San Francisco
November 30, 2002
By Urs Cipolat, MPI Program Manager
On October 3, 2002, the Middle Powers Initiative (MPI) held a Strategy Consultation at the United Nations in New York. The Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada, chaired the successful event, which brought together ambassadors and delegates from more than 20 countries and a dozen non-governmental organizations.
In their introductory remarks, Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, and Senator Douglas Roche, Chair of MPI, stressed the interconnectedness of the human security agenda. The formal presentations by Ambassador Mary Whelan from Ireland, Mr. Santiago Mourão from Brazil, and Ambassador Robert Grey Jr. from the United States, provided a useful overview of ongoing nuclear disarmament initiatives and a thought-provoking analysis of the new security context in which the international community finds itself since President George W. Bush took office. The off-the-record roundtable discussion, initiated by Dr. Randy Rydell of the UN Department for Disarmament Affairs, focused on the widely distributed August 2002 MPI Briefing Paper, "Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context." While much of the Strategy Consultation dealt with specific aspects of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation agenda, several interventions - notably those of Ambassador Grey and Mr. Mourão - addressed the overarching issue of human security in the 21st century. The following reflections - introductory in their nature - represent an attempt to recapitulate the core aspects of the human security debate, and relate them to the issue of nuclear weapons. More specifically, they aim to clarify why multilateral approaches are vital to effectively address today's pressing global security threats, including the threat of nuclear annihilation.
The introductory remarks on nuclear weapons and human security are followed by a set of MPI recommendations, a summary of the debate that took place during the Strategy Consultation, and a complete list of Consultation participants. The presentations of Rt. Hon. Kim Campbell, Ambassador Whelan, Ambassador Grey and Santiago Mourão can be found in the Annex. The Annex also contains the text of the two New Agenda Coalition Resolutions concerning nuclear disarmament, adopted by the UN General Assembly's First Committee on October 25 and 28, 2002, the record of the votes in the First Committee and the General Assembly, the recommendations of the UN Study on Disarmament Education, and the 13 Steps document adopted during the NPT 2000 Review Conference.
I. INTRODUCTION
Nuclear Weapons - An Obstacle to Human Security in the 21st Century
By Urs Cipolat, MPI Program Manager
More than a decade ago, the Berlin Wall fell. The subsequent breakdown of the Soviet Union, which led to the end of the Cold War, announced the birth of a new security context.
For fifty years, the superpower competition between the United States and the Soviet Union divided the world into two main camps, with each side trying to increase its security at the cost of the other.
Security during the Cold War was, in essence, mutually exclusive. Fear and suspicion dominated international relations and thwarted attempts to curb the resulting arms race. If anything, the deterrence doctrine - based on the premise of mutually assured destruction (MAD) - exacerbated widespread insecurity.
The end of Cold War bipolarity offered an exceptional opportunity in international relations to move beyond the age-old game of zero-sum security. A similar opportunity had previously emerged following WW II, when the trauma of two bloody world wars brought the international community to embrace a security concept based on cooperation rather than competition. The new concept, termed 'common security,' led to the creation of the United Nations. However, the UN experienced difficulties living up to its initial promises. Ideological divisions and re-emerging inter-state rivalries all too soon reanimated global antagonism, thus preventing the realization of collective security.
In the early 1990s, it seemed that history was about to repeat itself. The fall of the Berlin Wall revived the same hopes that had led to the creation of the United Nations, yet it also gave rise to challenges similar to those that had instigated the Cold War rivalry. Nevertheless, one essential difference emerged. Due to the existence of an increased number of pressing problems threatening the world as a whole, the international community could no longer afford a relapse into the zero-sum game of international security.
The post-Cold War security context demands that the world finally live up to the promises of the common security concept. Greater security today is contingent on greater inclusiveness, not exclusiveness. Global threats such as the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, environmental degradation, the spread of infectious diseases, pandemic poverty, or terrorism all require collective responses. National security no longer can be pursued unilaterally. The existence of transnational threats has rendered the world interdependent, turning each country's security into a global affair.
Human security - the fundamental goal of national security - has evolved into a problem of collective concern that can only be solved multilaterally. Ideological divisions and national self-interest can no longer be allowed to dominate the interactions between states. Notions of moral or national superiority and the tendency to enforce these by military might must be replaced by consistent recourse to universally agreed-upon norms and legal mechanisms in an effort to realize the aims of the UN and to replace the law of force with the force of law.
Still, it remains to be seen whether the international community will recognize the need for greater multilateral cooperation and embrace the common security concept. Developments in the early 1990s provided grounds for optimism. The crises in Iraq, Rwanda, Haiti and Yugoslavia all demonstrated that multilateral responses are the best possible option to effectively address regional instability. A series of world summits, organized under the auspices of the United Nations, provided valuable blueprints for how multilateralism could help resolve the pressing global threats. With his legendary proclamation of a "new world order . where the United Nations, freed from cold war stalemate, is poised to fulfil the historic vision of its founders," President George Bush Sr. validated the collective security concept.
Multilateralism was further boosted by the creation of the WTO and several regional free trade zones, the indefinite extension of the NPT, and the adoption of numerous new treaties such as the CWC, the Ottawa Convention, the CTBT, the Rome Statute, and the Kyoto Protocol. Finally, the IT revolution and the forces of economic globalization helped render multilateralism the central theme of international relations in the 1990s.
Then came the American presidential elections of 2000. George W. Bush's victory and the resulting radical shift in U.S. politics have created a severe challenge to the decade-old tradition of high-spirited multilateralism. With the new U.S. Administration systematically challenging the multilateralism paradigm of the 1990s and purposefully blocking any inclusive political processes, the international community is pushed backwards toward polarization, fragmentation, competition, and ideological division.
The question arising now is whether the world can afford another round of polarization and fragmentation. Can we afford a lengthy dispute over the value of inclusivism and multilateralism in a period when global threats seriously endanger the survival of our species?
The short answer is no. The current standstill of multilateral negotiations represents a time bomb. Unilateral militarism, the foreign policy doctrine pushed since Sept. 11, 2001, fails to address the pressing social, economic, and environmental threats of our time. On the contrary, it serves to aggravate them. The planned development and testing of modified or new nuclear weapons, the
establishment of a national missile shield, and the weaponization of space will accelerate, not curb, the proliferation of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. The setting up of trade barriers on steel, textiles, or agricultural goods in the North will increase, not alleviate, pandemic poverty in the South. Military oppression and the discriminatory application of human rights will boost, not reduce, terrorism and violence. Disrespect for international rules and universal values will promote, not eliminate, lawlessness.
Never before in history has the need for an inclusive security concept based on multilateral cooperation and the rule of law been greater. Yet the current culture of exclusiveness and divisiveness - exasperated and perpetuated by a small number of states maintaining nuclear arsenals - prevents the international community from moving in the right direction. The existence of 30,000 nuclear weapons - carrying 80,000 times the destructive power of the bombs dropped on Hiroshima and Nagasaki - inevitably keeps the world locked in the antiquated mindset of mutually exclusive security.
Breaking the dangerous deadlock requires progress toward the total elimination of nuclear weapons. This goal, however, requires the cultivation of a climate of multilateral cooperation, mutual trust, and universal respect for widely accepted norms and principles. As Benjamin Franklin reminds us, "We must all hang together, or assuredly we shall all hang separately."
II. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Middle Powers Initiative urges governments to work together to obtain the following priority results in fulfillment of the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation obligations under the NPT, outlined in the 13 Steps document of 2000:
1. Strategic Nuclear Arms Reductions: Implementation of the May 2002 U.S.-Russian Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (Moscow Treaty) in accordance with NPT principles so that downloaded warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; dealerting the remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
2. Tactical Nuclear Arms Reductions: Unilateral removal by the United States of its remaining tactical nuclear bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; creation of a wider process and control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons through
a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives;
b) formalizing these initiatives by establishing a verification mechanism;
c) reciprocally exchanging information - in accordance with existing NATO proposals - regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and
d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons.
3. Non-Use of Nuclear Weapons: Reversal of trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, as exemplified in the Russian National Security Concept of January 2000 or the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review of January 2002 and the U.S. WMD Strategy of December 2002; establishment of an absolute refusal of middle power countries in any multilateral or bilateral security alliances to participate in or support the first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.
4. Ban on Nuclear Testing: Implementation of a total moratorium on nuclear testing; entry into force of the CTBT; closing of all nuclear test sites, including those in Nevada, Novaya Zemlya and Lop Nor.
5. Control of Fissile Materials: Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials,
a) creation of a process of accounting for and control of fissile material holdings on a global scale and in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a worldwide inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons;
b) commencement of negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and
c) increased funding for the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.
6. Control of Missile Defenses and Non-Proliferation of Missiles: Initiation of negotiations aimed at the control of missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the NPT Art. VI process and to promote international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevention of missile proliferation, through
a) ad hoc arrangements (as with North Korea); and
b) developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
7. New Agenda Coalition Resolutions: Support for the full implementation of the two New Agenda Coalition Resolutions, "Towards a Nuclear-Weapon-Free World: the Need for a New Agenda" (A/C.1/57/L.3/Rev.1 of 18 October 2002) and "Reductions of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons" (A/C. l/57/L.2/Rev. 1 of 23 October 2002).
8. Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education: Full implementation of the recommendations made in the new UN Study on Disarmament and Non-Proliferation Education (UN/A/57/124), with particular attention to recommendations 1, 4, 8, 13, 17, 19, 20, 28, 31, 33.
9. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones: Reaffirmation and strengthening of existing nuclear weapon-free zones, be they established unilaterally, as in Austria, Mongolia and New Zealand, or multilaterally, under the treaties of Bangkok, Pelindaba, Rarotonga, and Tlatelolco, the Antarctica, Outer Space, or Seabed Treaties; support for the emerging nuclear weapon-free zone in Central Asia and the idea to turn the entire Southern hemisphere into a nuclear weapon-free zone; promotion of additional new nuclear weapon-free zones, especially in the Northern hemisphere.
III. SUMMARY OF THE STRATEGY CONSULTATION
1. General Reaction to the MPI Briefing Paper
The MPI Briefing Paper, "Priorities for Preserving the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty in the New Strategic Context" was well-received. Many delegations considered it an important and useful framework for discussion and agenda setting. The paper's emphasis on the three core concepts of the nuclear nonproliferation regime - verification, transparency, and irreversibility - was commended. Its close interconnectedness with the goals of the New Agenda Coalition, as articulated in the 2002 resolutions, was praised. The paper's six recommendations were welcomed.
2. Interconnectedness of Global Threats
In her introductory remarks, Rt. Honorable Kim Campbell, former Prime Minister of Canada, stressed the interconnectedness of the nuclear threat with other threats of global dimension. "Absent progress in the nuclear arena," Jonathan Granoff, President of the Global Security Institute, observed, "progress in any other area pertaining to human security, be it sustainable development, terrorism, or pandemic poverty will remain insufficient." Senator Douglas Roche called upon the participating delegations to take "unequivocal steps" in an effort to preserve the NPT and secure the treaty's full implementation by all parties. Counselor Santiago Mourão from Brazil emphasized that at the dawn of the 21st century, all security threats must be addressed in a holistic way. "Inconsistent processes," Mourão concluded, "will not lead us anywhere."
3. New Agenda Coalition Resolutions
Stating that "the New Agenda Coalition is very much in business," Ambassador Mary Whelan of Ireland presented two new draft UN Resolutions on behalf of the New Agenda Coalition (Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, New Zealand, South Africa, and Sweden). Since its creation in 1998, the Coalition has become an outspoken advocate of nuclear abolition and a vital force in the struggle for full implementation of the NPT commitments.
The two new resolutions underscore the importance of result-based disarmament. The first resolution, "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: the need for a new agenda," restates the goals articulated in the three previous NAC resolutions of 1998, 1999, and 2000. Accordingly, the new resolution asks all NPT signatory states to comply with the word and spirit of the NPT and other disarmament treaties. In particular, it addresses the nuclear-weapon states, urging them to comply with the disarmament commitments they made at the NPT Review Conferences of 1995 (Decision 2 of the Final Declaration) and 2000 (13 Steps), and to do so in a transparent, irreversible, and verifiable way.
The second resolution, "Reductions of non-strategic nuclear weapons," calls for the prioritizing of unilateral and multilateral steps - preferably within a legally binding framework - toward the de-alerting, reduction, and eventual elimination of tactical nuclear weapons. The resolution again emphasizes the importance of transparency, verifiability, and irreversibility. The possibility of U.S. withdrawal of tactical nuclear weapons from NATO was discussed, with some participants voicing the view that such withdrawal would neither reduce NATO cohesion nor
have a negative impact on overall European security.
Participants praised the New Agenda Coalition for its tireless work toward the full implementation of existing nuclear disarmament obligations. Some representatives expressed concern about the noticeably stronger wording of the omnibus resolution. While observing that the stronger wording needs to be assessed in context with recent developments such as the US Nuclear Posture Review, NAC member states indicated their willingness to modify the wording of the resolutions in an effort to gain broader support.
4. Re-rationalization of Nuclear Weapons - Nuclear Weapons, Weapons of the Poor
Participants expressed grave concern about the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review, the concept of "mini nukes," and the re-rationalization of nuclear weapons as useable arms. Such re-rationalization, Ambassador Grey stressed, is likely to stimulate proliferation and make nuclear arms the weapons of choice.
Instead of inventing new rationales for the use of nuclear weapons, many participants observed, nuclear weapon countries would be better off working toward the total elimination of their nuclear arsenals.
The re-rationalization of nuclear weapons, Santiago Mourão argued, has been stimulated by the deemphasis of the doctrine of deterrence. This de-emphasis has led to a search for new justifications for the existing nuclear arsenals.
5. Nuclear Weapon-Free Zones
Though not explicitly mentioned in the MPI Briefing Paper, several participants underscored the importance of strengthening the proliferation of nuclear weapon-free zones (NWFZs). Dr. Randy Rydell (UN Department for Disarmament Affairs), in his role as first respondent, referred to the imminent creation of a NWFZ in Central Asia. If entered into force, Rydell stressed, the zone would
be the first NWFZ located in its entirety in the Northern hemisphere. Mourão reiterated Rydell's appeal for the creation of further NWFZs.
Some participants warned that the impending NATO expansion is likely to generate a movement which may undercut the creation of NWFZs, in light of the fact that the new NATO member states may consent to the stationing of nuclear weapon.
It was suggested that MPI, in concert with others, could work toward obtaining a binding statement from NATO that would exclude the possibility of nuclear arms being deployed on the soil of the new NATO countries.
6. Multilateral Arms Control Measures
Ambassador Grey underscored that the entry into force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) remains an essential goal. He further stressed that progress toward a Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), though desirable, may be difficult to achieve. Several participants argued that the FMCT nevertheless should be kept on the disarmament agenda. However, it was suggested that if causing continuing stalemate in the CD, the FMCT item should be dealt with in the limited context of the nuclearweapon countries. Reference was made to a working paper by South Africa analyzing the FMCT issue (see http://www.reachingcriticalwill.org/cd/speeches02/safrfissilewpcd.html).
7. Reducing Nuclear Dangers - Disarmament Commission - NPT Secretariat
Support was expressed for the idea of a special conference on reducing nuclear dangers and the strengthening of the UN Disarmament Commission. Participants also discussed the idea of establishing a secretariat to service the NPT.
8. Moscow Treaty
The Moscow Treaty fails to commit to the principles of irreversibility, verifiability, and transparency. Some participants criticized the vagueness of the treaty. Others considered it an important - though incomplete - first step in the right direction. All participants stressed the importance of further clarification of the treaty's purpose and disarmament mechanisms, and expressed hope that the abovementioned principles will be followed in implementing the treaty and codified in supplemental agreements and in other agreements on reductions. |
