MPI Event Report
Oct 17, 2005
By John Koogler
United Nations, New York - The Middle Powers Initiative hosted a luncheon at the United Nations on October 17, 2005, on the theme "Moving Forward on Non-Proliferation and Disarmament." The working lunch was an opportunity to discuss institutional obstacles to nonproliferation and disarmament in light of critical issues before the First Committee of the General Assembly of the U.N.
The event was hosted by Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, with keynote speakers Ambassador Luis de Alba, Permanent Representative of Mexico, and Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier, Permanent Representative of Sweden. On October 12, Canada, Brazil, Kenya, Mexico, New Zealand, and Sweden (the G-6) officially withdrew their draft resolution "Initiating work on priority disarmament and non-proliferation issues" under significant pressure from the P-5 nations. The resolution would have created four ad hoc committees in Geneva under First Committee auspices for the purpose of making progress on a fissile material treaty and security assurances from the NWS to the NNWS. Following a concerted campaign by the P-5, supported by India and Pakistan, in the First Committee and demarches to the governments of the 6 nations, the draft was ultimately dropped despite significant support from middle power nations and the NGO community.
29 people attended the luncheon, including 13 ambassadors and Under Secretary-General Nobuyasu Abe, to discuss the implications of the failed measure, and concrete legal and political strategies for moving forward on the substance of the G-6's popular measure. The discussion took place within the larger framework of the Article VI Forum, which was inaugurated on October 3, 2005 to undertake work on examining the legal, technical, and political requirements for a nuclear weapons-free world.
The Nature of the Deadlock
Jonathan Granoff opened the session with comments on the nature of the institutional deadlock. He stated that the dual strategy of a minority of nuclear weapons states to undermine the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and to prevent meaningful dialogue by locking the CD and First Committee in procedural disputes. Noting the consensus voting requirement of the CD and the leverage of the P-5 in the First Committee, Granoff emphasized how easily a small number of nations have been able to either discourage discussion or simply veto measures designed to make progress on nonproliferation and disarmament.
He went on to argue that nations have a choice when faced with the roadblocks: to cede decision-making authority to the NWS, permitting the P-5 to dictate the terms and conditions of global action on nonproliferation, or to consolidate their voices and initiate action in spite of the institutional roadblocks that have been erected in the CD and the First Committee. Granoff urged the ambassadors to maintain a dialogue and uphold the spirit of the NPT through meaningful negotiations on all aspects of nonproliferation and disarmament. While the ultimate goal is the total elimination of nuclear weapons, he pointed out, the immediate goal was not to reach final agreement, but simply to agree to negotiate.
Current Situation
Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier of Sweden said that despite the successful NPT Review Conferences in 1995 and 2000, the results have "in reality amounted to almost nothing" since the commitments have be neglected. Through the failure of NWS to uphold their commitments, and because they have not indicated an intention to reduce their arsenals, nuclear proliferation has now "become a reality." The 2005 Review Conference was marked by lack of cooperation and by "blunt confrontations by a few."
Despite this gloomy analysis and the attempts to undermine the international agreement, she stated, the reality is that the NPT "remains part and parcel of international law" as do the commitments from the 1995 and 2000 review conferences. "We need to take a hard look at these commitments and begin to implement some of the key ones" while bringing in new issues, including those other than nuclear weapons, and the weaponization of space. Citing the difficulties faced in the CD and the First Committee, Bonnier concluded that the way diplomats work, including the use of regional groupings and the consensus rule, needs to be reassessed.
Moving Forward
In working around the deadlock in diplomatic fora, the issue must be brought directly to the attention of the heads of states. Only through educating heads of state and gathering momentum for disarmament and nonproliferation from the top down can the procedural logjam be effectively broken. The issue is so critical and of such importance, Ambassador Luis de Alba of Mexico said, traditional methods of appeal must not be relied upon. "We are not radicals" but the proposals we make are radical. "Revolution is needed, not evolution," therefore coordination with incoming CD presidents must be radical and provocative, starting with structured discussions and working groups. "If the NPT and nonproliferation/disarmament fight is dropped, what is our alternative?" Regardless of the fate of the CD, he continued, we must continue to use the First Committee since that is the democratic forum without the veto. De Alba stated that a crucial strength of the G-6 draft was that it worked to expand the middle ground, rather than placate the extremes. This is an important strategy, as any successful movement must gain not simply a majority, but overwhelming majority support.
With the floor opened for comments:
·Ambassador Paul Meyer of Canada concurred with de Alba, saying that the case against the abuse of consensus in the CD needs to be put more forcefully. Just as the United States argues that its national security issues cannot be subject to majority vote, neither can the world rely on the nuclear weapon states to look out for the collective security. An active resistance, not a passive opinion-sharing coalition, must be organized. Accountability on the issue of nonproliferation and disarmament must be put forward in a public forum, hold national leaders responsible for blocking progress on the issue.
·Ambassador Johannes Landman of the Netherlands argued that it is not the disarmament mechanism that is failing, but that countries using the mechanism are abrogating their responsibilities for leadership. The resulting ineffectiveness of the mechanism necessitated it "being put in the freezer," and the attention of the diplomatic community be focused on how to move forward within the existing framework and how to reinvigorate the mechanism and process.
·Ambassador Trezza (Italy) said the "substantive problem" in these deliberations is with the nuclear fuel cycle, and the international community should take the first step by addressing this as the most pressing topic. "What divides non-nuclear from nuclear weapon states" and within the Non-Aligned Movement is how to address the FMCT.
·Ambassador Rapacki addressed the panel, seeking clarity on how to keep the substance of the G6 initiative alive in the "6 plus 6" meetings (the six nations behind the ad hoc committee initiative and the next six presidents of the Conference on Disarmament). One possibility would be to streamline the process by meeting in two or three committees rather than four. Ambassador Bonnier agreed, stating that the "6 plus 6" must keep working on how to get substance into the CD, fewer committees are a possibility - where the issue is dealt with doesn't matter, as long as the issue is not dropped.
----------------------------------
Remarks by Ambassador Elisabet Borsiin Bonnier
We should not dwell on the past, but try to look ahead. But allow me a few initial remarks on some recent experiences that we unavoidably will carry with us as we try to move forward.
The period leading up to the 2005 NPT Review Conference had been rather gloomy. The much-praised results of the 2000 Review Conference had in reality amounted to almost nothing. Commitments entered into had been neglected, even rejected. There was little or no confidence that the nuclear weapon states really intended to build down their arsenals to zero. Proliferation had become a reality. The basic deal underpinning the Treaty's balance between the undertakings under the three pillars was put into question.
During the 2005 Review Conference the mood was neither one of co-operation and compromises, or give-and-take, nor one of carefully negotiated steps forward. Rather, most of us had to endure blunt confrontations by a few and attitudes of "all or nothing", "my way or no way". Some have characterised the Review Conference as "Deadly dead-lock" and "massive hostage-taking", not entirely without reason.
I for one felt as if the whole multilateral way of doing business was under attack. Much like it was some time ago in Cancun, like it has been for some time in the Human Rights Commission and like it, to some extent, played out also in the Summit here last month. Any hope that our Heads of State and Government would then succeed where the Review Conference failed was futile. They could not agree on a single word on disarmament and non-proliferation. And similar hurdles now seem to be accumulating before the Tunis summit on Information society in November and the Hong Kong trade ministerial in December.
But let us go back to disarmament and non-proliferation. Let's look at where we stand and how we can repair the damage and move ahead.
1. The NPT still stands. It remains part and parcel of international law. The obligations are mandatory. Not voluntary. The problem is not the Treaty but rather that some choose to comply with it ŕ la Carte. So we must ask ourselves: Is there any effective way to hold states accountable? Could we develop incentives and disincentives? Sanctions? Would it be helpful to have the UN Security Council more engaged? Or would that fall on the veto-power of nuclear weapons states? And what can our citizens do to hold their political leaders accountable for the present inertia?
2. The outcome of the 1995 and 2000 Review Conferences contain a broad spectrum of unanimously adopted political commitments under the treaty. 2005 may have shaken the ground on which they stand, but the fact remains that they still stand. And they do cover all three pillars.
We now need to take a hard look at these commitments and begin to implement some of the key ones. I do believe that it is both necessary and possible to seriously move ahead on a few key measures targeting both disarmament and non-proliferation. Even during the short week that the 2005 Review Conference was allowed to work it became clear that on a number of issues agreements would not be impossible. So let us get down to work on those.
3. In the nuclear field we do not need a new roadmap. But we do need focussed and concerted efforts to operationalise and implement existing commitments. Key words are compliance, implementation and verification. And key substance matters remain existing weapons as well as fissile material for possible future ones.
4. Some say that the disarmament agenda is outdated, that we should bring in new issues. Perceptions, threats and challenges evidently change over time. And will continue to do so. But the emergence of new dangers does not alleviate the burden of dealing with the old ones, and addressing the old ones is no reason not to face up to new ones. The present debate of old versus new threats is a false debate and the effect has largely been that neither is dealt with. Instead of fruitless debates where some agenda priorities are pitched against others, we should open our minds, and the agendas, to all global security concerns. Be they old or new.
5. Non-proliferation and disarmament is not only about nuclear weapons. We must take great care to ensure that the devastating inertia of the CD and the NPT Review Conference does not creep into the IAEA, OPCW and the upcoming Review process of the biological weapons convention.
We also need to take a serious look at another important cluster of issues which for much too long has been left by the wayside, namely that of preventing the weaponization of Outer Space. Year after year the UNGA passes resolutions which are not implemented. And year after year it figures on a CD programme of work, which is not adopted. I believe that, as a first modest step the disarmament community might benefit from a better understanding and interaction with the experts of COPUOS and UNISPACE III, but such suggestions are often met with blank stares into (a not so empty) space.
6. It is common knowledge that when diplomats and bureaucrats fail with the substance, they start blaming the procedures. We must not fall into that trap. Nevertheless, I do believe that we have to reassess the way we work. Not as a substitute for substantive focus but because the modes from the cold war period is simply no longer effective. In effect they are counter-productive.
- The present geographical groupings should be reserved for election purposes and possibly information-exchange. Not for position taking in a negotiating process. These groupings are a typical leftover from the cold war. Today like-minded states are found in all groupings and they should work closer together rather than be stymied by sometimes artificial group loyalties. Substance matters more than geography and we need much more co-operation across the geographical groups. The New Agenda Coalition, NAC is one example. Recently seven nations joined together to try to rally support for the inclusion of non-proliferation and disarmament in the Summit's Outcome Document. And now during the First Committee another six countries took an initiative to try to break the dead-lock in the CD. I believe, and hope, that we will see more "intercontinental" groupings like these.
- We also need to take a good look at the way consensus-rules are being abused for procedural hold-ups. It is not reasonable that procedural vetoes can be systematically abused to prevent substantive discussions from even beginning. For three out of four weeks the NPT Review Conference was effectively blocked this way. For 8 years the CD has similarly been stymied. Consensus-requirement on substance, once the discussions/negotiations are under-way is quite another matter. The right to say No is absolutely essential when national security matters are at stake, not the least for smaller nations outside defence alliances. But I fail to understand how it can threaten anybody's security to agree to discuss security concerns of others?
7. Now and again the so-called disarmament machinery is put into question. To my mind it is not the machinery itself that is lacking. Of course one can always do some housekeeping to make it smoother and more effective. But the key problem is our inability to fully utilise the potentials of all its parts. That goes for the UNGA and its First Committee, it goes for the UNDC, for the CD and for the various review processes connected to the body of international treaties. We could be a lot more flexible in exploring the inter-relationship between the various parts of this machinery. During the past two weeks some of us managed to excite or upset others by suggesting that pending agreement on a program of work in the CD we could utilise the UNGA-machinery and unused CD-funds to begin the work. That was too radical for some and we have now put it on the backburner for the time being thus yielding to those who wish to give the CD a ninth year of finding another more effective way forward.
8. And finally - the Political will. It cannot be denied that the lack of political will in some quarters to deal with certain issues is, of course, a major problem. But just leaning back and blaming the lack of political will by others is also a convenient way to shun one's own responsibility. There comes a point when one must realise that succumbing year after year to someone else's unwillingness becomes tantamount to denying the political will of one's own citizens. It should not surprise anyone when such situations give rise to a search for less conventional ways forward.
|
