Excellencies, ladies, and gentlemen,

I’d like to begin by paying a tribute to the memory of David Fischer who passed away recently in the UK. David was Assistant Secretary-General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) here in Vienna and was for many years within the IAEA and after his retirement a strong campaigner for the strengthening of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). I worked with David Fischer and the core group on the Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation (PPNN) and I am personally aware of his devotion both to nuclear disarmament and to nuclear non-proliferation. Secondly, I’d like to pay a tribute to the IAEA on its 50th anniversary and to wish it many more years of success in the cause of supporting the implementation of the NPT, in particular with regard to Article III and with regard to its advocacy for the elimination of nuclear weapons.

I must thank Senator Roche and the Middle Powers Initiative for their invitation to me to speak to you this morning and to express my admiration for their tenacity of purpose, their innovative creation of the Article VI Forum, to focus on the very important aspects of the NPT.

This month is the 200th anniversary of the abolition of slavery. When in 1807 an act of parliament in Britain succeeded in eliminating what was an appalling blot on humankind. The relevance of the abolition of slavery is twofold: firstly the Congress of Vienna in 1815 much after that did also condemn slavery and the practice and the slave trade. But more importantly, at a time when slavery encompassed about three quarters of the population of the world and it seemed impossible to eliminate this process, a few dedicated individuals like William Wilberforce finally to succeed in delegitimizing this inhumane practice. True, there are remnants of slavery still existing in various parts of the world today, but the legal norm has been clearly established. And those of us who feel that the presence of nuclear weapons is something that is unchangeable, that it cannot be disinvented, should take courage from the work of William Wilberforce, which is brilliantly portrayed in the film, “Amazing Grace,” that has just been released, as well as the work of others. I believe that just as much as slavery was abolished, just as much as the apartheid regime, which appeared immutable at one stage, was eliminated, we will be able to eliminate the most horrendous weapon of mass destruction invented by humankind.

As all of you are aware, the Chicago-based Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists moved the Doomsday Clock forward two minutes closer to midnight, that symbolic hour of Armageddon, of the end of the world. They did it for two reasons: first, of course, was the threat that nuclear weapons pose to the continued existence of humankind and the world as we know it. But there was also the imminence of climate change, which recent reports, like the Stern Report in the UK and the ICC report of a group of international scientists, has shown to be very much caused by human action which has to be reversed. The lesson of Jared Diamond’s book, Collapse, is that
when societies are faced with imminent collapse, it is not inevitable that they go under as some have done: North Greenland, the Mayan civilization. It is possible to take corrective action provided you engage in long-term planning and you are willing to reconsider the core values of your society. And today, faced with these twin threats to our continued existence, it is very important that we should ourselves engage in a dialogue which will help the world to step back from the brink of doomsday.

I’d like to congratulate MPI also on the excellent briefing book prepared by Dr. John Burroughs, and it would be all too easy for me to repeat whole sections of it. But I hope that what I say today will at least underline some of the very important themes that have been recognized in the MPI briefing book.

Today I speak here with the luxury of being a private individual, neither on behalf of my national government nor on behalf of an international organization. But being a member of civil society, I am encouraged by the fact that The New York Times once referred to civil society in an editorial as “the other super power.” So I do feel empowered as a private citizen, as a concerned global citizen in my present situation. My speaking plan this morning, bearing in mind that your title for this meeting is “Forging a New Consensus for the NPT” is, first of all, what was the old consensus? What were its features, and how did they manifest themselves? Secondly, what are the new opportunities for reconstructing both the old consensus and forging a new consensus? And finally I will make a few conclusions.

Addressing the old consensus, clearly the negotiation and the signing of the NPT in 1968 and its entry-into-force in 1970 was the recognition that there was a consensus among those in the international community who believed that, not only was it important to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons horizontally, but it was also important to control it spreading vertically.

There are, as we all know, three major pillars in the NPT: the non-proliferation pillar, the disarmament pillar, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy pillar. Like any tripod, this treaty rests on three legs. If one of the legs is weakened or eliminated, you cannot have the treaty sustain itself. And what we have seen over the years is, first of all, the weakening of one leg and then the weakening of another. And it is important for all of us to see the treaty therefore in a holistic manner and make sure that all three pillars are strengthened for the NPT to be sustained.

I believe that this old consensus that did exist has all the years been weakened as a result of the neglect mainly of the disarmament pillar. In 1995 we had an opportunity of helping to redouble our efforts with regard to the NPT. We had an opportunity of reinvigorating the dedication of the States Parties to the NPT to all its aspects. Indeed, the package that was adopted, which made it possible for the NPT to be extended indefinitely, did provide a new lease of life for the NPT. It had three closely interrelated and interlaced decisions: the primary decision to extend the treaty indefinitely; the second decision to strengthen the review process; the third decision to have a set of principles and objectives as benchmarks to judge the performance of each and every state party during the review process.

And finally we had the resolution on the Middle East, without which we would not have had the extension decision that we finally did, and without which we would not have had all the Arab
states join the NPT so that today, with the sole exception of Israel, every country in the Middle East is a party to the NPT. And this, I think, is one of the positive achievements of the 1995 Review Conference.

Sadly, after the 1995 Review Conference, we found a number of states adopting a “business as usual” attitude. Rather than fulfill the commitments that were made in the 1995 package of decisions, we found them engaging in casuistry and in a reinterpretation of what was in the package of decisions. This was ominous, because we were beginning to see therefore the unraveling of that old consensus, which had been fortified in 1995. This unraveling was taking place in various ways. At the 2000 Review Conference, it was extremely encouraging to have a positive Final Document being adopted by consensus, with thirteen specific steps identified toward the fulfillment of Article VI, which is the main concern of this Forum here today.

I’d like to pay tribute to the New Agenda Coalition Countries that formed a group across regional frontiers in order to work for common cause. I believe then and I believe now that the 2000 Review Conference and the Final Document was in many ways a vindication of the decision to extend the NPT indefinitely in the manner in which it was. There were a large number of critics of that decision in 1995, but that decision was in many ways inevitable because there was a majority that had been constructed for the indefinite extension, in the absence of a viable alternative that was being advocated by any other group. But it was necessary because of the position of a number of states that there had to be another bargain that fortified the original bargain contained in the NPT itself, where that equilibrium amongst the three objectives of the treaty had to be maintained.

And so the 2000 Review Conference and its Final Document did carry forward the consensus once again despite efforts to vitiate what had been achieved in 1995.

But thereafter I’m afraid the unraveling of that consensus became very rapid. We had the abrogation of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty, a very important bilateral treaty of relevance to Article VI, we had no major disarmament treaties negotiated, and we had a very different tone in the dialogue between the nuclear weapon states (NWS) and the non-nuclear weapon states (NNWS).

I suppose three main causes could be attributed to the rupture of this consensus and the emergence of what some call the Second Nuclear Age, others call a re-nuclearization of international politics. But certainly the trend we noticed after the Cold War of a de-emphasis on nuclear weapons was reversed, and there was a fresh salience given to nuclear weapons and the policies of the NWS. And so we found that there were new theories, new doctrines coming out. For example, in the Nuclear Posture Review of the United States, references to the preemptive use of nuclear weapons, even against conventional weapons attacks, and also the trivialization of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) as a causus belli, particularly in the case of Iraq, where we found no nuclear weapons or any other WMDs after the invasion.

But the second important cause was the actual acts of proliferation by members within NPT: the DPRK, and of course the earlier proven case of Iraq, which the IAEA and UNSCOM helped to eliminate before UNMOVIC came on the scene. And then, of course, the fact that Iran has not
been in conformity with the Safeguards Agreement has raised a number of questions. And then we’ve had the revelations of the A.Q. Khan network and its own contribution towards feeding the proliferation of nuclear weapons technology, expertise, and the trade in materials.

Finally, there is the alarming specter of terrorism, which of course predated 9/11. But 9/11 was a shock to the global system and made it very clear that terrorism was a global phenomenon, capable of remarkable organization of resources and material in the pursuance of their realistic aims. And the thought was of course present in the minds of all those who witnessed the horror of 9/11: what would have happened if the terrorists did have access to nuclear weapons?

And that has made our cause within the NPT even more urgent for us to ensure that all three pillars are pursued sincerely, honestly, and with the equilibrium that was in the minds of those who drafted the treaty.

Now may I move on to new opportunities that we have to construct a new consensus on the ruins or ashes of the old consensus. I believe that there are a number of straws in the wind. I believe that they can be seen as a pattern for the new consensus, which MPI hopes to forge as we begin this new review cycle for the NPT.

The need for us to do this is all the more urgent, not only because of the causes that I have identified, but also because we have one important bilateral disarmament treaty expiring in 2009 and another expiring in 2012. And although I understand that the Russian Federation and the United States have begun discussions and consultations I think we must all of us press them into fresh negotiations leading to fresh agreements with substantial, deeper cuts in their nuclear arsenals. Let us always remember that there are still approximately 27,000 nuclear weapons in the world today. There is no transparency on the part of NWS about their arsenals, but the information gathered by the NRDC in Washington and other organizations lead us to this conclusion: that of those 27,000 weapons, approximately 12,000 are on alert, deployed status, launch-on-warning status. And that is an ever-present danger for the existence of the world.

There was an opportunity in one of the NWS, the United Kingdom, to discontinue its nuclear weapons, because the Trident system will soon come to an end. But the decision has unfortunately been taken by this government in London to have a replacement of the Trident at the cost of some $40 million. There are forty-eight nuclear weapons, each of them eight times as powerful as Hiroshima, on the submarines that the UK has. I’m told part of the reason for renewal of the Trident system is the need to keep the ship building industry going in the UK so that the submarines could be built. But in fact, the Trident, which is going to continue now and I’d like to pay a tribute to those in the UK who have strongly resisted this. I’m told they’ve lost one battle, but they’re confident of winning the war. I wish them all success.

The next opportunity is the Weapons of Mass Destruction Commission (WMDC) report. And here the Chairman of the Commission, Dr. Hans Blix, will himself talk to you about the report. But I’d like to mention that in my final year as Under-Secretary-General of Disarmament Affairs in the UN, I proposed such a commission myself and wanted it first to be undertaken within the aegis of the United Nations. My boss at the time thought it wiser to be done elsewhere, and very fortunately a hugely courageous Foreign Minister, the late Anna Lindt of Sweden, agreed that the
government of Sweden would sponsor this WMD Commission, and she invited the respected Dr. Hans Blix, former Director General of IAEA and former Chairman of UNMOVIC, to head the Commission.

We were fourteen of us drawn from different countries and we functioned for over two years, meeting in different parts of the world, including here in Vienna, interacting with relevant organizations like the IAEA, like the CTBO and others, talking to civil society, to academics, and finally formulating a set of sixty recommendations. As I said, I will not go into all of these recommendations, but they are before the international community. They were presented formally in the First Committee last year by Dr. Hans Blix, and they are there in an official document of the United Nations. My hope is that delegations will give serious consideration to these recommendations as we approach the 2010 Review Conference. 2005 probably represented the nadir of the fortunes of the NPT, where there were bitter disputes and an inability to adopt a Final Document. Final documents have not been adopted always at all review conferences. They were not adopted in 1990 and they were not adopted in 1980. But the failure to adopt a Final Document in 2005 symbolized a deeper malaise in the NPT regime. And that malaise was even more evident when in the 60th UN General Assembly last year, there was not one word adopted on any disarmament issue in the outcome document. That, I think, indicated the complete destruction of the old consensus. That is why it is so important for us to use building blocks like the WMDC report to construct this new consensus that is so important.

There are signs of change. Our Chairman mentioned the Wall Street Journal op-ed piece of the 4th of January. That was followed shortly thereafter by another op-ed piece by President Gorbachev endorsing what was said. Now clearly one op-ed piece, two op-ed pieces, like one swallow does not make a summer, do not represent fundamental change. But if persons like George Schultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn could talk about achieving a nuclear weapons free world, I think we have come a long way.

The op-ed piece talks about reliance on nuclear weapons as deterrence to be increasingly hazardous and decreasingly effective. Their recommendations of turning the goal of a world without nuclear weapons into a joint enterprise reads very much like the 13 steps adopted in the 2000 review document.

Now of course these eminent gentlemen are no longer in positions of power in the US administration, the only surviving superpower. But they are men of great influence, and one hopes that this WSJ editorial will be studied carefully and will have impacts however invisible and subtle in the policies, not only of the US, but with regard to other NWS. There are also developments taking place in the Conference on Disarmament (CD), and I have just come from Geneva, where this morning there will be an opportunity for that sole multilateral negotiating body, where many of us have served ourselves to adopt finally a work program that will set the CD in motion once again. And I’m encouraged that the six presidents of the CD have worked together in order to present a document which has been widely consulted. There are still obstacles I gather to the adoption of this decision, which calls for focused discussions under three coordinators in nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances, and the prevention of arms race in outer space with their fourth negotiator presiding over negotiations for a treaty on the halt to the production of fissile material for the production of nuclear weapons.
Now to me, a number of the arguments that are being made, which are being disguised as calls for postponement so that further study can be made of this decision, can be discussed during the negotiating process. What is important is for the negotiating process to begin. I would be very disappointed if this decision is not adopted today. Even if it is not adopted today, when the CD resumes in May one hopes at least then that a decision will be taken to adopt that decision.

We must also look upon the recent agreement in the Six-Party Talks about the DPRK as another opportunity to rebuild a consensus. It is not a perfect agreement, and indeed there are already hiccups along the way, problems with regard to the release of North Korean money from a Macau bank and so on, but I am confident that these talks will finally succeed. They have shown us a path to a diplomatic political solution of a problem of actual proliferation of nuclear weapons. And all of us in the international community and in particular those within the NPT regime have a responsibility of ensuring that that agreement is safeguarded and consolidated and taken further so that we will have an unrolling of the nuclear weapons program of the DPRK. I believe that the neglect by the international community of the Agreed Framework that had been negotiated earlier and the way in which it was eroded should not be allowed to happen with regard to this agreement. Also I think the DPRK agreement is a pointer towards what we can do with regard to Iran. I would hope that despite the adoption last Saturday of a fresh Security Council resolution and the sixty days that we have as a respite for Iran to negotiate an agreement, not only with countries with whom it has been talking, but also with the IAEA, that there will be an opportunity now for a political solution to this problem.

I see also the signature finally in September last year of a Central Asian nuclear weapons free zone in Semipalatinsk which had been the site of the most horrendous series of nuclear weapon tests—a new opening for the NNWS and for the NPT to be strengthened. The fact that the five Central Asian countries who on their own proposed this nuclear weapons free zone, and who have been assisted by the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, now converted into an office, in their quest for this affirmative action on their part. We have them being consistently opposed by some of the NWS, but very fortunately they finally grasped the nettle and signed this treaty. This is a great step forward for the implementation of an important article in the NPT.

There is another opportunity that has arisen, and I have pointed this out to those of you who were with me in Annecy recently and earlier in New York in February of this year. That is the fact that four out of the five NWS are going to have a change in their political leadership either this year or next year. This is an opportunity, therefore, for new political thinking, for new leadership in forging this new consensus. Firstly in France we are faced with an interesting election for the presidency of that country. Although the nuclear weapon issue is not a part of the debate, I believe that there has to be some new responses in that important country with regard to the debate about nuclear weapons. In the UK, we know that the incumbent Prime Minister will be stepping down this year and whether he will be succeeded by Mr. Gordon Brown or whether there will be an election and David Cameron will be elected, we don’t know. But there will be a change of leadership there, and that change of leadership represents a new opportunity. In the US, of course, there will be election of a new President next year in November. And finally in the Russian Federation, too, there will be a successor to Mr. Putin.
These are opportunities that we can be hopeful will represent a new change, a new consensus. But there is also an opportunity here in the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) meeting, the first of its kind as you go on to the NPT Review Conference of 2010. I’d like to emphasize here with my experience, the importance of good conference management and electing the right conference officers. I’m delighted that Ambassador Yukiya Amano has been designated as the Chairman of the First PrepCom. I hope similar wisdom will be reflected in the choices of others. I do not think it is too early for members of the Non-Aligned Movement to begin thinking of who the president of the NPT 2010 Review Conference should be, because it is so important there should be continuity, a team of responsible office bearers who will head the PrepCom meetings and who will chair the main committees and also the Review Conference itself. I would urge all delegations to begin intensive consultation in their respective groups for selecting the right leaders of this important NPT review cycle.

Let me conclude with some important proposals. As I said, we are moving from the winter of our discontent in the NPT regime to perhaps the spring of hope. And in this transitional period it is normal for us to have good indicators and to have setbacks. And what we must always do of course is to be encouraged by the good things that happen but not be discouraged by the setbacks, and keep to our objectives with dedication and pursue them with persistence and perseverance.

I would warn first of all to watch out for Russian concerns. I think for too long after the Cold War, the concerns of the Russian Federation have been taken for granted. But I believe the speech in Munich by Putin in February and some articles that have appeared, such as an article by Sergei Rogov which appeared on the 3rd of March in The Washington Post, are a plea for recognition of Russian concerns. And behind these pleas, there are also unfortunately hints of tougher action to follow if these concerns are not recognized. One is the possibility of withdrawing from the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty. If one nuclear weapon state can abrogate one treaty, so can another. This is a dangerous game to play. The INF was one of the great triumphs of the post-Cold War period in terms of nuclear disarmament. And for that treaty to be annulled in some way would represent a major setback. So I would urge that in the discussions that are going on bilaterally, but also multilateral pressure is needed for us to ensure that the relationship between these two major NWS is once again put on an even keel so that the process of nuclear disarmament can continue.

I also see an encouraging sign in the styling of US diplomacy. Those of you who were present with me at the Monterrey workshop in Annecy would recall that four papers were presented by the US representative at that meeting. And although I had the opportunity of reading those papers subsequently and being disappointed in their content, what I do recognize is a very constructive tone in those papers, a desire to constructively engage the rest of the international community, and I believe there should be a positive response on the part of other members of the international community to that tone.

As you know, diplomacy, especially in the multilateral process, is something that is crucial in our discussions. There are statements, such as this in one of the papers presented by the US government, which says that “US diplomats have stressed in recent consultations that the United States is committed to engaging in dialogue with foreign partners on how to create an
environment in which it will be realistically possible to achieve and sustain the total elimination of nuclear weapons.

I know of very few US government documents which talk positively about the total elimination of nuclear weapons. I believe, therefore, that there is this opportunity which we must use. I believe also that it is important for us to have fallback positions. I have, throughout my diplomatic career, been a man of consensus, and I believed very strongly that the 1995 decision should not be a voted decision, although the rules of procedure permitted us to do that. And although the treaty itself required us to do that, a decision on the extension of the treaty could have been taken by a majority. But in a treaty so viscerally related to international peace and security as the NPT, it would have been suicidal if not dangerous for us to have exposed ourselves as a divided house. Which is why I labored so hard within the one month devoted to that review and extension conference for us to have this package adopted without a vote. But I think the time has come for us to also put on the table a proposal for the formal amendment of the NPT. There is provision in the NPT, as all of you know, for an amendment process. Any party to the treaty may propose amendments to this treaty, says Article VIII. The text of any proposed amendment shall be submitted to the depository government which shall circulate it to all parties to the treaty, thereupon if requested to do so by one third or more of the parties to the treaty, the depository government shall convene a conference to which they shall invite all the parties to the treaty to consider such an amendment.

Now Article VIII, Paragraph 2, which I shall not read out, clearly shows us the obstacles to that amendment process being successful. But I believe it is important for us to begin the process. I see in the audience somebody who helped me with the amendment process for the Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT), but for the PTBT we had a great leader in Ambassador Alfonso García Robles, who deservedly won the Nobel Peace Prize for his work on disarmament. He led us in that process. I hope that there can be a similar leader who will emerge to place on the table amendments, not only for Article VI, because we have to look at the treaty in all of its aspects, as I have been emphasizing. We need to ensure that all three pillars of the treaty are strengthened, and that can be done by having a well considered, formulated amendment to Article III to begin the new development of additional protocol and making that mandatory for all members of the NPT. That can be done by clarifying that the inalienable right to the peaceful uses of nuclear energy is not an absolute right in itself but is conditional upon conformity with Articles I and II and with the entirety of the treaty so that you do not isolate one of those pillars at the expense of the other two.

We can happily delete Article V, which is obsolete and which, as all of you know, is in fact defunct as a viable article of that treaty. And finally, of course, Article VI, which needs strengthening in light of the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice. And here, while I do not have a firm relation to offer you, I am sure that organizations like MPI can come out with formulations that can be considered in a conference that can be sorted by a required number of parties under Article VIII.

There are two final points that I would like to make. The first is Recommendation 59 of the WMD report where a world summit is proposed to consider the disarmament, the proliferation, and the terrorist uses of WMDs. I have at various fora suggested that this summit should be
considered for 2009 or shortly thereafter. It should be well prepared, but it is important for us to look at the problem of WMDs in this holistic way, to look upon the fact that disarmament and non-proliferation are two faces of the same coin, and that you cannot achieve one without achieving progress in the other. We must therefore maintain the equilibrium that we have talked about.

Finally, let me quote from the book I wrote on the NPT Review and Extension Conference, and this is not a commercial because when the book was published by Unity, it was published more as a service to the delegations meeting at the 2005 Conference. But I would like to quote one paragraph from it. It says, “The NPT remains a living treaty, which will evolve in response to the challenge of history. Despite its seemingly impossible amendment procedures, there are ways for the treaty to adapt and change in its implementation and in the achievement of a nuclear weapons free world. I have never believed that the NPT is a perfect treaty. Like all documents produced through negotiations, among nation states with different interests, it has its imperfections. But it is the best hope we have, together with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the IAEA as a watchdog, to achieve an end to nuclear weapons.

I thank you.