MPI Policy Document
San Francisco
April 2003
"This paper makes an important contribution in a threefold way. First, it clarifies that too little has been done to advance the nuclear disarmament agenda adopted in 2000. Second, it helps holding governments accountable for what they did and didn't do since 2000. Finally, it underscores that governments remain responsible under the commitments made in 2000 to fully implement the 13 Practical Steps."
Jayatha Dhanapala
UN Under-Secretary General for Disarmament Affairs, New York
To download MPI's April 2003 Briefing Paper, click on the following link:
April 2003 MPI Briefing Paper, "Advancing the NPT 13 Practical Steps" (PDF)
Context:
At the NPT Review Conference in 2000, the nuclear-weapon States pledged an "unequivocal undertaking" to accomplish the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals. They committed to more than a dozend practical disarmament steps to achieve this vital goal.
Three years into the deal, none of their commitments has been fulfilled. Worse, several steps have been "reversed."
This MPI Briefing Paper carefully describes relevant developments in the nuclear disarmament arena since 2000. On the basis of a thorough analysis of the status quo, MPI makes a range of practical disarmament recommendations, urging governments to deliver on their 2000 promises.
The Briefing Paper was written by Dr. Urs Cipolat, MPI Program Director, with the assistance of Dr. John Burroughs of the Lawyers' Committee on Nuclear Policyand Mr. Alyn Ware of the Parliamentarians for Nuclear Non-proliferation and Disarmament.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
(excerpted from the April 2003 MPI Briefing Paper)
The Middle Powers Initiative urges governments to work vigorously on the following priority steps in fulfillment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives under the NPT and reduce current nuclear dangers:
Step 1: CTBT
. Governments should pressure CTBT hold-out states to sign and ratify the treaty without delay or conditions.
. Support for the activities of the CTBTO PrepComm should be continued.
Step 2: Nuclear Test Moratorium
. Pending entry-into-force of the CTBT, all states with nuclear weapons should be pressured to maintain the moratorium on nuclear explosions.
. Governments should speak out strongly against the concept of "usable" nuclear weapons and affirm that any use of nuclear weapons is contrary to international humanitarian law and other laws governing armed conflict.
Step 3: Fissile Material Treaty
. Pending adoption of a CD programme of work, all nuclear-weapon states should be urged to adopt and maintain unilateral moratoria on the production of weapons-grade fissile materials.
. Breaking the CD impasse represents an absolute priority. Governments should support the call for negotiations on a FISSBAN and the formalization of negative security assurances. They should also consider proposals for progress on a FISSBAN outside the CD.
. Governments should support the creation of a comprehensive, reliable inventory of all weapons-usable fissile material stocks.
Step 4: Subsidiary Body of CD to Discuss Nuclear Disarmament
. In an effort to break the CD deadlock, governments should promote the "Five-Ambassadors" (A-5) proposal, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with nuclear disarmament.
. Governments should support the UN Secretary General's Millennium call for an international conference to end nuclear dangers.
Step 5: Principle of Irreversibility
. Nuclear-weapon states should be encouraged to apply the principle of irreversibility explicitly to current and future agreements on the reduction of strategic and non-strategic nuclear warheads.
Step 6: Elimination of Nuclear Arsenals
. Nuclear-weapon states and NATO members should be encouraged to revise their security policies and render them consistent with their commitment to accomplish the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
. Governments should continue to promote both the 2000 "unequivocal undertaking" and the 1996 Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, which unanimously ruled that there exists an obligation to "bring to a conclusion" nuclear disarmament negotiations.
Step 7: START II, START III, and ABM Treaties
. Russia and the US should continue to reduce their strategic nuclear arsenals in accordance with the goals and principles agreed upon under START II and III. Hence, reductions should be rendered transparent, irreversible, and verifiable; multiple-warhead missiles should be destroyed; and verification measures should be applied to warheads as well as delivery systems.
. Governments should support the A-5 proposal, which calls for the establishment of an ad hoc committee to deal with the arms race in space.
. Pending the adoption of a CD programme of work, governments should reaffirm the international, legally binding principles anchored in the 1967 Outer Space Treaty, which calls for the peaceful exploration and use of outer space and prohibits the stationing and installation of nuclear weapons or any other kinds of
weapons of mass destruction in outer space.
. Governments should support efforts for comprehensive and non-discriminatory missile control including flight test bans and space launch verification mechanisms.
Step 8: Trilateral Initiative
. Russia and the US should be encouraged to sign bilateral agreements with the IAEA under the Trilateral Initiative to subject all of their excess weapons-grade fissile materials to irreversible international control.
. Bilateral initiatives aimed at securing, converting, and eliminating weapons-grade fissile materials should be incorporated in an overarching multilateral, legally binding disarmament verification regime under IAEA
control.
. Governments should support the creation of an IAEA Nuclear Arms Control Verification Fund to help finance the implementation of the Trilateral Initiative and its progressive expansion to additional facilities located in Russia, the United States and other nuclear-weapon countries.
Step 9: Steps Leading to Nuclear Disarmament Consistent with Stability and Security
a) Unilateral reductions
. Governments should insist on additional unilateral reductions of both strategic and non-strategic arsenals worldwide.
. The "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative deserves maximum support. Financial assistance under the initiative should be made contingent upon international verification and immediate de-emphasis of the role of nuclear weapons in the security policies of the nuclear-weapon states.
b) Increased transparency
. Russia and the US should apply the START transparency framework to the SORT, with verification measures applied to both delivery systems and warheads.
. Governments should work actively for the conclusion of the Convention on Nuclear Terrorism and ensure that it includes adequate transparency and information sharing measures.
. All members of the CD should authorize, within the broader context of adopting a programme of work, the creation of the position of a Special Coordinator on transparency in armaments. This coordinator, in close cooperation with the Secretary-General, should examine proposals concerning the inclusion of nuclear
weapon stockpiles in the UN arms register. Governments should actively support the expansion of the register to include WMD.
c) Reductions of non-strategic weapons
. The Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 should be turned into legally binding agreements incorporating the principles of transparency and irreversibility.
. Immediate steps should be taken to reduce the operational status of all deployed non-strategic weapons.
. The "10 plus 10 over 10" initiative should pay specific attention to enhancing the security of the large Russian tactical nuclear stockpiles.
. NATO member states should reformulate their national security policies to fully comply with Arts. I and II of the NPT.
d) Reduction of operational status
. De-alerting measures should be applied to all nuclear forces.
e) Diminished role for nuclear weapons in security policies
. A treaty formalizing the negative security assurances of 1995 should be negotiated within the CD. The PrepComm should make recommendations to the 2005 NPT Review Conference on the modalities for immediate negotiations on this issue.
. Nuclear weapon states and NATO members should be encouraged to reassess their nuclear doctrines in light of the 1996 ICJ Opinion, and to reject the concept of "usable" nuclear weapons.
f) Engagement in process leading to total elimination of nuclear weapons
. Governments should support measures integrating all nuclear-weapon states in a process leading to the total elimination of nuclear weapons.
. Governments should encourage informal discussions on the legal, technical and political requirements for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons.
Step 10: Excess Fissile Materials
. Unilateral and bilateral disposition initiatives represent a step in the right direction, but ultimately fail to guarantee the irreversible conversion of fissile material stocks from military to exclusively civil use, nor do they allow for the required international verification. Nuclear-weapon states should conclude special bilateral verification agreements with the IAEA, based on the Trilateral Initiative.
. A process should be initiated to create a global inventory of all weapons-usable fissile materials.
. Governments should provide financial support to the various ongoing US-Russian initiatives aimed at the reduction of excess military stocks of weapons-grade fissile materials. Such financial support should be made contingent upon effective international verification and immediate de-emphasis of the role nuclear weapons play in the security policies of the nuclear-weapon states.
. Governments should support global moratoria on both reprocessing spent fuel for plutonium separation and using HEU in civil reactors.
. While tritium is not a fissile material, it should also be subject to internationally verified control and reduction because of the important role it plays in nuclear weapons.
Step 11: General and Complete Disarmament
. Governments should reduce their conventional military spending and strengthen multilateral disarmament treaties, in particular the Biological Weapons Convention.
Step 12: Regular Reports
. All states parties to the NPT should provide regular, standardized reports on the implementation of Art. VI as well as paragraph 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision.
. These reports should be submitted to each session of the NPT PrepComm. The reports on article VI should cover issues and principles addressed by the thirteen steps and include specific and complete information on each of these steps (inter alia, the number and specifications of warheads and delivery systems in service and number and specifications of reductions, dealerting measures, existing holdings of fissile materials as well as reduction and control of such materials, achievements in the areas of irreversibility, transparency and verifiability). Further, the reports should address current security policies and nuclear postures.
Step 13: Development of Verification Capabilities
. Nuclear disarmament must be verifiable. Governments should support the IAEA in its verification-related work and provide the Agency with generous assistance to enable it to perform the increasing number of international disarmament verification tasks under Art. VI. |
