Back from the Margins
The Centrality of Nuclear Disarmament

Briefing Paper for the Fifth Meeting of the Article VI Forum

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THE MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE

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Through the Middle Powers Initiative, seven international non-governmental organizations (Global Security Institute, International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Weapons, International Network of Engineers and Scientists, International Peace Bureau, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, Nuclear Age Peace Foundation, and the Women’s International League for Peace and Freedom) are able to work primarily through “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.

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Table of Contents

Summary 3

A. Verifiably Reducing US-Russian Nuclear Forces 4

B. Standing Down Nuclear Forces (De-alerting) 5

C. Missiles, Missile Defenses, and Space Security 6

D. Programs for the Abolition of Nuclear Weapons 10

E. Conclusion 14
SUMMARY

At the 1986 Reykjavik Summit, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev seriously considered proposals for elimination of nuclear weapons within 10 years. Now, more than two decades later, among elite analysts and top government officials there is renewed attention to achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world. This is indeed a welcome development. But caution must be exercised in assessing it. It is not sufficient to invoke the vision of abolishing nuclear weapons while focusing more on prevention of their spread and their acquisition by terrorists. There is still a failure really to come to grips with the unsustainability of a two-class world. The central task is accomplishing disarmament, thereby universalizing and entrenching the norm of non-possession.

The Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) believes that the vision of abolishing nuclear weapons needs to be reconnected with the necessary practical measures, to unlock the ability to implement those measures. The Article VI Forum aims to enfold the steps into what was formerly called the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals. To that end, this meeting of the Forum considers the Hoover Institution program for elimination of nuclear weapons and the revised Model Nuclear Weapons Convention as well as civil society and governmental proposals for generating the requisite political will.

MPI has itself examined and identified seven priority measures (see “Towards 2010: Priorities for NPT Consensus,” April 2007, online at www.middlepowers.org). They are:

• verified reduction of nuclear forces;
• standing down of nuclear forces (de-alerting);
• negotiation of a Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty;
• bringing the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty into force;
• strengthened negative security assurances;
• regulation of nuclear fuel production and supply;
• improved NPT governance.

This meeting further examines the first two measures, reductions and de-alerting. The meeting also considers the arena of missiles, missile defenses, and weaponization of space. Issues arising from that arena posed insurmountable obstacles at Reykjavik, and they have come to the fore again in controversies over European missile defense and satellite destruction. This Briefing Paper begins with these topics and then discusses programs for abolition.
A. VERIFIABLY REDUCING US-RUSSIAN NUCLEAR FORCES

1. Reducing US and Russian arsenals remains the indispensable step toward global elimination of nuclear forces. Between them, the United States and Russia have about 95% of the world’s 10,000-plus operational warheads and of the total world stockpile of over 25,000. The 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) commitment for each side to deploy no more than 2200 strategic warheads expires upon its coming into effect at the end of 2012, and SORT does not require verified dismantlement of delivery systems or withdrawn warheads. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START), which verifiably limits multiple-warhead missiles and provides some monitoring mechanisms for SORT reductions, expires at the end of 2009.

2. The United States and Russia have discussed the expiration of START. They explained their positions at the Conference on Disarmament in February 2008. Russian Minister of Foreign Affairs Sergei Lavrov stated: “Our goal is to preserve stability and predictability in strategic relations between Russia and the United States. Therefore, we suggest that all the best elements of [START] be borrowed and placed in the foundation of a new agreement. [It] could provide for new, lower ceilings subject to verification on both strategic delivery vehicles (intercontinental ballistic missiles, sea-launched ballistic missiles and heavy bombers), and their warheads. However, it has so far been impossible to arrive at acceptable solutions.” The reason for the stalemate is clear; the Bush administration is not interested in a new, legally binding agreement on verified reductions. Instead, as Thomas D’Agostino, Administrator of the US National Nuclear Security Administration, explained, the United States insists on a “post-START arrangement” with a “focus on transparency and confidence-building measures to enhance strategic security relationship.”

3. From MPI’s standpoint, it is essential to realize that US-Russian reductions – and how they are carried out – is not simply a matter of stability between the two powers. Rather, that the reductions are verified and irreversible, and that they are deep, are preconditions to progress towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Otherwise, other nuclear weapon states will not join in the process, nor will non-nuclear weapon states be assured that disarmament is on the horizon. Further, there should be international involvement in verification of US-Russian and subsequent reductions. The world must be assured of the trustworthiness of reductions if global elimination is to be accomplished. Key short-term steps are:

- negotiation of a new US-Russian strategic reduction treaty applying the principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility to both delivery systems and warheads that would include a requirement of dismantlement of warheads withdrawn under SORT;
- extension of START, unless superseded by a new treaty;
- US withdrawal of nuclear bombs based in NATO countries, and negotiation of reduction of US and Russian non-strategic nuclear weapons, either together with reduction of strategic nuclear weapons or separately.

From the Bush administration comes the objection that Cold War-style arms control is not necessary. The answer is simply, yes it is necessary: disarmament requires legally binding, verified, irreversible, and
transparent reductions. Perhaps the process need not be as cumbersome as has been true in the past. But whether or not a process is demanding is not the main consideration when it comes to controlling and eliminating nuclear weapons!

4. Departures in other ways from Cold War-style arms control are desirable. In a 1997 Wall Street Journal op-ed, former top US Defense Department officials Ashton Carter and John Deutch proposed a process they called CART, for Continuous Arms Reduction Talks. CART would address both strategic and non-strategic weapons, and unlike START, which addresses delivery systems, CART would require verified dismantlement of warheads as well. Other nuclear weapon states would also be involved in defining a second, multilateral phase of CART. In this vein, Russia and the United States have recently indicated some interest in engaging other states. It has been proposed by both countries with respect to elimination of intermediate and short-range missiles, and suggested by Russia with respect to missile defenses. As recommended by the International Panel on Fissile Materials, declarations of fissile materials contained in military stocks and warheads is a near-term and important way to involve all states possessing nuclear weapons.

5. Along with negotiations, Russia and the United States can and should implement their own reductions, so long as provision is made for verification and irreversibility. This is the thrust of the recent report, Toward True Security, from the Federation of American Scientists, Natural Resources Defense Council, and Union of Concerned Scientists. The report argues that regardless of what other states do, the United States should drastically reduce its arsenal, and make other changes as well, for example in policies on use and targeting, launch-on-warning, and warhead modernization. This approach is supported by the Practical Steps for disarmament adopted by the 2000 NPT Review Conference, which provide for “further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.” A little discussed, but important, area for reduction is the large infrastructures for maintaining, producing, and researching nuclear weapons. In the United States, spending on nuclear weapons research and maintenance, at more than $6 billion annually, exceeds Cold War levels.

B. STANDING DOWN NUCLEAR FORCES (DE-ALERTING)

6. Though a commitment was made in the Practical Steps to “concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems,” the basic relationship of a nuclear balance of terror between Russia and the United States with large numbers of warheads ready for immediate launch remains intact. According to a recent estimate by Bruce Blair of the World Security Institute, the two countries together have 2,654 warheads deployed in this posture. The imperative of changing this anachronistic relationship was addressed by a 2007 General Assembly resolution, “Decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems” (GA/62/36). Sponsored by Chile, New Zealand, Nigeria, Sweden and Switzerland, it was adopted by a vote of 139 to three, with 36 abstentions. It had substantial support from NATO non-nuclear weapon states.

7. The resolution observes that “the maintenance of nuclear weapons systems at a high level of readiness increases the risk of the use of such weapons, including the unintentional or accidental use.” It also recognizes that “reductions in deployments and the lowering of operational status contribute to the
maintenance of international peace and security, as well as to the process of nuclear disarmament, through the enhancement of confidence-building and transparency measures and a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies.” The resolution “calls for the taking of further practical steps to decrease the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems, with a view to ensuring that all nuclear weapons are removed from high alert status.”

8. In Wall Street Journal op-eds building on conferences held at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger and Sam Nunn have also highlighted de-alerting. Their January 2008 op-ed identified as a near-term measure: “Take steps to increase the warning and decision times for the launch of all nuclear-armed ballistic missiles, thereby reducing risks of accidental or unauthorized attacks.” They explained: “Reliance on launch procedures that deny command authorities sufficient time to make careful and prudent decisions is unnecessary and dangerous in today’s environment. Furthermore, developments in cyber-warfare pose new threats that could have disastrous consequences if the command-and-control systems of any nuclear-weapons state were compromised by mischievous or hostile hackers. Further steps could be implemented in time, as trust grows in the US-Russian relationship, by introducing mutually agreed and verified physical barriers in the command-and-control sequence.” In addition to the danger of computer hacking, Blair has emphasized another risk factor. At the same time as the Cooperative Threat Reduction program aims to secure warheads and fissile materials in Russia, high alert status requires many hundreds of weapons to be in transit or temporary storage at any given time, and therefore vulnerable to diversion to terrorists or other states.

9. In addition to elimination of the launch-on-warning option and changes in command-and-control, the US-Russian nuclear standoff can be defused through measures applied directly to delivery systems, lengthening the time required for a nuclear launch from hours to days to weeks to months. Warheads can be removed from missiles, strategic submarines kept in port, and nuclear bombs and air-launched cruise missiles stored separately from air fields. As the WMD Commission suggested, a US-Russian joint commission could facilitate implementation of such measures and the necessary monitoring. While most urgent with respect to Russia and the United States, it is also vital that other nuclear weapon states, which to various degrees already maintain their forces in a de facto de-alerted condition, adopt and affirm de-alerting as an entrenched, declared policy and practice.

C. MISSILES, MISSILE DEFENSES, AND SPACE SECURITY

10. When the DPRK conducted seven ballistic missile tests in July 2006, the Security Council condemned them, affirming “that such launches jeopardize peace, stability and security in the region and beyond, particularly in light of the DPRK’s claim that it has developed nuclear weapons” (SC/Res/1695). Little noticed was that the United States and India conducted tests around the same time, and a few months later France fired its new submarine-launched long-range missile over the Atlantic in its first experimental flight.

11. Indeed, ballistic missile tests provide a window into the ongoing world of missile maintenance and development. From June 2004 to September 2006, the United States conducted 11 tests of intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and one test of a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM).
During the same period, Russia conducted seven tests of ICBMs and 11 tests of SLBMs; China conducted three tests of ICBMs and two of SLBMs; India performed about a dozen tests of short (less than 1,000 kilometers) and medium (1,000 – 3,000 km) range missiles; Pakistan carried out nine tests of short- and medium-range missiles; and Iran performed several tests of a medium-range missile. Only the five NPT nuclear weapon states have ICBMs and SLBMs with a range of over 5,500 km. As of 2005, there were six additional countries with missiles over a range of 1,000 km: India, Iran, Israel, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia and the DPRK. It does not appear that there is a near-term trend toward more countries developing or acquiring such missiles. At least another 19 countries have short-range ballistic missiles. It is estimated that about 70 have cruise missiles, many for more easily accomplished anti-ship missions. Only three countries deploy nuclear cruise missiles, France, Russia, and the United States; China, Pakistan, and possibly Israel have them under development.

12. Efforts are made to restrict the spread of missile-related technology through export controls under the Missile Technology Control Regime, and to provide for confidence-building measures, such as pre-launch notification, under the Hague Code of Conduct. However, aside from US-Russian agreements and the NPT disarmament obligation applying, per the preamble, to “nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery,” there are no treaty constraints on the acquisition, development and deployment of missiles. At the Reykjavik summit, Presidents Reagan and Gorbachev considered proposals for global elimination of ballistic missiles. The proposals were revisited after the end of the Cold War, for instance in the Zero Ballistic Missiles concept put forward in 1993 by the Federation of American Scientists and supported by Paul Nitze and others. In 1996, the Canberra Commission forcefully took up this topic, calling for a "global treaty controlling longer range ballistic missiles" and, as an interim step, exploration of a missile flight test ban. The Commission explained that such a treaty would “increase the confidence of nuclear weapon states that nuclear disarmament will not damage their security” and “avoid the potential destabilizing effect of ballistic missile defense systems.” But these and similar proposals have gone nowhere.

13. In this context, the United States in particular has relied on two interrelated military strategies: first, the development and deployment of advanced delivery systems capable of preemptively taking out, among other things, an enemy’s missiles; and second, development and deployment of missile defenses, against both short-range and longer-range ballistic missiles, that can work in tandem with preemptive strikes. Missile defense has benefited from its intuitive appeal (there must be some way within national control to end vulnerability to devastation!), and also from the constant drumbeat about “rogue states” – despite the fact that there are only a handful of states, aside from the nuclear weapon states, that possess or seek to acquire longer-range missiles.

14. Generally there is an intensified drive to develop and deploy missile defense systems, in Europe and elsewhere. The Declaration of the November 2006 NATO Riga Summit notes “the signature of the first major contract for a NATO Active Layered Theatre Ballistic Missile Defense system which is a major step towards improving the protection of deployed NATO forces.” It also welcomes the completion of a “Missile Defense Feasibility Study” and “tasked continued work on the political and military implications of missile defense for the Alliance.” Several NATO member states, and European companies, are developing missile defense systems in cooperation with the United States, as are non-NATO states including the Republic of Korea, Japan, Australia and Israel. India recently tested a system designed to
intercept short and medium-range missiles. All of this activity is underway despite the fact that missile defense still is not a proven technology. Thus the US ground-based missile defense system deployed in Alaska and California has yet to be tested in operationally realistic conditions.

15. This is a trend that deserves the closest attention because of its potentially negative impacts on reduction and elimination of nuclear forces. That potential has been dramatically illustrated by the controversy over the US plan to deploy a missile defense system, ostensibly to counter an emerging Iranian capability, in Poland (interceptors) and the Czech Republic (radar installation). Negotiations are underway between the Bush administration and the Polish and Czech governments. To build public support, the two European governments reportedly would like NATO backing for the plan. The US Congress has required that the interceptors be demonstrated by realistic tests and declined to fund construction in the two countries in 2008, but continued to fund the project otherwise. The United States reportedly also will seek to place a radar station in southeastern Europe.

16. Russia has objected strenuously to the plan. It contends that the system could be used against its ICBMs and thus would undermine strategic stability. The concern is that, if expanded beyond the 10 interceptors now planned, the system could make a preemptive strike theoretically more possible because it would be backed by missile defenses. The United States denies the Russian contention, but some non-governmental analysts have supported the Russian view. The controversy contributed to Russia’s decision to “suspend” implementation of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, and has prompted belligerent statements by Russian officials, e.g. that Russia would target the missile defense sites.

17. The Practical Steps adopted in 2000 provide for the preservation and strengthening of the Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. Nonetheless, the United States subsequently withdrew from the treaty. The negative consequences of that step are now beginning to be felt. It is crucial that renewed attention be devoted to the question of missiles and missile defenses. As an immediate matter, at a minimum a way can and must be found to meet Russian concerns about the plan for a US missile defense system based in Europe; optimally, the plan would be cancelled. More broadly, the basic premise of the ABM Treaty remains valid. Given ongoing reliance on nuclear forces, missile defenses can undermine stability and prevent reduction and elimination of the forces. Accordingly, limits on missile defenses need to be reinstated. The real defense against nuclear-armed missiles is agreements to eliminate them where they exist and to prevent their installation in additional countries. Thus the control of missiles as well as missile defenses, in US-Russian, regional, and global settings, needs to be put back on the international agenda.

18. Missile control is feasible, as explained, for example, by Beyond Missile Defense, a 2002 briefing paper of the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation. It could begin with a ban on testing of missiles and anti-missile missiles whose verification would be relatively straightforward. As for reduction and elimination of existing missiles, the US-Soviet/Russian arms control experience shows that the deployment and storage of missiles can be monitored by satellite, and their destruction per agreement can be verified by on-site inspection. Development of missiles would be severely hampered or prevented by the flight test ban. Also, much of infrastructure for missile development — e.g., production facilities, test ranges, missile containers — is susceptible to monitoring. While challenging, on-site monitoring of space rocket programs can minimize the risk that they will contribute to ballistic missile development.
19. Recently there has been resumed discussion of a proposal dating back to 1991, globalization of the US-Russian Intermediate Nuclear Forces Treaty. In October 2007, Russia and the United States jointly called “on all interested countries to discuss the possibility of imparting a global character to this important regime through the renunciation of ground-launched ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 500 and 5,500 kilometers, leading to the destruction of any such missiles, and the cessation of associated programs.” In February 2008, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov said that some states were not prepared to support the initiative, but that Russia would like to continue searching for solutions.

20. Control of missiles and missile defenses implicates to some degree proposals to prevent the use of space as a platform for anti-satellite, anti-missile, and air- and ground-strike systems. Most directly, this is because space-based anti-missile systems could be one part of an architecture of missile defense also composed of air-, ground- and sea-based systems, as US proponents of missile defense have long argued going back to Edward Teller’s 1980s vision/nightmare of a space-based “nuclear-pumped X-ray laser.” However, placing weapons-related systems in space for any purpose is extremely expensive, and making the systems both effective and defensible is very technically challenging. Also, for many purposes, ground- or air-based systems are more effective and certainly cheaper. Notably, destruction of satellites using ground or sea-based missiles or anti-missiles has been demonstrated by the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1980s, and more recently by China and again the United States.

21. The United States vigorously resists pressure to expand limitations on the placement of weapons-related systems in space, most recently firmly rejecting a “draft treaty” introduced by Russia and China in February 2008 with some fanfare at the Conference on Disarmament. However, it appears that what might be feasible in the next 10-15 years is deployment of space-based anti-satellite systems, along with systems for protecting satellites (e.g., enhancing maneuverability, disabling approaching objects). Whether the United States or other countries would actually choose this course of action is another matter; it could and should be viewed as making more vulnerable highly prized assets, satellites that serve a wide array of crucial functions, commercial, public, and military. Deployment of space-based anti-missile systems does not seem to be on the near-term horizon.

22. Nonetheless, whatever the likelihood or timeframe or nature of “weaponization” of space, negotiating a space security instrument that would prevent that outcome is extremely desirable. In addition to its own general peace-enhancing, resource-saving effects, it would contribute to making limits on ground-, sea-, and air-based missile defenses more acceptable. Space would be ruled out as a platform for missile defenses, and a ban on striking space objects from the ground and air would reinforce limitations on missile defenses and missiles or provide an incentive for their adoption. A space security instrument would also create an environment more conducive to the reduction and elimination of nuclear weapons and their associated delivery systems, especially missiles. States may be reluctant to give up their nuclear weapons if they view them as an equalizer against a United States that has amplified its superiority in non-nuclear armaments with space-based strike capabilities, or may one day do so.
D. PROGRAMS FOR THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

23. In October 2006, a conference was held at the Hoover Institution on the occasion of the 20th anniversary of the Reykjavik Summit. The conference generated an initiative by former top US officials to operationalize in today’s world the vision of Reagan and Gorbachev, and the promise of the NPT, of a nuclear weapons-free world. In an op-ed published in the Wall Street Journal in January 2007, Shultz, Perry, Kissinger, and Nunn wrote that “first and foremost is intensive work with leaders of the countries in possession of nuclear weapons to turn the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise.” In that op-ed and a second one a year later, they identified a number of steps for leaders to agree upon, generally mapping those supported in UN and NPT contexts by non-nuclear weapon states and by NGOs including MPI. A second conference was held at the Hoover Institution in October 2007, and a third was organized by the Norwegian government, the Nuclear Threat Initiative, and the Hoover Institution in Oslo in February 2008.

24. What is most distinctive about the Hoover program is the framing of well-known steps within the goal of abolition of nuclear weapons. Given its proponents, the initiative forever puts to rest the assertion that being for the abolition of nuclear weapons is unrealistic. In the United States, it has freed think tanks and NGOs devoted to influencing policy in Washington to speak more forcefully. It has been approvingly cited by governments, most recently in February 2008 by German Minister of Foreign Affairs Frank-Walter Steinmeier in an important speech at the Munich Security Conference and by Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov in his statement to the Conference on Disarmament. It has had a stimulating effect on UK policy, not immediately affecting, however, its program to replace the Trident nuclear weapons system.

25. In June 2007, UK Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Margaret Beckett endorsed the first Wall Street Journal op-ed. In January 2008, Prime Minister Gordon Brown, in a speech in Delhi, pledged “that in the run-up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conference in 2010 we will be at the forefront of the international campaign to accelerate disarmament amongst possessor states, to prevent proliferation to new states, and to ultimately achieve a world that is free from nuclear weapons.” In February 2008 at the Conference on Disarmament, UK Secretary of State for Defense Des Browne stated that the United Kingdom “is willing to host a technical conference of P5 nuclear laboratories on the verification of nuclear disarmament before the next NPT Review Conference in 2010.” The United Kingdom also continues longstanding research into verification of warhead dismantlement and related matters and to that end is engaged in a technical cooperation initiative with several Norwegian defense laboratories and VERTIC, a London-based NGO. Further, it is contributing to a study to be completed this year of the political and technical requirements for a nuclear weapons-free world by the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

26. The Hoover program is focused on developing a political consensus, especially in the United States and other nuclear weapon states, on the necessity of implementing manifestly practical measures already supported by most governments as well as by MPI and other NGOs. It does not address the elimination of nuclear weapons within a time bound framework considered by Reagan and Gorbachev, nor specific procedural steps like a world summit or a General Assembly Special Session on Disarmament. Nor does it venture into areas outside the existing agenda, for example global control of missiles or missile...
defenses. In calling for bilateral or collective measures, the program leaves the impression that, absent agreements or coordination, little immediate action is implied by the call for movement toward a nuclear weapons-free world. There is no urging of unilateral steps or restraint by the United States or other nuclear weapon states, to reduce arsenals, refrain from warhead or delivery system modernization, change use and targeting policies, or reduce nuclear weapons infrastructure.

27. Beginning in the 1960s, US nuclear weapons policy has had three pillars, deterrence, non-proliferation, and arms control. Since 2000, it is the first pillar, deterrence, that has received by far the most emphasis, reinforced by doctrines of military counter-proliferation, even including possible use of nuclear weapons. Apart from its invocation of the vision of a nuclear weapons-free world, the Hoover program thus far has emphasized practical measures whose implementation would shore up the pillars of non-proliferation and arms control. However, the need for progress through credible steps toward elimination must not be marginalized. In the absence of such progress, it may not be possible to manage the instability now being experienced by an inherently unstable two-class world.

28. A contrasting program for the abolition of nuclear weapons calls for negotiation of a convention prohibiting and eliminating nuclear weapons similar to that in force for chemical weapons. An annually adopted General Assembly resolution, “Follow-up to the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice on the Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons,” first underlines “the unanimous conclusion of the International Court of Justice that there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations leading to nuclear disarmament in all its aspects under strict and effective international control.” It then calls “upon all States immediately to fulfill that obligation by commencing multilateral negotiations leading to an early conclusion of a nuclear weapons convention prohibiting the development, production, testing, deployment, stockpiling, transfer, threat or use of nuclear weapons and providing for their elimination.”

29. In 2007, the resolution (GA/62/39) was approved by a vote of 127 to 27, with 27 abstentions. The abstentions and negative votes largely came from countries aligned with the Western nuclear powers. Japan explained its abstention on the ground that negotiation of a convention is “premature,” an explanation that probably would be offered by other states that abstained or voted no. Members of the New Agenda Coalition voted for the resolution, as did China, India and Pakistan. Despite the studied lack of interest by the other nuclear weapon states, the call for a convention is gaining attention. In a February 2008 speech, Sergio Duarte, UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, described “the refusal to negotiate or discuss even the outlines of a nuclear-weapons convention” as “contrary to the cause of disarmament.”

30. In December 2007, Costa Rica and Malaysia requested the UN Secretary-General to circulate the updated Model Nuclear Weapons Convention as a document of the General Assembly (A/62/650). They explained that it is a “useful tool in the exploration, development, negotiation and achievement” of a convention or a package of instruments establishing a nuclear weapons-free world. The updated model convention is contained in Securing Our Survival: The Case for a Nuclear Weapons Convention, released in 2007 by International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War, the International Association of Lawyers Against Nuclear Arms, and the International Network of Engineers and Scientists Against Proliferation. The book examines the desirability and feasibility of nuclear disarmament in the context of the changed
global security dynamics since the model convention was first circulated in 1997. Whether or not the political will is summoned in the near future to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons, it is undoubtedly true that all measures now under active consideration – the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty is a very good example – must be designed and negotiated with a view to their place in the architecture of a nuclear weapons-free world. The model convention is an important contribution to this work.

E. CONCLUSION

31. The Middle Powers Initiative believes that a crucial route to achieving global security is middle power leadership. Middle power countries can exercise such leadership through individual initiatives, such as Norway’s work with the United Kingdom on verification of nuclear disarmament and its hosting of the recent Oslo conference, and Canada’s establishment of the Centre for Treaty Compliance. But it also must be exercised collectively, by bringing joint middle power influence to bear in NPT, UN, and NATO contexts. In so doing, middle powers can be assured that they have public opinion behind them. Measures supported by middle powers enjoy very broad support around the world, as indeed does nuclear disarmament. For example, a 2007 WorldPublicOpinion.org poll found that large majorities of Americans and Russians favor taking nuclear weapons off high alert, sharply cutting their numbers, banning the production of weapons-grade nuclear material, and, once advanced methods of verification are established, undertaking their elimination. Developments since the failed 2005 NPT Review Conference, among them the constructive tone of discussions at the 2007 NPT PrepCom and the renewed attention to nuclear disarmament by opinion leaders, including presidential candidates, in the United States, signal that the 2010 Review Conference will provide an opening to set the world on a course to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. Middle powers must seize this opportunity.
Through the Middle Powers Initiative, seven international non-governmental organizations work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapon states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers, and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee chaired by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.

Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

MPI, which started in 1998, is widely regarded in the international arena as a highly effective leader in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The work of MPI includes:

a) **Delegations** to educate and influence high-level policy makers such as Foreign, Defense and Prime Ministers, and Presidents. Delegations focus on leaders who have great impact on nuclear weapon policy making, both domestically and internationally. MPI Delegations are planned to coincide with significant political events such as the NPT Review Conferences and their preparatory meetings, NATO and other summits;

b) **Strategy Consultations**, which serve as the “off the record” interventions designed to provide a working environment in which ambassadors, diplomats, experts, and policy makers can come together in an informal setting at pivotal opportunities, in order to complement the ongoing treaty negotiations at various forums such as the United Nations or the European Parliament; and

c) **Publications**, such as Briefing Papers, that examine whether or not the nuclear abolition agenda is progressing and make corresponding recommendations to governments and activists. MPI Briefing Papers serve as intellectual catalysts for the MPI Delegations and MPI Strategy Consultations, and are widely read.

The Global Security Institute, founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000), has developed an exceptional team that includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats, effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace Laureates, and concerned citizens. This team works to achieve incremental steps that enhance security and lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. GSI works through four result-oriented program areas that target specific influential constituencies.