Obstacles on the way to the Global Zero

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Russian Ground Troops actual deployment

Royal United Services Institute
- Active units
- Reserve units
«Kavkaz-2012» exercises

19th indep. MR Bde Southern MD equipment during exercises

Unable to leave:
50 vehicles of the engineering battalion
20 BMP-3 IFV
3 T-90 MBT

Lost during move to training area:
1 BMP-3 IFV (fallen off cliff)
1 tractor + trailer (fallen off cliff)
1 mobile re-fuelling station

Lost at the training area:
2 T-90 MBT (gun barrels u/s)
3 BMP-3 IFV (2 sunk during river crossing, 1 engine u/s)

Even elite Russian brigades are far from being really combat ready and combat capable
Phased Adaptive Approach
– Phase IV: Early Intercept Of MRBMs, IRBMs, ICBMs (By 2020) –

LTG Patrick J. O’Reilly, Director, MDA, to 13th Annual AUSA Conference, April 26, 2011
Approved for Public Release 11-MDA-6171 (21 APR 2011) ncr-113571/042111
How this is seen from Washington, D.C. ...
...and from Moscow
Potential scope of the problem for Russia

Notional intercept range
Notional strike range in land-attack mode

ROССIЯ
И СОПРЕДЕЛЬНЫЕ ГОСУДАРСТВА
1:4000 000
Potential scope of the problem for Russia
How would West reciprocate? == Russian NSNW infrastructure
Weapons Secure Storage System (WS3) to be equalled to...
...the Russian Objects “S”

Object 1050 S, Berezovka, Saratov Oblast

General outlay of one storage bunker
Operations hall of an «Object ‘S’» storage bunker (the smaller type)

Two of four vaults for 24 weapons each
Entrance to the «Object 712» national-level storage-site

126 metres of granite over the storage vaults at ‘Object 712’
Russian Objects “S” are well comparable to the US KUMSC -
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- why then to equal them to the US WS3’s?
«Do not ask what world can give you – ask what YOU can give the world!»
Do not count on the Russian ‘asymmetric contribution’ for one more time – it will hardly happen

«Do not ask what world can give you – ask what YOU can give the world!»
Prospective 450/700 km NSNW exclusion zone*

- No Russian NSNW to the West and to the South of the Red line (infrastructure objects serving Strategic forces excluded)
- No NATO NSNW to the East and to the North of the Blue line

* - according to the Polish-Swedish proposal how the Kremlin might utilize it
The Kremlin is obsessed about the BMD system?
That might make the deal!

Swap data on BMD capabilities PLUS data on the US/NATO NSNW stockpile on the data on the Russian NSNW stockpile