Final Document of the Review Conference of States Parties to the 2010 NPT Review Conference

New York 3-28 May 2010

Key Points in Comparison to Recommendations of the Middle Powers Initiative
**Recommendaions of the Middle Powers Initiative to the 2010 NPT Review Conference Released April 2010**


**Disarmament:**
Reaffirm the unequivocal undertaking to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear arsenals. Encourage states parties, especially the nuclear weapon states, to initiate comprehensive national research and development programs to support continued progress toward a world free of nuclear weapons, including expanded work on verification technologies. Agree to begin collective preparatory work for negotiations on a convention or framework of instruments for the sustainable, verifiable and enforceable global elimination of nuclear weapons.

**I.A.ii (Pg.19)** The Conference reaffirms the unequivocal undertaking of the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament, to which all States are committed under Article VI.

**I.B.i (Pg.20)** The Conference reaffirms the urgent need for the nuclear-weapon States to implement the steps leading to nuclear disarmament agreed to in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and security, and based on the principle of undiminished and increased security for all.

**Action 3 (Pg.20)** In implementing the unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals, the nuclear-weapons States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons, deployed and non-deployed, including through unilateral, bilateral, regional, and multilateral measures.

**95. (Pg.14)** The Conference welcomes efforts towards the development of nuclear disarmament verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world. The Conference notes the cooperation between Norway and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland in establishing a system for nuclear warhead dismantlement verification.

**I.B.iii (Pg.20)** The Conference calls on all nuclear-weapon States to undertake concrete disarmament efforts and affirms that all States need to make special efforts to establish the necessary framework to achieve and maintain a world without nuclear weapons. The Conference notes the five-point proposal for nuclear disarmament of the Secretary-General of the United Nations, which proposes, *inter alia*, consideration of negotiations on a nuclear weapons
convention or agreement on a framework of separate mutually reinforcing instruments, backed by a strong system of verification.

82. (Pg.13) The Conference affirms that the final phase of the nuclear disarmament process and other related measures should be pursued within an agreed legal framework, which a majority of States parties believe should include specific timelines.

Action 6 (Pg.21) All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should immediately establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work.

**Transparency:**
Support establishment of a UN-based, comprehensive accounting system covering size of nuclear arsenals, delivery systems, fissile materials, and spending on nuclear forces.

Action 19 (Pg.24) All States agree on the importance of supporting cooperation among Governments, the United Nations, other international and regional organizations and civil society aimed at increasing confidence, improving transparency and developing efficient verification capabilities related to nuclear disarmament.

Action 21 (Pg.24) As a confidence-building measure, all the nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to agree as soon as possible on a standard reporting form and to determine appropriate reporting intervals for the purpose of voluntarily providing standard information without prejudice to national security. The Secretary-General of the United Nations is invited to establish a publicly accessible repository, which shall include the information provided by the nuclear-weapon States.

94. (Pg.14) The Conference notes the increased transparency of some nuclear-weapon States with respect to the number of nuclear weapons in their national inventories and encourages all nuclear-weapon States to provide additional transparency in this regard.

**CTBT:**
Support early entry into force of the CTBT. Oppose conditioning approval of the CTBT on programs inconsistent with the CTBT’s role, stated in the treaty’s

I.D.i (Pg.22) The Conference recognizes that the cessation of all nuclear test explosions and all other nuclear explosions, by constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons, constitutes an effective measure of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in all its aspects.
preamble, as an “effective measure” in “constraining the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.”

I.D.ii (Pg.22) The Conference reaffirms the vital importance of the entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as a core element of the international nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation regime, as well as the determination of the nuclear-weapon States to abide by their respective moratoriums on nuclear test explosions pending the entry into force of the [CTBT].

Action 10 (Pg.22) All nuclear-weapon States undertake to ratify the [CTBT] with all expediency, noting that positive decisions by nuclear-weapon States would have the beneficial impact towards the ratification of that Treaty, and that nuclear-weapon States have the special responsibility to encourage Annex 2 countries, in particular those which have not acceded to the NPT and continue to operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities, to sign and ratify.

Action 11 (Pg.23) Pending the entry into force of the [CTBT], all States commit to refrain from nuclear-weapon test explosions or any other nuclear explosions, the use of new nuclear weapons technologies and from any action that would defeat the object and purpose of that Treaty, and all existing moratoriums on nuclear-weapon test explosions should be maintained.

FMCT:
Support negotiations for a fissile materials treaty that comprehensively prevents the use of existing materials outside military programs for weapons acquisition and that fosters disarmament.

I.E.i. (Pg.23) The Conference reaffirms the urgent necessity of negotiating and bringing to a conclusion a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

Action 15 (Pg.23) All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced Programme of Work, immediately begin negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the Report of the Special coordinator of 1995 (CD/1299) and the mandate contained therein. Also in this respect, the Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

Action 16 (Pg.23) The nuclear-weapon States are encouraged to commit to declare, as appropriate, to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) all fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes and to place such material as soon as practicable.
under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside military programmes.

**Action 17 (Pg.24)** In the context of Action 16, all States are encouraged to support the development of appropriate legally binding verification arrangements, within the context of the IAEA, to ensure the irreversible removal of fissile material designated by each nuclear-weapon State as no longer required for military purposes.

**Action 18 (Pg.24)** All States that have not yet done so are encouraged to initiate a process towards the dismantling or conversion for peaceful uses of facilities for the production of fissile material for use in nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.

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<td>Reaffirm the commitment to a “diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.” Affirm that the record of non-use of nuclear weapons since World War II should be extended forever. Agree that nuclear weapon states will make legally-binding assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT that are in compliance with the obligation of non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. Encourage all states now part of nuclear alliances to take steps to reduce and phase out the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines.</td>
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<td>[The nuclear weapon states are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia] (c) To further diminish the role and significance of nuclear weapons in all military and security concepts, doctrines and policies; (d) Discuss policies that could prevent the use of nuclear weapons and eventually lead to their elimination, lessen the danger of nuclear war and contribute to the non-proliferation and disarmament of nuclear weapons; ...</td>
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89. (Pg.14) ... The Conference also welcomes the reductions announced by some nuclear-weapon States in the role of nuclear weapons in their security doctrines, as well as statements by some nuclear-weapon States regarding measures related to strengthening negative security assurances, and notes that China maintains a declaratory policy based on no first use of nuclear weapons.

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<td>The Conference reaffirms and recognizes that the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons and the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in receiving unequivocal and legally binding security assurances from nuclear-weapon States which could strengthen the nuclear non-proliferation regime.</td>
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<td>All States agree that the Conference on Disarmament should, within the context of an agreed, comprehensive and balanced programme of work, immediately begin discussion of effective international arrangements to assure non-nuclear-weapon States against ...</td>
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the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons, to discuss substantively, without limitation, with a view to elaborating recommendations dealing with all aspects of this issue, not excluding an internationally legally binding instrument. The Review Conference invites the Secretary-General of the United Nations to convene a high-level meeting in September 2010 in support of the work of the Conference on Disarmament.

**Action 8 (Pg.22)** All nuclear-weapon States commit to fully respect their existing commitments with regard to security assurances. Those nuclear-weapon States that have not yet done so are encouraged to extend security assurances to non-nuclear weapon States parties to the Treaty.

**105. (Pg.16)** The Conference calls on the nuclear-weapon States to bring into effect the security assurances provided by nuclear-weapon-free-zone treaties and their protocols.

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**Nuclear Forces:**

Welcome the new agreement on strategic nuclear forces between the United States and Russian Federation. Agree to build on this progress through the following steps:

- Accomplish further reductions in the US and Russian nuclear arsenals in their entirety, deployed and non-deployed, strategic and non-strategic, in accordance with the principles of irreversibility and verification, including through verified dismantlement of warheads. Include other states with nuclear arsenals in the reduction process as soon as possible, to be carried out in coordination with preparations and negotiations for a convention or framework of instruments for the global elimination of nuclear weapons;

- All states with nuclear

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**89. (Pg.14)** The Conference welcomes the signing of the Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms as well as the unilateral reduction measures announced and implemented by other nuclear-weapon States, including the closing and dismantling of nuclear weapons-related facilities....

**I.B.ii (Pg.20)** The Conference affirms the need for the nuclear-weapon States to reduce and eliminate all types of their nuclear weapons and encourages, in particular, those States with the largest nuclear arsenals to lead efforts in this regard.

**Action 4 (Pg.20)** The Russian Federation and the United States of America commit to seek the early entry-into-force and early implementation of the Treaty on Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms and are encouraged to continue discussions of follow-on measures in order to achieve deeper reductions in their nuclear arsenals.

**Action 5 (Pg.21)** The nuclear-weapon States commit to accelerate concrete progress on the steps leading to nuclear disarmament, contained in the Final Document of the 2000 Review Conference, in a way that promotes international stability, peace and undiminished and increased security. To that end, they are called upon to promptly engage with a view to, inter alia: (a) Rapidly moving towards an overall reduction in the global stockpile of all types of nuclear
weapons declare the size of their stockpiles and commit not to increase them;

*Lower the operational status of nuclear forces and implement steps to reduce quick-launch capability;

*Remove all nuclear weapons deployed on the territories of non-possessor states;

*Refrain from activities inconsistent with moving toward a world free from nuclear weapons, including expanding capabilities to produce nuclear weapons, designing and manufacturing modified or new-design warheads, modernizing delivery systems, and retaining Cold War deployments based on long gone adversarial relationships.

weapons, as identified in action 3; (b) Address the question of all nuclear weapons regardless of their type or their location as an integral part of the general nuclear disarmament process; ... (e) Consider the legitimate interest of non-nuclear weapon States in further reducing the operational status of nuclear weapons systems in ways that promote international stability and security; (f) Reduce the risk of accidental use of nuclear weapons; ....

90. (Pg.14) The Conference recognizes that reduction in the operational status of nuclear weapons and announced measures relating to de-targeting contribute to the process of nuclear disarmament through the enhancement of confidence-building measures and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.

I.B.iv (Pg.20) The Conference recognizes the legitimate interests of non-nuclear-weapon States in the constraining by the nuclear-weapon States of the development and qualitative improvement of nuclear weapons and ending the development of advanced new types of nuclear weapons.

The Middle East Resolution:
Agree on methods to advance the commitments in the 1995 Middle East resolution, preferably a special representative empowered by the three NPT depository states or an international conference convened by the UN Secretary-General.

IV.7 (Pg.30) The Conference emphasizes the importance of a process leading to full implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East. To that end, the Conference endorses the following practical steps:

(a) The Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, will convene a conference in 2012, to be attended by all States of the Middle East, on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction, on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at by the States of the region, and with the full support and engagement of the nuclear-weapon States. The 2012 Conference shall take as its terms of reference the 1995 Resolution;

(b) Appointment by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a facilitator, with a mandate to support implementation of the 1995 Resolution by conducting consultations with the States of the
region in that regard and undertaking preparations for the convening of the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will also assist in implementation of follow-on steps agreed by the participating regional States at the 2012 Conference. The facilitator will report to the 2015 Review Conference and its Preparatory Committee meetings;

(c) Designation by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the co-sponsors of the 1995 Resolution, in consultation with the States of the region, of a host Government for the 2012 Conference;

(d) Additional steps aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including that IAEA, the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons and other relevant international organizations be requested to prepare background documentation for the 2012 Conference regarding modalities for a zone free of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, taking into account work previously undertaken and experience gained;

(e) Consideration of all offers aimed at supporting the implementation of the 1995 Resolution, including the offer of the European Union to host a follow-on seminar to that organized in June 2008.

IV.10 (Pg.31) The Conference further recognizes the important role played by civil society in contributing to the implementation of the 1995 Resolution and encourages all efforts in this regard.

Non-Proliferation and the Nuclear Fuel Cycle: Agree that the Additional Protocol is a standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations. Commit to the multilateral regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply, such as through the establishment of a low enriched uranium fuel bank to assure a guaranteed supply of nuclear reactor fuel. At the same time, encourage increased reliance on renewable sources of energy

18. (Pg.4) The Conference notes that many States recognize that comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols are among the integral elements of the IAEA safeguards system. The Conference notes that in the case of a State party with a comprehensive safeguards agreement concluded pursuant to article III, paragraph 1, of the Treaty and supplemented by an additional protocol in force, measures contained in both instruments represent the enhanced verification standard for that State. The Conference notes that the additional protocol represents a significant confidence-building measure. The Conference encourages all States parties that have not yet done so to conclude and bring into force an additional protocol.

Action 28 (Pg.25) The Conference encourages all States parties which have not yet done so to conclude and to bring
and joining and supporting the International Renewable Energy Agency.

into force additional protocols as soon as possible and to implement them provisionally pending their entry into force.

**Action 58 (Pg.28)** Continue to discuss further, in a non-discriminatory and transparent manner under the auspices of IAEA or regional forums, the development of multilateral approaches to the nuclear fuel cycle, including the possibilities of creating mechanisms for assurance of nuclear fuel supply, as well as possible schemes dealing with the back-end of the fuel cycle without affecting rights under the Treaty and without prejudice to national fuel cycle policies, while tackling the technical, legal and economic complexities surrounding these issues, including, in this regard, the requirement of IAEA full scope safeguards.

**NPT Governance:**
Agree to strengthen NPT governance by providing for meetings of states parties empowered to assess compliance with non-proliferation and disarmament requirements and to take decisions; establish a standing executive body; and establish a small secretariat.

110. (Pg.17) The Conference recognizes the importance of ensuring optimal coordination and continuity throughout the review cycle. In this context, the Conference encourages past and incumbent Presidents and Chairs to be available for consultations with the incoming President and Chair, if necessary, regarding practical matters relating to their responsibilities. Participation in these meetings will be voluntary and without affecting the costs assessed to States parties.

111. (Pg.17) The Conference recommends that a dedicated staff officer to support the Treaty’s review cycle should be added to the Office for Disarmament Affairs of the United Nations Secretariat. The dedicated officer will function in an independent manner and be responsible to the meetings of States parties to the Treaty. Pending a further decision by States parties, the costs associated with the staff officer will be funded from voluntary contributions from States parties in a position to do so. Such voluntary contributions will be provided without any conditions. The mandate and functions of this officer will be reviewed in the next review cycle.

112. (Pg.17) The Conference affirmed that improving the effectiveness of the strengthened review process is an ongoing responsibility of States parties and therefore, in this regard, deserves further consideration in the next review cycle.