The Chair (Mr. Kevin Sorenson (Crowfoot, CPC)):

I call this meeting to order. This is the Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs and International Development, meeting number 10. Pursuant to Standing Order 108(2), this afternoon we are pleased to have a delegation from the Middle Powers Initiative, and on behalf of my colleagues, I'd like to welcome you all and thank you for being here.

This committee first met with a delegation from the Middle Powers Initiative in 1999. Soon after, it had completed a major report on Canada's policies on nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. Notwithstanding some differences of opinion, the goal of reducing the threat of nuclear weapons is one that is shared by all members. Major challenges remain in that regard; there has been progress in reducing the number of
nuclear weapons in the world. However problematic, the number of countries that have these weapons has increased. Moreover, the system designed to prevent more countries from obtaining them, needs to be strengthened.

I know you have all testified before this committee before, and between you all, you bring a wide range of relevant experience, including senior political leadership, parliamentary experience, arms control diplomacy, and NGO engagement. We look forward to hearing a summary of your remarks and then using the question time after.

Among our guests today, we welcome back the Right Honourable Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada; we welcome back the Honourable Doug Roche, the Chairman; and Thomas Graham, Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group; and also, Jonathan Granoff, President, Global Security Institute. I want to welcome you and the time is yours. It's very good to have you folks with us today.

The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell (Former Prime Minister of Canada, Middle Powers Initiative): Thank you very much, Mr. Chairman, and honourable members of the standing committee. It is a pleasure to be here again addressing you on behalf of Middle Powers Initiative. I'll be very brief. We had an opportunity to speak with some of you last evening, but I also want to turn the microphone over to my colleagues, who represent great technical expertise in this area.

Very briefly, I think the important thing for us to understand is that for many of us, nuclear weapons are not a fact of the Cold War, something that we thought was dealt with when the Berlin Wall came down. We now see that in the context of 21st Century security issues, particularly the issues of international terrorism threats that come from non-state actors, nuclear weapons are, unfortunately, still at the centre of that particular security agenda. They're at the of that agenda because of the slow progress in dealing with the nuclear arsenals of the major nuclear powers, particularly the United States and the former Soviet Union, Russia, which, of course, became the inheritor of the nuclear arsenals of countries like the Ukraine, which gave them up. But also because as we see that there is a challenge to the non-proliferation agenda; the non-proliferation architecture in the world. A lot of this comes from the failure of many people to understand the importance of still dealing with nuclear weapons; the threat that they still pose to us.

On the one hand one can argue that the nuclear non-proliferation treaty was a great success because had it not been entered into, had it not been negotiated, we would probably have a world now with anywhere between 40 and 50 states having nuclear weapons. If you can imagine that situation in the context of today's world with failing states, non-state actors interested in getting hold of these weapons, and the kind of threat that that would pose today; I think we can see that however difficult today's situation is, it would be a lot worse if we did not have this treaty.

The Middle Powers Initiative is here for two purposes. One, is to make the point that this is still an issue that requires the attention of all legislators who are interested in security issues, and also to remind this committee--not that it needs to be reminded--in
the most friendly and supportive way of the very important role that Canada has played since the beginning of the non-proliferation regime in being a great supporter of it, of being architect of it, Canada was, in fact, probably the first country that voluntarily agreed to be a non-nuclear power when we were very capable of being a nuclear power, having been partners in the Manhattan Project after World War II. Canada has a very strong moral authority to advocate for this issue and we have done so very effectively over the years. The message that we have is, twofold. One, that it's still a very important issue and second, that we help the Government of Canada and the legislators here who are the very important link to the public. We'll continue to advocate Canada's strong role in trying to make this regime effective in the coming years.

I'd now like to turn the floor over to my colleague, Thomas Graham. You have the bios. We're going to very brief and not repeat those.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Ms. Campbell, for your testimony.

I should just make reference. I welcome the Minister of Foreign Affairs here this afternoon too. He's sitting in the back and we always appreciate when our minister drops in.

Sorry for that brief interruption, Ambassador Graham. The time is yours.

**Amb. Thomas Graham (Ambassador and Chairman, Bipartisan Security Group, Middle Powers Initiative):** Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I will also be brief so there'll be ample time for questions and dialogue. Following on the Prime Minister's statement, I just want to expand on what she said somewhat.

William Perry, former defence secretary of the United States, has said recently that in his judgment there is a greater than 50% chance of a nuclear detonation on U.S. soil in the next 10 years. That could be just as easily Canadian soil because terrorists strike wherever they see opportunities. Senator Sam Nunn, former chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Armed Services, wrote in 2004 that because of the condition where long-range strategic nuclear missiles are continued to be kept on hair-trigger alert 15 years after the end of the Cold War, in which they served absolutely no useful purpose except to threaten our joint continued existence, are leading us into a situation where some day there could be an—and these are his words—“...Armageddon of our own making”.

Ambassador Paul Nitze, the architect of the U.S. Nuclear Weapon Policy over many decades, toward the end of his life, in 1999, wrote a *New York Times* article in which he made it clear the time had come where nuclear weapons are now a greater threat to us than to anyone else and it's time for their complete elimination worldwide.

The centrepiece of world security, as Prime Minister Campbell has indicated, is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in today's world. It prevented a situation where there could be today as many as 40 nuclear-weapon states in the world, meaning that every
conflict would run the risk of going nuclear and it would be impossible to keep nuclear weapons out of the hands of terrorists, they would be so widespread. The principal reason this didn't happen was the negotiation of this treaty and its entry into force in 1970 and its indefinite extension in 1995.

However, this treaty is based on a central bargain. We didn't get it for free. The central bargain is the nuclear-weapons states—the United States, United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—pledge to pursue disarmament measures aimed at the ultimate abolition of nuclear weapons. And it was made very clear in the negotiating record what those principal measures were deemed to be: a comprehensive test ban prohibiting all nuclear tests worldwide; drastic reductions in nuclear arsenals; a treaty prohibiting the further production of nuclear bomb material; and legal safeguards in which the nuclear-weapons states pledged they would never use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapons states parties to the NPT. That's the least that could be expected of treaty partners, one would think.

Thirty-six years later, none of those measures have been delivered. This part of the basic bargain remains unfulfilled. The other part on the nuclear weapons side, the nuclear-weapons state side was to share peaceful nuclear technology. In exchange for this, the rest of the world—some 180-plus countries—pledged never to acquire nuclear weapons. But it was a bargain and the nuclear-weapons states have not delivered on that bargain and that delivery still remains uncertain, which is what the NPI brief is all about.

Now, the other side of the bargain is beginning to fall apart, given the long neglect on one side. North Korea has withdrawn from the treaty and built up to 9 or 10 nuclear weapons, it is estimated. And all of you know about the Iranian crisis where Iran is believed to be pursuing nuclear weapons.

These are not the only situations, there's India, Pakistan, Brazil, Ukraine, and other countries that could be problems. We further have a situation where the increased demands for power world-wide are growing exponentially and this will require nuclear power to be used world-wide, but it can't be used at all effectively in the absence of a strong non-proliferation treaty regime providing the necessary safeguards.

Further, we now live in a world completely different from anything we've known in hundreds of years. For the first time, almost since the middle ages, no major state threatens another major state, rather the threat is deterioration and world order of the 50 to 70 failed or failing states and the rise of international terrorism. In this extremely dangerous situation in which we find ourselves it is of the greatest importance that this treaty, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, be revived, strengthened, and the central bargain of the treaty be fully implemented.

Canada has long shown leadership on this subject and has made very important contributions in the past. I very much hope they will continue.

Thank you.
The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Ambassador.

To Mr. Granoff.

Mr. Jonathan Granoff (President, Global Security Institute, Middle Powers Initiative): Thank you, Mr. Chairman, members of the committee, it's an honour to address you.

I want to just walk through the practical threat reducing security enhancing proposals that are contained in our brief, and each of them should be evaluated on their own merits. In other words if they're not threat reducing, if they're security enhancing and they don't promote strengthening the treaty regime they should fail. If on the other hand they do meet those criteria I think they should be supported. So let's go through each one of them based on that criteria.

The first one is a fissile materials cut-off treaty. A fissile material cut-off treaty was proposed by the United States at the conference on disarmament in May of this year. But if we go to the history of the treaty you'll note that this was something that was called for at the very inception of the entire process, and at the extension conference in 1995 as part of the bargain, and then again reaffirmed at the 2000 review. All we're saying is we need to cut-off the production of weapons grade highly enriched uranium and plutonium, and have a strengthened verification regime to make sure that it's done, to have it inventoried and make sure that these materials do not get into the hands of sub-state actors and terrorists. Can it be done? Well the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission headed by Hans Blix has concluded it can be done.

The fissile material expert panel headed by Frank von Hippel who was the science advisor under the National Security Council of the United States concludes that it can be done. Almost all of the experts conclude that it can be done. Can it be 100% effective? We can never know. But certainly it's better to have some verification regime than none. We found that the inspection regime was effective in Iraq. It helped disarm Saddam Hussein, and it helps reinforce the norm that this material is unacceptable.

The second goes right to the heart of the first. Verification, strengthening the controls. There's a treaty between the United States and Russia called the Moscow Treaty which calls for the reduction of nuclear weapons to around 2,200 in the year 2012. In 2009 the inspection regime under the START Treaty, which my colleague Ambassador Graham helped negotiate under George Bush senior, that the inspection regime of the START treaty ends in 2009. After that there's no verification of the cuts contemplated under the Moscow Treaty, also known as the SORT Treaty.

Now having a legal instrument that's simply based on goodwill in my opinion is not sufficient to give the international community the kind of security that it deserves. I believe every person on the planet has a right to know that these cuts are being made, that the super powers are moving towards a safer world. Where are we right now in the standoff between Russia and the United States? We still have over 3,000 each weapons
on hair-trigger launch on warning high alert status, leaving an individual decision maker with only a few minutes critical time to decide the fate of all humanity for all time. I don't believe any human being should have to have that on their shoulders. In fact in January of 1995 a weather satellite off the coast of Norway appeared to be a trident launch and Boris Yeltsin had but a few minutes to decide whether to use those nuclear weapons that he had. So we're suggesting that the delivery vehicles and the weapons be decoupled, de-alerted, lower the status of these weapons. There's really no good reason for us to be living with this sword over our head. Over 96% of the weapons are in the possession of these two countries.

Remember most of these weapons have triggering devices the size of what was dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Their destructive capacity simply boggles the human imagination. Any use of these would tear at the fabric of civilization in psychological and physical ways that are unpredictable.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, 176 countries including Canada has ratified that. One hundred and seventy-six countries is a serious weight of public opinion and the United States has signed it but not ratified it. Several other countries haven't. We would urge that Canada which has already made a strong commitment for this push for full ratification of the treaty. Why is this a security enhancing measure? Well because if countries can't test they can't miniaturize, they can't put their weapons on intercontinental ballistic missiles. Also, it sends a message that the political currency of these devices is diminished and that's as important as anything.

The last, but not least, is negative security assurances. The equities of this are very obvious. In order to gain the indefinite extension of the treaty in 1995, countries without nuclear weapons were promised if you will accede to the indefinite extension of the treaty, you will not be threatened with nuclear weapons. The other side of that is to say to somebody, you must agree never to have nuclear weapons, but you will still remain under the threat of nuclear weapons and the inequities of that are obvious.

The consequence of these kind of blatant inequities is instability and if there's anything that we need as we walk down the ladder is stability. The call for the elimination of nuclear weapons is a legal duty. It is a legal duty under the treaty, but it's going to be difficult to get there. I see it as a compass point. The compass point is where the compass needs to go and the elements involved in that are lowering the political currency of the weapons. What we put forward is a map that helps us get there and each step on this map helps strengthen the security of the world. Moreover, these are all positions which have been taken and supported by the Canadian government, by most governments in the world. They are very moderate and they are doable and they are practical.

Thank you very much.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Senator Roche.
Hon. Douglas Roche (Chairman, Middle Powers Initiative): Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

I'll be very brief, because I know you want to go to questions.

Mr. Chairman, when you opened the meeting you drew attention to the report that this committee did in 1999 and I'm so pleased to see your two able research staff still with you. That report, Mr. Chairman and members, was a landmark in the examination of the nuclear weapons policies. It had the effect of having Canada go into NATO and securing a review of NATO's nuclear weapons policies. So we consider your work very important and we have been here now five times. This is the fifth visit since 1999 and we pay our compliments to the Government of Canada because of the leadership this government has shown in the international community in working on the nuclear weapons file.

Mr. Chairman, we have to get right down to it. The Secretary-General of the United Nations, Mr. Kofi Annan, said only a few days ago that the world is sleepwalking--and that's his word “sleepwalking”--toward a possible nuclear catastrophe because of the proliferation of nuclear weapons and the continued existence of nuclear weapons by those who have them. Thus, the Middle Powers Initiative makes an appeal once more to the Parliament of Canada, to this committee, to the Government of Canada, to speak out in the international community for a vigorous multilateral approach to resolving the nuclear weapons dilemma.

We're not suggesting that any one country could do all this alone. This is a very big and complex file. My colleague just referred to Hans Blix, the Chief Weapons Inspector in Iraq, who later headed an international commission on weapons of mass destruction, whose report was published last week. He said in responding to a television interview when they asked him, You have 60 recommendations, what's your most important? He said the most important of all is to get a comprehensive test ban treaty to shut off the nuclear arms race development. Thus, that is one of our principal recommendations.

You will find in the brief you have that we have prepared for you recommendations that are in harmony with Blix. Ours is what you might call a stripped down version and we're applying it particularly to the Government of Canada to instruct your diplomats to work in a vigorous manner with like-minded states. There are about 25 states that the Middle Powers Initiative is working with that all want the same thing. They want the comprehensive test ban treaty. They want a fissile cut-off treaty. They want de-alerting of nuclear weapons. They want verification. So this is a matter of states working together to advance an international agenda.

I do not subscribe to the theory or the statements sometimes made that nothing's happening in this field or it's all too difficult. Not at all. We are in a historical momentum toward closing the net on nuclear weapons starting with the indefinite extension of the non-proliferation treaty in 1995, the International Court of Justice saying in 1996 that all states had an obligation to conclude negotiations toward the elimination of nuclear
weapons, and all states of NPT in 2000 making an unequivocal undertaking and 13 practical steps.

So the chart has been laid. We're not asking for...or wandering at midnight without a compass. We know exactly what needs to be done. What we need is the political will of states that will work together to ensure that the essential points that are made in this brief are carried out. That's the work of the Middle Powers Initiative.

I thank you, Mr. Chairman, for receiving us. We thank you again for the work that Canada has done and we're ready to respond to your questions.

**The Chair:** Thank you to the delegation.

Especially Mr. Granoff referenced a number of times the political collateral or the political value of doing this, and Mr. Patry was one of those who were here in 1999. As I look around, he may have been the only one. He's been here quite a while, but the title of the report then was *Canada and the Nuclear Challenge: Reducing the Political Value of Nuclear Weapons for the Twenty-first Century*. It is still very pertinent.

We'll go to the opposition first, to Mr. Wilfert, please.

**Hon. Bryon Wilfert (Richmond Hill, Lib.):** Thank you very much, and I thank our witnesses for coming today.

Sometimes I wonder whether we've come very far from the vision that former Senator Hubert Humphrey had in 1963— one of the architects of the non-proliferation treaty— when he presented it before the Senate. It was signed in 1963.

You mentioned a number of areas. The first thing I would certainly agree with is the issue of having the government commit itself to the multilateral diplomacy approach. That is extremely important. It's something we have been known for and we certainly need to continue.

I have a couple of areas, if I can briefly go through them, Mr. Chairman.

First, on the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty there is a stalemate, as you know, that has existed for a decade. The question is how do we break that stalemate. We obviously have certain expertise that we can bring to the table, but the United States, among others, certainly has been unwilling, or has refused I suppose, the whole issue of linkage with every issue whether it's nuclear disarmament or weaponization of space, as examples.

Are there some creative approaches that we can take with likeminded states to try to break that logjam? The issue of non-state actors is obviously very important in this international climate in terms of the selling of technology and of components for nuclear weapons. I read your brief, but I don't know that you necessarily addressed in any
detail—maybe you can before the committee—how we might approach the issue of increasing the role of non-state actors in the international community.

On the whole comprehensive treaty issue with North Korea and Iran, we know, as was mentioned, that North Korea has probably up to nine, and yet the six-power talks are going nowhere there. The North Koreans are clearly a bully on the block which no one wants to take on directly. There doesn't seem to be much encouragement for the North Koreans or the Iranians, given the activities of those who already have weapons. If they're not prepared to follow certain rules, obviously their view is why should we. Could you address that?

In the international community we often talk about countries signing onto the non-proliferation treaty for the purpose of getting nuclear expertise, but they can certainly withdraw from that at any time and then revert to nuclear weaponry. We have certainly seen that in the past. Could you address that a little more?

Finally, we always want to talk about empowerment of parliamentarians, and I congratulate the government on the fact it is going to help organize the MPI Article 6 forum here in September. You may want to indicate to the committee how we, as parliamentarians or the committee, might play a role. I strongly believe, regardless of party, that we should in fact be playing a role, as parliamentarians, in that regard.

Sorry, Mr. Chair, I had to get them out.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Wilfert. With those six questions you have left a minute and 10 seconds for our friends to answer, and I know that for Ms. Lalonde, I will give her exactly the same amount of time I give you, so could we have our guests answer?

Amb. Thomas Graham: I will answer in a minute and ten seconds.

First, with respect to fissile material cut off, the United States just has never really been on board that in recent years. It's been called for over the past thirty-six years, explicitly for the last ten. I think the best course of action in the immediate future is to work with other like-minded states and also talk with the Americans. They've tabled a treaty that has no verification provisions in it, and try to encourage them that this is in fact a verifiable exercise and they should reconsider their position.

Second, with respect to non-state actors, that's a very serious threat. That's what struggling against nuclear terrorism, WMD terrorism is all about. There is a major worldwide effort going on involving many countries. Canada is involved. We're doing the best we can, but in today's world with the failed and failing states and so forth it's a very difficult task.

North Korea, I believe there is a solution there. Even though the talks have gone nowhere, the principal problem there is that they've dragged on so long that now that the
DPRK has these ten weapons and the question is now that they have them are they going to ever be willing to give them up. That remains to be seen.

Iran, I think there have been favourable developments there. The United States has agreed to join the negotiations. We have all the P-5 in the negotiations, plus Germany. I think they're going in the right direction. Iran has indicated at least some interest. I think the situation there looks more positive than it has in recent months.

Countries joining the treaty, gaining expertise in withdrawing, that's really only happened once with North Korea. North Korea is a strange country and even Billy Graham says that, and so I don't think I would universalize from that particular issue, and I'll turn over the article 6 forum to Ambassador Roche.

Mr. Jonathan Granoff: There was a question about withdrawal. There were some proposals at the last review conference along these lines, that if a country withdraws from the treaty, the privileges that they gained pursuant to article 4 allowing for peaceful uses would have to be forfeited, thereby preventing the situation of a country utilizing article 4 privileges to develop the wherewithal to have a nuclear arsenal and then withdrawing.

The failure of the review conference to even get to the substance of reviewing that, I think was shameful, and I echo the Secretary General's statement that it was shameful that no final statement was made there or at the summit, which could have addressed this issue.

So there is a practical way of addressing this and that has been put on the table by major middle power states who put that forward.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Ms. Lalonde, six minutes, please.

[Fransais]

Mme Francine Lalonde (La Pointe-de-l'Île, BQ): Merci beaucoup à vous d'être ici.

Expliquez-nous, pourquoi il n'est pas utopique de penser qu'en 2010 tous les pays du monde pourraient accepter de se donner les moyens d'éliminer les armes que Hans Blix appelle les armes de terre, c'est-à-dire les armes nucléaires.

Pourquoi, n'est-ce pas utopique de penser qu'on peut avoir un traité efficace?

[English]

The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell: I don't think it is utopian and I think what is interesting is that there are many challenges facing the world today that are very scary--global warming, climate change, these kinds of things.
The resolution of the nuclear issue is actually within our capabilities. Nuclear materials are verifiable, are traceable. If the political will is there we could actually deal with this particular threat to our security, and so although one of our goals is to put this back in the centre to take it seriously, because not dealt with it's a great threat, but in fact we have the capacity to deal with this. It is not something beyond our capacity, so I don't think it's utopian, but I think it requires political will but it also requires us to remind people that it still matters.

Sometimes those of us who have lived through a period of time forget that new people come, younger people come who didn't live through those old issues and they don't necessarily recognize that they're important. We have to keep restating it, and that's why the Middle Powers Initiative comes back year because everyone, and particularly parliamentarians, have many issues on their minds, and it's to remind people that we can deal with it but only if we focus our attention on it.

Amb. Thomas Graham:

I strongly agree with the Prime Minister that it is not utopian, it is possible, and I believe in the not too distant future serious efforts will be made to accomplish that.

The Chair: Ms. Lalonde.

[Français]

La vice-présidente (Mme Francine Lalonde): Je pensais que vous en mettriez d'avantage, je voulais vous provoquer. Personnellement, je crois profondément à cela.

Ma deuxième question est la suivante. Aussi longtemps que les États-Unis n'accepteront pas de faire des efforts en ce sens, croyez-vous que l'on sera capables d'empêcher l'Iran, la Corée du Nord et tous les autres pays, tel qu'Israël, de cacher des armes ou de ne pas en fabriquer?

[English]

Mr. Jonathan Granoff: The Nobel Peace laureate has addressed this very squarely. The Nobel Peace laureate said,

For some to say that nuclear weapons are good for them but not for others is simply not sustainable. The failure of the nuclear weapon states to abide by their legal pledge to negotiate the elimination of nuclear weapons contained in the Nuclear Non Proliferation Treaty is the greatest stimulus to their proliferation.

Hans Blix described it recently at the United States Constitution Centre when he presented the Blix Commission report. He said that it's not practical for a parent to have a cigar in their mouth and tell their children not to smoke. In other words, as long as the P-
5 continue to say that they need nuclear weapons, or as long as NATO, the most powerful military force in the history of the world, continues to say that these devices, of which one represents more of the fire power than all of the weapons ever used in the history of humanity...people forget what we're talking about. We're talking about weapons of massive human annihilation, of catastrophic scale. If these are needed for the security of the states with these huge conventional forces, what does it tell other states which will increasingly be able to obtain them at a lower and lower cost?

For that reason, we say that it is legally required and it is practical to walk down the ladder. Can it be done in a utopian fashion overnight? Of course not. That's why we're saying that the pathway toward a more secure world, each step of that pathway makes us more secure. So it's not utopian; it's very hard-nosed and realistic.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

Anyone else?

You have another 30 seconds.

[Français]

Mme Francine Lalonde: Ai-je terminé tout mon temps?

[English]

Mr. Kevin Sorenson:

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Thirty seconds.

[Français]

Avez-vous des conseils à donner au Canada sur l'utilisation du CANDU? En effet, le Canada peut vendre le CANDU pour des raisons civiles mais il peut être utilisé pour d'autres raisons.

Hon. Douglas Roche: Je répondrais en anglais, s'il vous plaît.

Ms. Francine Lalonde: Oui, bien sûr.

[English]

Hon. Douglas Roche: We have confidence that the Atomic Energy of Canada Limited is maintaining the strictest standards with respect to CANDU reactors.

The Middle Powers Initiative does not take a position on the efficacy of nuclear power. Rather, we recognize that the Non-Proliferation Treaty guarantees access to nuclear
power by states. And thus, we feel that the International Atomic Agency and its inspection facilities need to be strengthened and supported much stronger financially than is now the case.

But with respect to CANDU reactors, we do not have a position on it.

**The Chair:** We'll go to Mr. Van Loan, and then to Mr. Marston.

**Mr. Peter Van Loan (York—Simcoe, CPC):** Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.

Canada has obviously depended strongly on the international architecture of nuclear arms control to protect and safeguard our own security and I think everybody takes that as a given. In case there's any doubt, the four priorities that you laid to us in your report are consistent with this government's practice and policies.

I'm concerned with suggestions that proliferation is in some way justified by the fact that the nuclear powers have not yet fully disarmed. I think to fuel that kind of discussion is almost to give an excuse and justification for proliferation activities. I think one has to be very careful about encouraging that, suggesting that and justifying that because that really is to play into the hands of proliferation.

The reality if that were the case, that we have seen is that the most troubling proliferation activities actually happened as we've had the greatest amount of disarmament happen among the permanent nuclear powers. But that aside, we also see that the worse proliferation problems have happened outside of the non-proliferation treaty countries, those who have withdrawn with the possible exception of course of Iran who are in there but kind of being defiant.

So in terms of those countries that are outside where we've seen proliferation occur, I'm not sure I see the answer for those biggest troubles in your report. Even if we proceeded on all the paths you lay out there, I'm not sure we're going to address the concerns of that kind of proliferation in those countries. I'm wondering if anybody has something to offer on that front.

**Mr. Jonathan Granoff:** Which countries are you talking about?

**Mr. Peter Van Loan:** Well all the countries that we've seen participate in proliferation. Korea for example withdrew and others who were never in.

**Mr. Jonathan Granoff:** Let's take Korea. It had the suggestions with respect to the withdrawal provisions been in effect in which that would have addressed Korea. So now we've learned from that. I think that some of the suggestions—

**Mr. Peter Van Loan:** I know there were others who were never parties. Correct?
Mr. Jonathan Granoff: There are three countries that have not joined the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in addition to North Korea which dropped out. India, Pakistan and Israel.

India for many years challenged the nuclear non-proliferation regime by saying, we will only join if we see bonafides that you're going to move towards disarmament. They said, we're sixth of the world's population and as long as nuclear weapons are a currency of power, we won't renounce them until we know that there's going to be universal progress.

Mr. Peter Van Loan: That's exactly the justification I talked about. We're seeing a great movement towards disarmament in the past decade.

Mr. Jonathan Granoff: There has been a huge quantitative movement but there hasn't been the consistent unequivocal commitment to getting there. I agree with you fully that proliferation is bad in all respects.

Dr. Blix described it very well as follows “nuclear weapons are very bad in the hands of irresponsible states but nuclear weapons themselves are bad in anybody's hands and that a state that could be responsible one year in the future may not necessary be responsible”.

So we're not by any means justifying proliferation by the failure of the nuclear weapons states to move rapidly. We're only saying that to strengthen the non-proliferation regime means to fulfill the threat reductions steps that will also reduce the threat and give more security to the nuclear weapons states. The same process of reducing the threat will also strengthen the non-proliferation regime and move us in the right direction. So these are not really opposed concepts.

Hon. Douglas Roche: Mr. Van Loan, the situation is like this. The 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world constitute a volcano. These other states like North Korea and Iran are flashpoints off that volcano. The volcano could erupt at any time and that's what we're being warned about.

Naturally we want to stop any country whatsoever from obtaining nuclear weapons, period. But it is unrealistic to think that other states in the world as we proceed through the 21st century will not wish to acquire nuclear weapons as instruments as power if the nuclear weapons states themselves do not follow their legal obligations on the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And that's what this issue is really all about.

We must enforce the legal base of the Non-Proliferation Treaty in insisting with the International Court of Justice has done, that the nuclear weapons states enter into comprehensive negotiations leading the elimination of nuclear weapons. Nobody's saying this can be done overnight. It's technically impossible. But not to start down that road and to show the good faith—which is the word used at article—is to signal to the world that nuclear weapons are indeed going to be important for political power.
Mr. Peter Van Loan: I think anybody could look at it and say that we've had significant reductions and that represents some good faith and that's a positive thing. My question, again, I don't want to dwell on that aspect of it, I really want to dwell on what do you do to those folks outside of the regime? I don't really think Pakistan and India look at each other and say that Russia or the United States is a threat. I'm not sure that Israel thinks that China is the threat. I think there are other reasons why countries see nuclear weapons as sources of power. If they're outside the regime what can be done to bring them to heel? That's the original question I had for you. I didn't see an answer here. Is there an answer to that?

Amb. Thomas Graham: Let me try to give a brief answer. The existence of these three unregulated nuclear arsenals outside the NPT have been a problem for many years. Now we have a fourth, North Korea. Doing something about this should be highest on the agenda. The agreement that the United States has negotiated with India, at least in part, is motivated by that effort.

I personally have significant problems with the agreement in its current form but I do support the objective of the agreement, which was to try to bring India into the international non-proliferation system. Pakistan and Israel are very tough cases but I have written an article about how this could be accomplished, which appeared in the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists in 2004. We don't have time to go into it now, but I believe there are diplomatic solutions that could bring these countries at least into a relationship with the non-proliferation regime. They're not going to give up their arsenals overnight. But we could bring them into a relationship with the regime and have them regulated in some way, have some limits on them. If you're really interested I'll send you a copy of the article.

The Chair: Yes Mr. Graham, actually, if you wouldn't mind maybe sending the committee a copy of that report.

We'll go to Mr. Marston.

Mr. Wayne Marston (Hamilton East—Stoney Creek, NDP): I want to thank the committee for coming here today. It's a reminder and a hope combined for those of who lived through the missile crisis, over forty years ago, remembering not sleeping those nights for the number of days that was occurring and all the images that conjures back up for us.

What I'm concerned about, we're dealing with North Korea and Iran, and people out there have a great fear that these weapons could be political weapons for them, instruments of power, as you indicated. Is there an assessment any place on their possible support for non-government actors to get out there to deliver something to North America? This is the common person's fear out there today.

The Chair: Thank you Mr. Marston.
Mr. Graham.

**Amb. Thomas Graham:** The common person's fear is that non-state actors are out there and they may deliver nuclear devices onto the North American continent. I think that's a very real concern. It's one that's worried me for years. There are so many ways it could happen. Former President Clinton used to say the easiest way to do it would be to put a nuclear weapon inside a bail of marijuana and it would get right in. It could come in pieces and be assembled here.

The first line of defence is intelligence. We should not skimp the money that we put into intelligence, that is absolutely the first line. The second line is we've got to work as closely as possible with other countries to interdict any such attempts and to know what's going on out there and to try to stop it from happening. But having said all that, if we don't strengthen the non-proliferation treaty and make it a worldwide instrument; if we don't get rid of the fissile material in Russia; if we don't do something about the incredibly dangerous situation in Pakistan; if we don't do something about failed and failing states worldwide, eventually it will happen.

**Hon. Douglas Roche:** Mr. Marston, your question is extremely important. In 2000 at the NPT review of that year, the states' parties grappled with the question of terrorists' use of nuclear weapons. They came to this conclusion and they wrote it into their document and all 188 states' parties signed onto the following sentence, “the only absolute guarantee against the use, by terrorists, of a nuclear weapon, is the elimination of nuclear weapons”. And that's the point that we want to stress with the Canadian government that is today, rightly, concerned about questions of security. Among the Canadian government's concerns about security should be terrorist acquisition and use of nuclear weapons.

**Amb. Thomas Graham:** I agree with what Senator Roche just said and for the committee's information, there are many people in the United States, former very senior government officials in the Reagan and first Bush administrations who share that view and there has been a series of meetings and attempts to see if a critical mass could be brought together to actually take serious steps in the direction of elimination. I would recommend to you, and I'll send this to the committee too, an op-ed article by Ambassador Max Kampelman who was President Reagan's nuclear arms negotiator generally to this effect.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Mr. Graham.

Mr. Marston, you still have a minute.

**Mr. Wayne Marston:** Really, the heart of my question though was has there been an assessment of those particular states, North Korea and Iran, as to again whether these are power weapons for them only or if there's a maliciousness there to support the non-governmental or the terrorists?
**Amb. Thomas Graham:** I could give my personal judgment on that which is worth the exact amount I'm going to charge the committee.

For North Korea, I think they see it as a way of survival. For Iran, I think it's a weapon of prestige.

**The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell:** Could I just add that I think it's important to understand that if a weapon from any of these countries wound up in the hands of a terrorist, it would involve the most extraordinary retribution against that country. It would be a huge gamble. Even Afghanistan, for harbouring Osama bin Laden, didn't involve nuclear weapons there but this harbouring him, that involved massive military intervention there and it would be a huge gamble for a state to think that it could provide that kind of weaponry to a terrorist group and not have that detected.

It's more the theft, the accidental use, and a kind of, for example, activity that happened with AQ Khan in Pakistan that is really very worrisome.

**The Chair:** Thank you, Ms. Campbell.

Mr. Obhrai, and I do stand corrected. Mr. Obhrai was here in 1997 and 1999 and he was part of that report as well.

Mr. Obhrai.

**Mr. Deepak Obhrai (Calgary East, CPC):** Thank you. Thank you for noticing.

Of course, we had You would be foolish to say that you wouldn't support the elimination of nuclear weapons, specifically when we've discussed the matter you're just discussed about terrorists getting their hands on nuclear weapons or failed states getting nuclear weapons.

However, events are going in a different direction. Specifically with the five permanent members who under NPT have obligations that you have just mentioned that they have failed to fulfill. This gives an impression to the other countries as recently as now France saying it will have no hesitation in using nuclear weapons in reference to terrorist attacks.

China just said that in light of the nuclear agreement cooperation between the U.S. and India, that China would start cooperating with Pakistan to do that and so suddenly you have this other side of the (inaudible) nucleus coming out.

It's quite interesting, this agreement between India and the U.S. Really if you go down into (inaudible) I do understand you're saying that the Americans want the Indians to come into the other agreements, such as the non-proliferation treaty.

Nevertheless, it is a challenge out there that the direction--and I honestly believe that the direction the U.S.A. has taken in reference to India has its own self interest--it had
nothing to do with elimination (inaudible) self-interest and it came along and it did and now you are saying these things are happening.

Taking all these new developments that are taking place which are totally going in a different direction from what we are discussing here today, what do you think? Do we really need to focus on this or do we really need to take that into account and say okay, the world (inaudible) How can we make the world safer, taking that new development into account?

Mr. Jonathan Granoff:

The perception of the direction of course depends on where you sit. For example, the United States did put forward the proposition that we need a Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. The rest of the world needs to say, yes, we agree with that, this is the right direction, and we need to make it verifiable. That way we'll be able to help safeguard ourselves from terrorists getting this material.

The steps that will make us safer and the steps that will corrode the regime happen to be very close to each other right now. In other words, a treaty between the United States and Russia that's not verifiable, I say, undermines the legitimacy of international law. But a treaty that is verifiable will strengthen it. This issue of verification, which is an issue in which Canada has some expertise, and has a record of advocacy, is extremely important.

If the agreement with India was coupled with a fissile material cutoff, coupled with a comprehensive test ban treaty, coupled with India agreeing to abide by the article 6 commitments of the NPT, and thus roping India into the process of the historical movement toward downgrading nuclear weapons and eliminating them, then it's a positive step. On the other hand, if those elements are not there, then it cuts to the core of the regime. We are in a turning point.

This is what the Secretary General of the United Nations said a few weeks ago. He said:

*We are at a crisis point right now in which one route is going to strengthen multilateral cooperative security based on the rule of law, and another route is going to unravel this regime. We are at a point now in which decisions that are made are going to affect our future in irreversible ways.*

That's what we're asking everybody to do, focus on strengthening those norms that can make us safer.

The Chair: Thank you, Mr. Granoff.

We want to get to Mr. Patry. You just have a couple of minutes.
Mr. Bernard Patry (Pierrefonds—Dollard, Lib.): Merci, monsieur le président

Thank you.

In the 1995 review conference, Sea, it was a good one. The regime was In the year 2000 there was a useful consensus. In 2005 there was a total failure. What's going to happen in five years from now, four years, in the year 2010, nobody knows about that. God knows.

My question is, how can international communities address the fact that countries missigned the NPT as a means to develop civilian nuclear expertise and can simply withdraw from the treaty of nuclear weapons. That's a question now.

I have a second question going back to the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty. Obviously, you mentioned this. It's one of your four priorities that you gave us, you say:

--to emphasize the need the start negotiations on the Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty continue Canadian expertise on the verification--

We read about this.

My question concerning this is the following: you also stated that:

To take advantage of the opening discuss about this middle-power countries should explore creative ways to overcome the stalemate.

What do you mean? Could you emphasize about the creative ways because we seem to be signed in a deadlock for the moment.

Hon. Douglas Roche: Thank you, Mr. Patry.

I'll try to answer the elements of your questions briefly.

First of all, you mentioned 2010, that's the next review conference of the NPT. The middle powers initiative takes the view that the NPT cannot withstand two failed conferences in a row. It failed in 2005. Thus, what are we doing about it? What are the creative initiatives that you have mentioned?

For our part, we have started an article 6 forum of 25 states that are like-minded; they're non-nuclear and like-minded. They want to move ahead on the agenda that we have been describing here. We are providing a forum for them. We met at the United Nations last October, then we went to The Hague and the Netherlands in March for two days. Now, with the support of the government of Canada we are coming here at the end of September.
I want to state parenthetically to Mr. Wilfert—I owe you the answer about the parliamentarians—that every member of this committee will receive an invitation to attend the article 6 forum on September 28 and 29. It will be opened the evening before by Hans Blix, the author of this outstanding report.

Finally, on the breakout from the treaty, we want to ensure that the loophole in the NPT is closed. That loophole is this: that states can access through the NPT, they use their access to getting nuclear technology, and then will they use it to make a bomb. We want that stopped. The only way to get cooperation of states who have an inalienable right to access nuclear energy, the only way to close the loophole is to have the major powers show that they are also living up to their commitments. The only way the NPT can survive is if there's a balanced implementation of the responsibilities for disarmament as well as non-proliferation.

The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell: Could I just add that my colleague, Mr. Graham, today was speaking about the fact that there are also new technologies for nuclear power that are non-proliferable, and that may be something that we need to try and bring into a regime, as well, to protect it, cause the point you make is a very good one.

The Acting Chair (Mr. Bernard Patry): Thank you, Mr. Chair.

Amb. Thomas Graham: That's right, Mr. Chairman. There's a new type of nuclear fuel available that you can't make weapons from and down the road there is going to be new types of power reactors that are similarly non-proliferative. So technology is advancing in a positive way.

The Chair: All right.

Well, thank you so much for coming here. I think all committee members would agree that an hour just is not long enough for this type of topic, and so we also appreciated the opportunity to get together a little bit last night.

We would welcome you back, and we look forward to September. Thank you for coming.