race in outer space. Although U.S. participation in such discussions can not be expected under the current administration, many States with space capabilities might participate. If discussions were organized to permit representation by non-governmental entities, including corporate space interests, U.S. corporations with an interest in non-weaponized space might also join. Such discussions could be used to prepare the groundwork for actual treaty negotiations at the CD or elsewhere. Finally, middle power countries should advocate the launch of an accidental war prevention initiative. Elements of such an initiative should include a No-Launch-on-Warning agreement or pledges; physical de-alerting/accidental launch prevention measures; and global missile launch warning/false alarm prevention measures. Such an initiative could be seen as both a complement to the “protection” offered by missile defense systems and a means of reducing the “need” for such systems. It would also be an extremely important safety measure in its own right.
f) **Control of Fissile Materials**: Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, middle power countries should help create a process of global accounting for and control of fissile material holdings, in accordance with principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification. This process should culminate with the establishment of a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons. Further, middle power countries should promote negotiations on a fissile materials production ban. Finally, they should set an example by increasing funding for the IAEA eight-point plan to improve the protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.

g) **Strengthening of IAEA**: Effective nuclear non-proliferation cannot be accomplished without a strengthened International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). With an inspection budget of roughly $100 million per year – less than the amount the U.S. spends each day to maintain its nuclear arsenal –, the IAEA is badly underfunded. Middle power countries have a vital interest to contribute to the strengthening of the IAEA.

8. Achieving full implementation of the 13 Practical Steps, including the priorities for action listed above, is a long-term endeavor. In addition to working toward these long-term goals, the Middle Powers Initiative encourages middle power countries to support the following short-term actions that promise to prepare the ground for progress in the months preceding and immediately following the 2005 NPT Review Conference:

**Stimulate the Global Dialogue on Nuclear Weapons**

9. It is essential that governments and individuals assign a much higher priority to addressing the nuclear threat, that Heads of State and Government personally engage on the issue, and that the global community as a whole acts to stigmatize and devalue the possession of nuclear weapons by all States. With respect to stimulating the global dialogue on nuclear weapons, middle power countries should take the following steps:

a) **International Conference on Elimination of Nuclear Threats**: Middle power countries should work to build support for an international conference, preferably at the Heads of State and Government level, to identify ways to eliminate nuclear threats, as proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report for the U.N. Millennium Summit. This could be done by co-sponsoring a resolution at the U.N. or offering to host the conference.

b) **Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission**: Middle power countries should support the work of the independent Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission, set up by Sweden in December 2003. The Commission’s Final Report is expected by the end of 2005.

c) **Culture of Accountability**: Middle power countries should support efforts to firmly institutionalize a “culture of accountability” within the NPT framework. This entails, *inter alia*, ensuring that the Final Document of the 2005 NPT Review Conference will i) include a clearer definition of the reporting requirement under the NPT; ii) grant NGOs greater access to NPT related debates; and iii) define procedures that allow for greater interactivity during the NPT review process.
d) **Permanent NPT Secretariat:** Middle power countries should support the call for the creation of a permanent NPT Secretariat to improve operation of the review process and ensure timely availability of review documentation. Until such a Secretariat is put in place, middle power countries should lend their support to the establishment of an unofficial NPT Documentation Center to fulfill some of the duties that the Secretariat would eventually undertake, notably to collect and make available the reports submitted by States parties, other Review Conference and Preparatory Committee documents and papers, and collateral information and analysis. Such a center (and its website) might also be used to advance work on other areas related to the elimination of nuclear weapons, such as verification techniques, and to address areas outside the scope of the NPT review process, such as the programs of non-NPT States.⁴

e) **Forum for Compliance Concerns:** Middle power countries should open a dialogue with other States and the public on how to address NPT compliance concerns – both horizontal and vertical – using mechanisms that reinforce multilateral institutions for peaceful conflict resolution and the international rule of law, rather than undermine them.⁵ Discussion topics should include improved safeguards, transparency measures, inspection procedures and other verification techniques, and the creation of appropriate fora for raising and resolving compliance concerns (including concerns about activities of non-parties).

f) **Disarmament and Non-proliferation Education:** Middle power countries should provide support for public education about nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, in line with the recommendations of the *U.N. Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (2002)*⁶, in order to raise the level of public engagement and awareness on these issues.

g) **Alternative Disarmament Negotiation Fora:** In light of the fact that the principal disarmament negotiation forum, the Conference on Disarmament (CD) in Geneva, has been stalled for nearly a decade, middle power countries should seek to address some of the pressing nuclear disarmament issues, notably the negotiation of a Fissile Materials Cutoff Treaty, the prevention of an arms race in outer space, and security assurances, in *ad hoc* parallel fora. The U.N. Disarmament Commission represents a possible alternative to the CD. Middle power countries should initiate a series of meetings among States (e.g., like-minded NATO NNWS, NAC members, and other interested States) and elements of civil society (e.g., NGOs, universities, corporations) interested in advancing the disarmament agenda, with the goal of enabling preliminary discussions of topics currently blocked at the CD.

**Bring NATO Policy in Compliance with the NPT and Build Bridges**

10. A major impediment to progress is the polarization of the nuclear debate between the nuclear-weapon States, which tend to focus on non-proliferation at the expense of disarmament, and the non-nuclear-weapon States, many of which tend to focus on disarmament at the expense of non-proliferation. As a result of this polarization, there is at present a near-total absence of effective global discussion of the future of nuclear weapons.
11. Between these poles, however, sit groups of States – notably several of the NNWS members of NATO, which support their NWS allies but also bring strong support for disarmament to the table, and the members of the New Agenda Coalition (NAC), which include strong support for non-proliferation efforts within their disarmament advocacy. These States, which occupy positions more toward the center of the nuclear debate, may hold the key to bridging the gap between the NWS and the NNWS, thus unlocking the door to long-term disarmament and non-proliferation progress.

12. However, while a number of NATO NNWS are supportive of centrist positions in the nuclear debate, the security policy of NATO remains strongly opposed to nuclear disarmament and thus incompatible with the obligations of NATO member States under the NPT. This inherent contradiction prevents the middle power countries members of NATO from playing a more effective role in strengthening the center of the nuclear weapons debate. Regardless of the individual intents of these States, current NATO security policy sends the wrong message to militaries, governments, and publics around the world, namely that the possession of nuclear weapons is legitimate, necessary for true security, and the defining characteristic of powerful states; that the members of NATO will continue to arm themselves with these weapons regardless of the nuclear abstinence of other states and regardless of their NPT obligations; and that the opposition expressed by NATO States to the possession of nuclear weapons by other States is hypocritical and self-serving.

13. In order to permit themselves to play a more effective role in bridging the currently polarized, stagnant nuclear debate, middle power countries members of NATO should work toward a fundamental NATO nuclear policy reform. Such a reform should entail the following steps:

   a) **Comprehensive NATO Nuclear Policy Reform**: Middle power countries members of NATO should seek agreement within NATO to reform alliance nuclear policy, and publicly advocate adoption of a no-first-use policy by NATO and all NWS, elimination of NATO nuclear-sharing arrangements, withdrawal of nuclear weapons to NWS territory, and pursuit of arms control and disarmament measures leading to the reduction and early elimination of non-strategic nuclear weapons, all in the explicit context of working to fulfill the legal obligation under the NPT to proceed toward the total elimination of all nuclear weapons.⁷

   b) **Moratorium on Expansion of Role of Nuclear Weapons**: Middle power countries inside and outside of NATO should call upon the Alliance to refrain from expanding the role of nuclear weapons (including stationing such weapons on the territory of its new member States), restarting nuclear testing, or supporting the concept of pre-emptive nuclear war.

   c) **Bridge Building**: Middle power countries inside and outside of NATO should help organize regular meetings between NATO States, NAC States, and other key NNWS to build bridges, strengthen the center of the nuclear weapons debate, develop common positions and advocate them vis-à-vis the NWS. Security assurances are one possible area for common efforts.⁸
Endnotes

1 Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

2 The NAC includes the following middle power countries: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden.

3 The full text of the 13 Practical Steps is reproduced as the end of this paper. For further discussion, see Middle Powers Initiative, “Advancing the NPT 13 Practical Steps,” MPI Briefing Paper, April 2003 (http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/pubs/13steps_0403.pdf).

4 A possible model for such a centre is the unofficial Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC) website developed by the Government of Canada and administered by the Department of Peace Studies of the University of Bradford. This website (http://www.opbw.org) functions as an information clearinghouse for work related to the BTWC, and serves as a placeholder for the Organization for the Prohibition of Biological Weapons that may one day exist, paralleling the existing Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (http://www.opcw.org). The web address www.opnw.org is available for use for a virtual Organization for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons; Physicians for Global Survival (Canada) registered the address in 2003 for this purpose.


8 In a recent Aide-Memoire, the Middle Powers Initiative recommended that NATO Member States support the NAC resolutions at the U.N. and engage with NAC countries and the NWS to develop a security assurances protocol. See Middle Powers Initiative, “Aide-Memoire: Making the NPT Work in 2005,” October 2003 (http://www.middlepowers.org/mpi/archives/000215.shtml#000215).
Other Policy Briefs published by the **Middle Powers Initiative** (MPI) include:


MPI’s website is [http://www.middlepowers.org](http://www.middlepowers.org).

Policy Briefs published by the **Bipartisan Security Group** (BSG), MPI’s sister program, include:


BSG’s website is [http://www.gsinsitute.org/bsg/index.html](http://www.gsinsitute.org/bsg/index.html).
13 PRACTICAL STEPS
EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament":

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
   * Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
   * Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
   * The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
   * Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
   * A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
   * The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Senator Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador. www.middlepowers.org