Fulfilling the NPT Bargain for
Disarmament and Non-Proliferation: Next Steps

Briefing Paper for the Third Meeting of the Article VI Forum

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Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental organizations are able to work primarily through "middle power" governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapons states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee, chaired by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.

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Summary

The Second Nuclear Age has begun and the danger of the use of a nuclear weapon is growing. The only guarantee against use is the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons. Though such a goal seems far off, the security architecture for a nuclear weapons-free world must be built. Both non-proliferation and disarmament must be addressed to effect a balanced implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT).

On June 1, 2006 at the United Nations, The Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission chaired by Hans Blix released its final report, *Weapons of Terror: Freeing the World of Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Arms*. The report states: “There is an urgent need to revive meaningful negotiations, through all available intergovernmental mechanisms, on the three main objectives of reducing the danger of present arsenals, preventing proliferation, and outlawing all weapons of mass destruction once and for all.” The Middle Powers Initiative strongly concurs. At the core of MPI’s mission is the belief that the safety and moral integrity of present and future generations depends upon initiating, achieving, and sustaining the *universal* elimination of nuclear weapons.

The Article VI Forum, sponsored by MPI, seeks to stimulate and shape effective responses to the crisis of the non-proliferation/disarmament regime and to examine the political, technical, and legal elements of a nuclear weapons-free world. Two meetings of the Forum have been convened, at the United Nations in New York in October 2005, and at the Clingendael Institute in The Hague in March 2006. This Brief outlines five priority measures to be considered at the third meeting in Ottawa, September 28-29, 2006: a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty; verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals; reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces; the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty; and strengthening assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon states. These measures would decrease risks of use, diminish the access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states, and generate support for strengthening the non-proliferation side of the regime and resolving regional crises. They would make for a safer world now and create the pre-conditions for elimination of nuclear arms.
A. The Situation Today

1. A time traveler from the Cold War would find today’s world familiar in that nuclear weapons are very much part of the landscape, but strange in that there is no longer a veneer of a grand confrontation of ideologies, only the brute assertion of overwhelming power. A Second Nuclear Age has begun. In the First Nuclear Age, nuclear weapons were rationalized by the policy of mutually assured destruction. Now, there is a new emphasis on their war-fighting role. In January, President Chirac signaled that nuclear weapons could be used against a state responsible for a terrorist attack on France. According to credible media reports this spring and summer, until the Joint Chiefs of Staff insisted on their removal, U.S. civilian officials at the highest level wanted to keep nuclear use options in plans for counter-proliferation strikes on Iran. The problem of nuclear weapons is re-emerging in other new ways: heightened concern about terrorist acquisition; the DPRK’s declaration that it has a nuclear deterrent and its June missile test launches; Iran’s pursuit of a uranium enrichment capability that would produce fuel for nuclear reactors or, should Iran so choose, material for nuclear bombs. The nuclear weapon states refuse to give up their arsenals and feign surprise that other nations, seeing that nuclear weapons have become the currency of power in the modern world, are trying to acquire them. So are terrorists. No major city in the world is safe from the threat of nuclear attack.

2. The events of the summer of 2006 are driving the world toward more danger. The conflict between Israel and Hezbollah; the ongoing conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan; the continued confrontation with Iran; the DPRK’s missile test launches, all increase the odds of regional nuclear arms racing and of wider conflicts in which nuclear weapons might be used. The aggravation of nuclear dangers underlines the imperative of returning to respect for the rule of law in the sphere of disarmament and non-proliferation. That in turn would contribute to building security in the Middle East and Northeast Asia.

3. The intensity of new nuclear dangers has led International Atomic Energy Agency Director General Mohamed ElBaradei, who won the 2005 Nobel Peace Prize, to state: “If we wish to escape self-destruction, then nuclear weapons should have no place in our collective conscience and no role in our security.” UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan well articulated the urgency of the present situation in a speech this spring in Tokyo. “We seem to have reached a crossroads,” he said. "Before us lie two very divergent courses. One path can take us to a world in which the proliferation of nuclear weapons is restricted, and reversed, through trust, dialogue and negotiated agreement, with international guarantees ensuring the supply of nuclear fuel for peaceful purposes, thereby advancing development and economic well-being. The other path leads to a world in which rapidly growing numbers of States feel obliged to arm themselves with nuclear weapons, and in which non-State actors acquire the means to carry out nuclear terrorism.” The Secretary-General continued, “The international community seems almost to be sleepwalking down the latter path - not by conscious choice but rather through miscalculation, sterile debate and the paralysis of multilateral mechanisms for confidence-building and conflict resolution.”

4. In Weapons of Terror, the WMD Commission calls for commencement of “preparations for a World Summit on disarmament, non-proliferation and terrorist use of weapons of mass destruction to generate new momentum for concerted international action.” The Middle Powers Initiative endorses this call, as well as the thrust of the Commission’s analysis and recommendations. The Commission observes: “Nuclear weapons must never again be used – by
states or by terrorists – and the only way to be sure of that is to get rid of them before someone, somewhere is tempted to use them. Today, we are in a dangerous situation. There has been a third wave of nuclear proliferation. Proliferation has not been halted and serious steps to outlaw nuclear weapons have not been taken.” The three waves of nuclear proliferation are: first, the United States, Soviet Union, United Kingdom, France, and China; second, Israel, India, and Pakistan, as well as South Africa until its arsenal was dismantled; third, Iraq, Libya, the DPRK, and possibly Iran. While nuclear weapons programs have been reversed in Iraq and Libya, the report conveys that the third wave is sending an ominous signal. Quoting the unanimous holding of the International Court of Justice that “there exists an obligation to pursue in good faith and bring to a conclusion negotiations on nuclear disarmament,” the Commission states that the obligation “requires that states actively pursue measures to reduce the numbers of nuclear weapons and the importance of their role in military force structures. Yet, even though nuclear-weapon states ask other states to plan for their security without nuclear weapons, they do not themselves seem to be planning for this eventuality.” The Commission adds: “A nuclear disarmament treaty is achievable and can be reached through careful, sensible and practical measures. Benchmarks should be set; definitions agreed; timetables drawn up and agreed upon; and transparency requirements agreed…. It is time to move from the present stalemate and revive the discussion and negotiations about such steps.” Among those steps are the priority measures set forth in this Brief and virtually all of the MPI recommendations resulting from the 2005 strategy consultation at the Carter Center in Atlanta (Appendix A).

5. Most of the world’s governments – including allies of the nuclear weapon states – have called for implementation of concrete steps towards a nuclear weapons-free world. Freed of the constraints of consensus that stymied the 2005 NPT Review Conference, in fall 2005 the UN General Assembly once again adopted several resolutions to that effect. Perhaps most significant was the “Renewed Determination” resolution sponsored by Japan and nine other countries from both the North and South. It received the support of the vast majority of states, with 162 countries voting for it and only two against, the United States and India, with seven abstentions. Its adoption means that nearly all governments are now on record as favoring application of the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification “in the process of working towards the elimination of nuclear weapons.” This is a ringing endorsement of the principles embedded in the 13 Practical Steps for disarmament agreed by the 2000 NPT Review Conference. (See Inside Back Cover for the Practical Steps) The resolution wisely singles out two other commitments from the Practical Steps, “the necessity of a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies,” and reduction of “the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.” It also calls for entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and negotiations on a Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty (FMCT). The 2005 resolution put forward by the New Agenda Coalition, the pioneering cross-boundary group, and adopted by a vote of 153 for, five against, and 20 abstentions, directly affirms the continuing force of the Practical Steps.

B. Critical Assessment

6. On the disarmament side of the ledger, little of value can be counted. It can be said that reductions are proceeding slowly in the overall number of warheads, now about 27,000. In the case of the United States, the current total arsenal of about 10,000 will be an estimated 6,000 in 2012. Defenders of the U.S. record observe that this will be the smallest arsenal size since the Eisenhower administration and that there has been roughly a four-fold reduction since the end of the Cold War.
However, an extremely negative development is that the United States, with Russian acquiescence, has rejected application of the principles of verification, irreversibility, and transparency to the nuclear arms reductions agreed in the 2002 Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty. Absent accounting for the warheads and their verified dismantlement, reductions cannot be objectively confirmed and achievement of a nuclear weapons-free world will be impossible. Another disturbing development is that nuclear weapons have been given a new prominence in security postures, rather than a diminishing role as promised in the Practical Steps. Also dismaying is that no nuclear arms control/disarmament negotiations of any kind, bilateral or multilateral, are taking place. Due to the decade-old impasse over its program of work, the Conference on Disarmament has been unable to deliberate on a Fissile Materials Cut-Treaty, nuclear disarmament, security assurances, and prevention of weaponization of space.

7. On the non-proliferation side of the ledger, in large part due to the refusal of the Bush administration to countenance reference to the Practical Steps, the 2005 NPT Review Conference failed to reach agreement on a program of action. The lack of progress on compliance with the disarmament obligation thus precluded movement on addressing multiple non-proliferation challenges. There was no endorsement of more robust inspections by the IAEA under its Additional Protocol. Nor were there steps taken to regulate the acquisition and operation of technologies for production of plutonium and enriched uranium. As the failure of the Review Conference demonstrates, attempting to strengthen non-proliferation constraints while upgrading the political currency of nuclear weapons is contradictory and unsustainable.

8. Outside of multilateral forums, the United States and India are seeking to create an arrangement under which India would accept safeguards on civilian but not military nuclear facilities in return for access to civilian nuclear fuel and technology. While the proposed deal would partially engage India in the non-proliferation system, it undermines a core bargain of the NPT, that countries renouncing nuclear weapons are promised access to peaceful uses of nuclear technology, and would indirectly augment India’s capability to produce fissile materials for weapons. MPI therefore opposes it. Minimal criteria for approval of the deal by the Nuclear Suppliers Group and the U.S. Congress should be entry into force of a verified Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty as well as India’s formal acceptance of the NPT obligation of good-faith negotiation of cessation of arms racing and nuclear disarmament. The need to prevent arms racing in South Asia is highlighted by recent reports that Pakistan is constructing a new plutonium production reactor and the announcement that the United States is going ahead with the long-blocked sale of nuclear-capable F-16 fighter aircraft to Pakistan.

9. In July, the Security Council demanded that the DPRK suspend its ballistic missile program and urged its return without pre-conditions to the six-nation talks aimed at denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula. In August, the Security Council demanded that Iran suspend enrichment and reprocessing activities, signaled the imposition of sanctions should Iran not comply, and supported diplomatic efforts aimed at reaching a comprehensive solution. Both crises, MPI strongly believes, must be addressed diplomatically, not militarily. Solutions must include credible assurances of non-attack by nuclear or any other means. Fundamentally, if we expect the DPRK, Iran, and other potential proliferants to play by the rules of the NPT, so too must the major nuclear powers. This means at a minimum a demonstrated commitment to implementation of the Practical Steps for disarmament. That would establish an environment in which the world’s states could be effectively mobilized to create and support solutions to particular crises and to strengthen the regime generally.
C. Priority Measures

Fissile Materials Cut-off Treaty

10. An FMCT would permanently end production of fissile materials, primarily separated plutonium and highly enriched uranium (HEU), for use in weapons. It would affect most directly the countries possessing nuclear weapons; NPT non-weapon states already are subject to a verified ban on diverting materials to weapons. Achievement of an FMCT would restrain arms racing involving India, China, and Pakistan, cap Israel’s arsenal, and establish ceilings on other arsenals as well. A verified FMCT also would help build a stable framework for reduction and elimination of warheads and fissile material stocks; help prevent acquisition of fissile materials by terrorists; meet a key NPT commitment; and institutionalize one of the basic pillars of a nuclear weapons-free world. FMCT negotiations remain stalemated in the Conference on Disarmament, primarily due to U.S. refusal of linkages to negotiations or even discussions on other established priority topics. To take advantage of the opening discussed below, middle power countries should explore creative ways to overcome the stalemate. The Conference has already shown flexibility in 2006 by undertaking “structured discussions.” Brazil, Canada, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden proposed last year that the General Assembly, bypassing consensus procedure at the Conference, establish committees on topics that the Conference is not addressing. While starting negotiations on an FMCT is desirable, the Conference or other forums should also deal with the other priority items. Deliberations on nuclear disarmament would provide an overview of process and aims; security assurances are essential to the NPT bargain; and prevention of weaponization of space is essential for many reasons, not least that deployment of space-based weapons would make reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals much more difficult.

11. On May 18, the United States tabled a draft FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament along with a draft mandate for negotiations. While the draft treaty contains no verification requirements, the draft mandate does not preclude proposing them. It is not necessary that a mandate require that a treaty be verified, so long as this is subject to negotiation. If negotiations do begin, middle power countries should hold to their position that verification is imperative and feasible. The U.S. position is that extensive verification mechanisms could compromise the core national security interests of key parties, would be so costly that many countries would be hesitant to implement them, and still would not provide high confidence in the ability to monitor compliance. However, as the International Panel on Fissile Materials has observed, a verification system could initially focus on declared enrichment and reprocessing facilities in the weapon possessing states. They could be monitored just as the same kinds of facilities are monitored through IAEA safeguards in non-weapon countries Brazil, Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan. Later stages of verification could focus on the more difficult task of confirming the absence of clandestine activities. The U.S. draft is also deficient because it does not bar the conversion of the existing large stocks of civilian materials to weapons use and is silent on the existing large military stocks. As demonstrated by papers by South Africa, Canada, and other countries, as well as the International Panel, these and other matters like HEU used in naval reactors are susceptible to practical approaches, within an FMCT, or in subsequent agreements reached within an FMCT framework, or in parallel negotiations. For example, an FMCT could provide that existing military materials declared “excess” to “military” needs would be subject to a verified ban on weapons use. Steps can also be taken in anticipation of a future FMCT. Finally, due to the enormity of the risks posed by the nuclear fuel cycle, middle
powers should support renewable energy sources and energy conservation, and to this end should consider establishment of an international sustainable energy agency.

**Verification of reduction and elimination of nuclear arsenals**

12. President Reagan repeatedly invoked the Russian dictum, “trust but verify.” It is essential to bring the principle of verification symbolized by that dictum back to center stage. The Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT) requires Russia and the United States each to deploy no more than 2200 strategic warheads by 2012, but includes no provisions for verification of reductions or dismantling of warheads or delivery systems, leaving each country free to retain thousands of warheads in addition to those deployed. The two countries declared that they would make use of monitoring mechanisms under START to track reductions. But START expires in 2009, and SORT does not provide any schedule for reductions prior to 2012. A high priority therefore is to press Russia and the United States to agree on means to verify and make irreversible the reductions. The WMD Commission recommends negotiation of a new treaty that would further cut strategic forces and also provide for verified dismantlement of warheads withdrawn under SORT. In negotiating SORT, the Bush administration rejected a detailed agreement spelling out transparency and verification measures on the grounds that Cold War-style arms control is no longer necessary and that the United States has no interest in determining together with Russia the size and composition of the two countries’ arsenals. Indeed, the administration viewed SORT as memorializing reductions, though not irreversible ones, that the United States planned to make regardless of the agreement. This approach overlooks that Cold War or no, the two countries need to regulate their nuclear relationship; “partnership” is not necessarily forever. Further, accounting for warheads and verifying reductions is essential to achieving marginalization and elimination of nuclear weapons globally.

13. In working towards a nuclear weapons-free world, many tools exist for effective verification and monitoring, especially with respect to declared facilities, warheads, and fissile materials, as shown by studies this decade undertaken by the United Kingdom and the U.S. National Academy of Sciences. However, achieving confidence that reduction and elimination of arsenals have been implemented remains challenging, principally due to the possibility of hidden warheads, stocks of fissile materials, or capabilities. The National Academy of Sciences found that confidence would increase based on monitoring programs undertaken on an ongoing, long-term basis in an atmosphere of transparency and cooperation. An implication is that verification and transparency measures need to be implemented beginning now, above all regarding U.S.-Russian stocks and reductions. More broadly, all nuclear-armed states must initiate processes to apply the principles of verification, transparency, and irreversibility to reduction and elimination of their arsenals. Declarations of fissile materials contained in military stocks and warheads, as recommended by the International Panel, is one of the first steps that could be taken. Countries with nuclear weapons owe the rest of the world greater proof of compliance with the disarmament obligation. To that end, verification processes should involve international monitoring. Middle power countries should consider what initiatives they could take to develop verification capabilities, in accordance with the commitment made in the Practical Steps. An exemplary action in this regard is the establishment of the Canadian Centre for Treaty Compliance at Carleton University in Ottawa.
Reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces

14. The United States is now estimated to have more than 1600 warheads ready for delivery within minutes of an order to do so, and Russia more than 1000 warheads similarly ready for launch. It should be an absolute scandal that, every moment of every day, the two countries remain locked in a Cold War-style nuclear standoff. Non-governmental experts have explained that the standoff can be defused through separation of warheads from delivery systems and other measures that lengthen the time required for a nuclear launch, from days to weeks to months. An accompanying step is the elimination of the launch-on-warning option that requires nuclear forces to be on hair-trigger alert. The 2000 Review Conference committed to reduction of the operational status of nuclear forces, often referred to as “de-alerting.” While most urgent with respect to Russia and the United States, it is also vital that other weapon states, which to various degrees already maintain their forces in a de facto de-alerted condition, adopt and affirm de-alerting as an entrenched, declared policy and practice. De-alerting would help alleviate risks associated with mistakes, coups, attacks on nuclear weapons facilities, false warnings, unauthorized launches, hacking into command and control systems, and developments that cannot now be anticipated. Depending on the extent of its execution and verification, it would also lessen the moral corruption inherent in reliance on nuclear weapons for security and defense.

Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty

15. After four decades of discussions and partial test ban agreements, negotiations on the CTBT were completed in 1996. Although 135 states have ratified the treaty, ten of the 44 states whose ratification is required for entry into force have yet to do so. Of the ten, three weapon-possessing states, the United States, China, and Israel, have signed but not ratified the treaty; two other weapon-possessing states, India and Pakistan, have not taken the first step of signing it; and the DPRK, which may have weapons, has also not signed. The Preparatory Commission for the CTBT Organization has made great strides in developing the International Monitoring System, which will likely be completed in 2007. In a 2002 study, the U.S. National Academy of Sciences concluded that with a fully functioning monitoring system, clandestine nuclear explosions with a yield of more than one to two kilotons are detectable by technical means alone, and further found that any undetected low-yield explosions are not likely to significantly advance weapon development. The CTBT would help to check the spread of nuclear arms and to constrain refinement of advanced arsenals; protect the environment; and have a substantial organizational and technical infrastructure. It would be an indispensable part of the architecture of a nuclear weapons-free world. Its entry into force must remain a high priority. Also crucial is maintenance of the moratorium on nuclear test explosions that has held since the 1998 tests by India and Pakistan and continued support for the Preparatory Commission.

16. Middle power countries should call upon weapon states to refrain from warhead research and development. It is contrary to a central purpose of the CTBT and the commitment in the Practical Steps to a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies, and could lead to a resumption of testing to gain confidence in the performance of new or modified warheads. The WMD Commission stated: “If research on nuclear weapons is continued, modifications should only be for purposes of safety and security – and demonstrably so.” But research and development is taking place for purposes of replacing existing systems, increasing reliability over the long term, and enhancing military capabilities. France reportedly is planning the deployment of new warheads
whose concept was tested in 1995-1996 on new versions of its cruise and submarine-launched missiles. Russia is developing new warheads for its most recent silo-based and mobile missiles, including one involving a maneuverable reentry vehicle. The U.S. “reliable replacement warhead” program aims to yield modified or new-design warheads; Britain reportedly has a similar program. The Middle Powers Initiative is deeply concerned at the failure of the nuclear weapon states to make credible progress in implementing their disarmament obligations under the NPT. Despite current Congressional intentions, the U.S. program will enable research on improvement of military capabilities. It has been described by a top official as incubating future “revitalized” scientists able to design, develop and produce a new-design warhead with “different or modified military capabilities” within three to four years of a decision to do so. The U.S. Department of Defense projects that four to six replacement or refurbished warheads will be deployed in about two decades, and also envisions warhead development for next-generation delivery systems. Exotic changes are not necessary to achieve significant advances in capability. Under the U.S. “lifetime extension program,” the main warhead for submarine-launched missiles is being given a capacity to destroy “hard targets” with a “ground burst” by modifying a sub-system in its reentry vehicle. To the extent that weapon states’ modernization programs are intended to and will result only in perpetuating existing military capabilities, planning and preparing for maintenance of nuclear forces for decades to come is contrary to the obligation to work in good faith for their elimination.

Strengthened assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-weapon states

17. Particularly in France and the United States, doctrine and preparation for nuclear strikes against non-weapon states is a central development of the Second Nuclear Age. That trend gives a special urgency to the long-standing demand of non-weapon states party to the NPT for a legally binding instrument barring such use. The logic is unassailable; countries that have foresworn nuclear weapons are entitled to guarantees of non-use of the weapons against them. NPT weapon states have given such assurances in the form of declarations, and they are also legally codified in protocols to the regional nuclear weapon free zones. There is an excellent argument that the declarations are binding, notably because they were reiterated in connection with the 1995 indefinite extension of the NPT. However, the declarations and protocols contain loopholes, and the legally binding status of the declarations should be confirmed.

Disarmament as the compass point

18. In the view of the Middle Powers Initiative, implementation of the above-outlined priority measures should take place in the context of a visible intent to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world. The measures are valuable in and of themselves. They decrease risks of use, diminish the access of terrorists to catastrophic weapons and materials to build them, raise barriers to acquisition by additional states, and generate support for strengthening the non-proliferation side of the regime and resolving regional crises. Moreover, the measures pass key tests: they do not diminish the security of any state; they reinforce the NPT and enhance the rule of law; they make the world safer now; they move the world towards elimination of nuclear weapons. But their achievement is hindered when the weapon states cannot foresee the end of the process. If nuclear weapons are to be a permanent and central part of the security environment, that alters those states’ calculations about whether to reduce their flexibility by agreeing to measures like the CTBT, the FMCT, intrusive verification of reductions and de-alerting, and strengthened security assurances. The point is illustrated by the 1999 debate preceding the failure of the U.S. Senate to approve ratification of the
CTBT. While there were claims that verification of the test ban would be inadequate, a more significant factor seemed to be doubts that maintenance and modernization of U.S. nuclear forces over the long term would be unaffected. If the marginalization of nuclear weapons, and their eventual elimination, were on the horizon, such doubts would have less weight. It accordingly is crucial to consider how to keep the overall process of disarmament in view. One means of doing so would be a World Summit.

D. The Role of Middle Powers

19. Middle powers working together have a tremendous potential to make a difference, perhaps more than they fully realize. Spurred on by the example of the New Agenda Coalition, governments have moved beyond Cold War groupings and worked across the North-South divide. Since 1998, the seven New Agenda states (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, Sweden and South Africa) have consistently pressed the nuclear weapon states to live up to their obligations. Other states have joined in the Seven Nation Initiative (Australia, Chile, Indonesia, Norway, Romania, South Africa, along with the United Kingdom) and sponsored the Renewed Determination resolution overwhelmingly approved by the General Assembly (Australia, Bangladesh, Chile, Italy, Japan, Nepal, Nicaragua, Spain, Switzerland and Ukraine). Middle powers can bridge the gulf between the weapon and non-weapon states. By voting for the 2005 New Agenda resolution, 14 NATO states backed the Practical Steps: Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, Czech Republic, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Italy, Lithuania, Luxembourg, The Netherlands, Norway, Slovakia, and Turkey. Other significant affirmative votes came from Asia and the Pacific, including U.S. allies Australia, Japan, and the Republic of Korea.

20. Middle powers can also draw on the resources of civil society organizations, like the Article VI Forum, and catalyze civil society action in return. To build the political will necessary to sustain a process leading to the elimination of nuclear weapons, civil society organizations, publics around the world, and officials such as heads of state, mayors and parliamentarians must be intensely engaged. Middle powers should strive to support civil society participation in the NPT review process and UN deliberations, engage in regular consultations with NGOs, and promote disarmament and non-proliferation education. A fusion of strength of an informed civil society and like-minded governments holds great promise.

21. Believing that the NPT cannot withstand another failed review conference in 2010, MPI urges middle power countries to undertake multilateral diplomacy to rescue the NPT and to meet today’s challenges of disarmament and non-proliferation. This work begins in 2007 at the first Preparatory Committee meeting for the 2010 Review. Also vital is determined and strategic intervention in the deadlocked Conference on Disarmament and in the General Assembly. Middle powers must act as a liberating influence on the disarmament process; they have a power of exposure, a power of convening, a power of stimulating progress. There is an urgent need for stronger political action and leadership, and middle power countries have the potential to exert such leadership, indeed to unite the world in demanding disarmament and working for its achievement.
Appendix A: Recommendations from Atlanta Consultation II, The Carter Center
RECOMMENDATIONS


Entitled Atlanta Consultation II: On the Future of the NPT, the gathering involved high-level representatives of key governments and was modeled after the successful Atlanta Consultation I that MPI held at The Carter Center in 2000.

Below are the recommendations, which have been excerpted from the final report.

The Middle Powers Initiative recommends the following policy options to states party to the Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty (NPT) for their consideration:

1. A successful outcome of the Review Conference depends on its ability to address equally every aspect of the Treaty. The strengthening of the commitments contained in the NPT regarding nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear disarmament should be done in a balanced way.


3. The United States and Russia should build upon their progress in the Moscow Treaty by applying the principles of transparency, irreversibility, and verification to reductions under the Treaty, and by negotiating further deep, verified, and irreversible cuts in their total arsenals, encompassing both warheads and delivery systems.

4. Russia and the United States should engage in a wider process of control of their non-strategic weapons, through formalization and verification of the 1991-1992 initiatives, transparency steps, security measures, U.S. withdrawal of its bombs deployed on the territories of NATO countries, and commencement of negotiations regarding further reduction/elimination of non-strategic weapons.

5. Nuclear weapon states should implement their commitment to decreasing the operational readiness of nuclear weapons systems ("de-alerting") by planning and executing a program to stand down their nuclear forces, culminating in a global stand-down by the 2010 Review Conference.
6. Nuclear weapon states should further implement their commitment to diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in their security policies by not researching or developing modified or new nuclear weapons and by beginning negotiations on a legally-binding instrument on the non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states party to the NPT.

7. States should begin and rapidly conclude negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons in accordance with the 1995 statement of the Special Coordinator and the mandate contained therein, with the understanding that negotiations can and should address a range of issues, including dealing with existing military materials. As soon as possible a technical advisory panel should be created to assist with issues regarding verification of the treaty. In addition, states should work to develop a global inventory of weapons-useable fissile materials and warheads, and the nuclear weapon states should accelerate placing their "excess" military fissile materials under international verification. States should seriously consider proposals to ban production of all weapons-useable fissile materials, and to establish multilateral controls on uranium enrichment and plutonium reprocessing technology and a moratorium on supply and acquisition in the meantime.

8. Adherence to the Additional Protocol on Safeguards should become a universal standard for compliance with non-proliferation obligations and treatment as a member in good standing of the NPT with access to nuclear fuel.

9. Prior to or at the Review Conference, a firm agreement should be reached on a program of work in the Conference on Disarmament that includes a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. Achieving such an agreement in advance would greatly enhance the prospects for a cooperative outcome to the conference. Should it not prove possible to overcome the deadlock on a program of work, alternative venues should be pursued.

10. The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date. In the meantime, states should continue to observe the moratorium on nuclear testing, fund the Preparatory Commission for the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty Organization, and support completion of the International Monitoring System.

11. States should use the opportunity provided by the NPT review process to build upon the 13 Practical Steps to undertake deeper consideration of the legal, political and technical requirements for the elimination of nuclear weapons, in order to identify steps that could be taken unilaterally, bilaterally, and multilaterally that would lead to complete nuclear disarmament. The United Kingdom's initiative on verification, the New Agenda Coalition's proposals on security assurances and the strengthening and expanding of Nuclear Weapon Free Zones are positive examples in this regard. Such consideration should include the investigation of means to enhance security without relying on nuclear weapons.
13 PRACTICAL STEPS
EXCERPTED FROM THE FINAL DOCUMENT OF THE NPT 2000 REVIEW CONFERENCE

The Conference agrees on the following practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement Article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on “Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament”:

1. The importance and urgency of signatures and ratifications, without delay and without conditions and in accordance with constitutional processes, to achieve the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

2. A moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions pending entry into force of that Treaty.

3. The necessity of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices in accordance with the statement of the Special Coordinator in 1995 and the mandate contained therein, taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate commencement of negotiations on such a treaty with a view to their conclusion within five years.

4. The necessity of establishing in the Conference on Disarmament an appropriate subsidiary body with a mandate to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference on Disarmament is urged to agree on a programme of work which includes the immediate establishment of such a body.

5. The principle of irreversibility to apply to nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures.

6. An unequivocal undertaking by the nuclear-weapon States to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals leading to nuclear disarmament to which all States parties are committed under Article VI.

7. The early entry into force and full implementation of START II and the conclusion of START III as soon as possible while preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty as a cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons, in accordance with its provisions.

8. The completion and implementation of the Trilateral Initiative between the United States of America, the Russian Federation and the International Atomic Energy Agency.

9. Steps by all the nuclear-weapon States leading to nuclear disarmament in a way that promotes international stability, and based on the principle of undiminished security for all:
* Further efforts by the nuclear-weapon States to reduce their nuclear arsenals unilaterally.
* Increased transparency by the nuclear-weapon States with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to Article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament.
* The further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process.
* Concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
* A diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies to minimize the risk that these weapons ever be used and to facilitate the process of their total elimination.
* The engagement as soon as appropriate of all the nuclear-weapon States in the process leading to the total elimination of their nuclear weapons.

10. Arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes, to ensure that such material remains permanently outside of military programmes.

11. Reaffirmation that the ultimate objective of the efforts of States in the disarmament process is general and complete disarmament under effective international control.

12. Regular reports, within the framework of the NPT strengthened review process, by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI and paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", and recalling the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice of 8 July 1996.

13. The further development of the verification capabilities that will be required to provide assurance of compliance with nuclear disarmament agreements for the achievement and maintenance of a nuclear-weapon-free world.
MIDDLE POWERS INITIATIVE
A program of the Global Security Institute

Through the Middle Powers Initiative, eight international non-governmental organizations work primarily with “middle power” governments to encourage and educate the nuclear weapon states to take immediate practical steps that reduce nuclear dangers and commence negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons. MPI is guided by an International Steering Committee chaired by Hon. Douglas Roche, O.C., former Canadian Disarmament Ambassador.

Middle power countries are politically and economically significant, internationally respected countries that have renounced the nuclear arms race, a standing that gives them significant political credibility.

MPI, which started in 1998, is widely regarded in the international arena as a highly effective leader in promoting practical steps toward the elimination of nuclear weapons.

The work of MPI includes:

a) **Delegations** to educate and influence high-level policy makers such as Foreign, Defense and Prime Ministers, and Presidents. Delegations focus on leaders who have great impact on nuclear weapon policy making, both domestically and internationally. MPI Delegations are planned to coincide with significant political events such as the NPT Review Conferences and their preparatory meetings, NATO and other summits;

b) **Strategy Consultations**, which serve as “off the record” interventions designed to provide a working environment in which ambassadors, diplomats, experts, and policy makers can come together in an informal setting at pivotal opportunities, in order to complement the ongoing treaty negotiations at various forums such as the United Nations or the European Parliament; and

c) **Publications**, such as Briefing Papers, that examine whether or not the nuclear abolition agenda is progressing and make corresponding recommendations to governments and activists. MPI Briefing Papers serve as intellectual catalysts for the MPI Delegations and MPI Strategy Consultations, and are widely read.

GLOBAL SECURITY INSTITUTE
Promoting security for all through the elimination of nuclear weapons

The Global Security Institute, founded by Senator Alan Cranston (1914-2000), has developed an exceptional team that includes former heads of state and government, distinguished diplomats, effective politicians, committed celebrities, religious leaders, Nobel Peace Laureates, and concerned citizens. This team works to achieve incremental steps that enhance security and lead to the global elimination of nuclear weapons. GSI works through four result-oriented program areas that target specific influential constituencies.

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