By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.
[CONTINUED]
14. Reducing Nuclear Danger: Priority Points
14.1 A number of delegations referred to a recent report, "Reducing Nuclear Danger," published by the U.N.'s Advisory Board on Disarmament Matters < http://www.un.org/documents/ga/docs/56/a56400.pdf>. Germany suggested that the summary of ideas be the "subject of further substantive discussion in the review process leading to the 2005 Review Conference."
14.2 The Advisory Board's summary states that "emphasis should be
given to the following measures for reducing nuclear dangers":
"(a) Promoting a wide-ranging international dialogue on cooperative security;
(b) Preliminary political and technical measures in preparation for the possibility of convening, at the appropriate time, a major international conference that would help to identify ways of eliminating nuclear dangers;
(c) De-alerting of nuclear weapons;
(d) Review of nuclear doctrines;
(e) Further reduction of tactical nuclear weapons as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process;
(f) Enhancing security at a global and a regional level by promoting increased transparency of all nuclear weapons programmes;
(g) Creating a climate for implementing nuclear disarmament measures. Programmes of education and training on the dangers of nuclear weapons would foster an informed world public opinion that would be able to exercise a positive influence on the political will to eliminate nuclear weapons."
The following specific measures and broad approaches received varying degrees of support from the Board:
(a) Preventing the further proliferation of nuclear weapons;
(b) Banning the use of nuclear weapons;
(c) Changing military doctrines to no first use of nuclear weapons;
(d) Withdrawing all nuclear weapons deployed abroad back to their owner's territory;
(e) Eliminating all but a very small stock of reserve warheads;
(f) Creating additional nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned;
(g) Providing unconditional negative security assurances to all non-nuclear-weapon States;
(h) Abolishing the policy and practice of nuclear sharing and a nuclear umbrella;
(i) Reducing the number of nuclear-weapon systems, including eliminating multiple independently
targetable re-entry vehicles;
(j) Enhancing nuclear transparency at the global and regional levels, particularly with respect to facilities and nuclear postures;
(k) Keeping nuclear submarines deployed in a mode that would make the firing of nuclear ballistic
missiles from close range on depressed trajectories more difficult;
(l) De-targeting;
(m) Shaping communication practices so as to make immediate strikes difficult or impossible;
(n) Keeping nuclear forces in a low status of alert;
(o) De-mating nuclear warheads from launchers;
(p) Removing essential parts from launchers or nuclear warheads (such as batteries, fuel, connection cables and computers);
(q) Promoting confidence-building measures between neighbouring States in territorial conflict, including the disengagement of forces, stationing of neutral (peacekeeping) forces on either side of the demarcation line, and refraining from supporting armed non-State actors within the contested territory."
15. Chairman's Factual Summary
15.1 The mandate of the PrepComm reads: "The consideration of the
issues at each session . should be factually summarized, and its results transmitted in a report to the next session for further discussion." No mention is made about whether there should be agreement on the factual summary or how the agreement would be arrived at. Chairman Salander, sensing that it would be virtually impossible to get agreement on any meaningful summary, informed the PrepComm that his draft summary would not be open for negotiation and would not be amended. He simply annexed it to the Report of the PrepComm and the Report was adopted.
15.2 The Chairman's Factual Summary follows:
"States parties reaffirmed the NPT is the cornerstone of the global non-proliferation regime and the essential foundation for the pursuit of nuclear disarmament. In the current international climate, where security and stability continue to be challenged, both globally and regionally, by the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and of their means of delivery, preserving and strengthening the NPT is vital to peace and security.
States parties stressed their commitment to the effective implementation of the objectives of the Treaty, the decisions and the resolution of the 1995 Review and Extension Conferences and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference, adopted by consensus.
States parties further stressed that continued support to achieve universality of the Treaty was essential. They called on the four States remaining outside the Treaty - Cuba, India, Israel and Pakistan - to accede unconditionally to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States, particularly those three States that operate unsafeguarded nuclear facilities. Concern was expressed about the ongoing development of nuclear weapons and missile programs in different regions, including those of States not parties to the Treaty.
It was stressed that the best way to strengthen the non-proliferation regime was through full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the Treaty.
It was generally felt that the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 have given an even greater sense of urgency to the common efforts of all States in the field of disarmament and nonproliferation. The view was held that further strengthening and reinforcing the non-proliferation regime was imperative to prevent the use of nuclear materials and technologies for criminal/terrorist purposes. The enhancement of the non-proliferation regimes covering all weapons of mass destruction, including efforts by the IAEA, was considered to be the most important integral part of combating terrorism.
There was emphasis on multilateralism as a core principle in the area of disarmament and non-proliferation with a view to maintaining and strengthening universal norms and enlarging their scope. Strong support was expressed for the enforcement of existing multilateral treaties. The need to seek treaties and other international agreements that meet today's threats to peace and stability was underlined.
The view was expressed that the Treaty should be seen in its larger context of coherent commitments and credible progress toward nuclear disarmament. Without the fulfillment of Article Vl over time, the Treaty, in which non-proliferation and disarmament are mutually interdependent and reinforcing, will lose its true value.
The importance of increased transparency with regard to the nuclear weapons capabilities and the implementation of agreements pursuant to article VI and as a voluntary confidence-building measure to support further progress on nuclear disarmament was stressed. It was emphasized that accountability and transparency of nuclear disarmament measures by all States parties remained the main criteria with which to evaluate the Treaty's operation.
States parties remained committed to implementing article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives of Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament" and the Final Document of the 2000 NPT Review Conference. Disappointment was expressed in the progress made in implementing the practical steps for the systematic and progressive efforts to implement article VI of the NPT and paragraphs 3 and 4 (c) of the 1995 Decision on "Principles and Objectives for Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Disarmament", as agreed at the 2000 NPT Review Conference. It was also noted that the goal of nuclear disarmament can best be achieved through a series of balanced, incremental and reinforcing steps. The nuclear-weapon States informed the States parties of their respective measures taken in accordance with Article VI of the NPT, for example reductions of nuclear weapons arsenals, reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, and that new nuclear weapons are not being developed.
Concern and uncertainty was expressed about existing nuclear arsenals, new approaches to the future role of nuclear weapons, and possible development of new generations of nuclear weapons.
Strong support was expressed for the CTBT, as reflected in the Final Declaration adopted at the Conference on Facilitating the Entry into Force of the CTBT held on 11-13 November 2001 . The importance and urgency of the early entry into force of the CTBT was underscored. States which have not ratified the Treaty, especially those remaining 13 States whose ratification is necessary, and in particular those two remaining nuclear-weapon States whose ratification is a prerequisite, for its entry-into-force, were urged to do so without delay. States reaffirmed the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear-weapon-test explosions or any other nuclear explosions. States parties noted the progress made by the CTBTO PrepCom in establishing the international monitoring system.
Concern was expressed that the decision by the United States to withdraw from the ABM Treaty, and the development of missile defense systems, could lead to a new arms race, including in outer space, and negatively affect strategic stability and international security. Hope was expressed that the US-Russia bilateral negotiations to create a new strategic framework will further promote international stability.
States parties welcomed the announcement in December 2001 that the United States and the Russian Federation had completed reductions in their nuclear arsenals required under START I. They further welcomed the continuing US-Russia bilateral negotiations on strategic nuclear arms reductions, and many expressed the hope that such efforts would result in a legally binding instrument with provisions ensuring irreversibility, verification and transparency.
The importance of further reductions in non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process, was emphasized. There were calls for the formalization of the Presidential Nuclear Initiatives of 1991 and 1992 on reducing non-strategic nuclear weapons. It was stressed that non-strategic weapons must be further reduced in a verifiable and irreversible manner. Negotiations should begin on further reductions of these weapons as soon as possible.
States parties expressed regret at the inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start negotiations on a non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and to establish a subsidiary body to deal with nuclear disarmament. The Conference was urged to agree on a programme of work. States that have not yet done so were called upon to declare a moratorium on the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices.
The importance of arrangements by all nuclear-weapon States to place, as soon as practicable, fissile material designated by each of them as no longer required for military purposes, under IAEA or other relevant international verification and arrangements for the disposition of such material for peaceful purposes was stressed.
Several States parties endorsed the work being carried out under the Trilateral Initiative - involving the IAEA, the Russian Federation and the United States - in developing techniques and methodologies for placing excess nuclear materials from dismantled weapons permanently under IAEA safeguards. States parties were informed that the United States had already placed some of its fissile material under IAEA safeguards and that both the United States and the Russian Federation were working to develop practical measures for the monitoring and inspection of fissile material, including verification by the IAEA. Some States parties also noted the IAEA's safeguards experience in verifying nuclear materials and expressed the view that the IAEA could play an important role in verifying nuclear disarmament agreements.
The view was held that the attainment of a nuclear-weapon-free world should be accompanied by the pursuit of other effective arms control agreements at a global and also particularly at a regional level.
States parties recalled that regular reports should be submitted by all States parties on the implementation of Article VI as outlined in paragraph 15, subparagraph 12 of the 2000 Final Document. It was stressed that such reporting would promote increased confidence in the overall NPT regime through transparency. Views with regard to the scope and format of such reporting differed. Some States parties suggested that such reports should be submitted, particularly by the nuclear-weapon States, at each session of the Preparatory Committee, and should include detailed and comprehensive information, e.g. in a standardized format. Several States parties expressed interest in open-ended informal consultations on reporting to prepare proposals for consideration for subsequent sessions of the Preparatory Committee. Other States parties advocated that the specifics of reporting, the format and frequency of reports, should be left to the determination of individual States parties.
States parties recalled the 2000 Final Document and the request that all States parties, particularly the nuclear-weapon States, the States of the Middle East and other interested States, report through the UN Secretariat to the President of the 2005 NPT Review Conference, as well as to the Chairperson of the Preparatory Committee meetings to be held in advance of that Conference, on the steps that they have taken to promote the achievement of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and the realization of the goals and objectives of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
Support was expressed for the concept of internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free zones (NWFZs) established on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among States in the regions concerned. The contribution of such zones to enhancing global and regional peace and security, including the cause of global nuclear non-proliferation, was emphasized. It was noted that the number of States covered by the NWFZs has now exceeded 100. The establishment of NWFZs created by the Treaties of Tlatelolco, Rarotonga, Bangkok and Pelindaba was considered as a positive step towards attaining the objective of global nuclear disarmament. The importance of the entry into force of the existing NWFZ treaties was stressed. Efforts aimed at establishing new NWFZs in different regions of the world were welcomed. It was also stressed that assurances against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons to all States of the zones should be provided by the nuclear-weapon States. Support was expressed for the efforts among the Central Asian countries to establish a NWFZ in their region. States parties noted that no progress had been achieved in the establishment of NWFZs in the Middle East, South Asia and other regions.
On the issue of universality, States parties reaffirmed the importance of the resolution on the Middle East adopted by the 1995 Review and Extension Conference and recognized that the resolution remains valid until its goals and objectives are achieved. The resolution is an essential element of the outcome of the 1995 Conference and of the basis on which the NPT was indefinitely extended without a vote in 1995. States parties reiterated their support for the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons as well as other weapons of mass destruction. States parties noted that all States of the region of the Middle East, with the exception of Israel, are States parties to the NPT. States Parties called upon Israel to accede to the Treaty as soon as possible and to place its nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. Some States parties affirmed the importance of establishing a mechanism within the NPT review process to promote the implementation of the 1995 resolution on the Middle East.
States parties expressed concern at the increased tension in South Asia and the continuing retention of nuclear weapons programmes and options by India and Pakistan. States parties urged both States to accede to the NPT as non-nuclear-weapon States and to place all their nuclear facilities under comprehensive IAEA safeguards. States parties noted that both States have declared moratoriums on further testing and their willingness to enter into legal commitments not to conduct any further nuclear testing by signing and ratifying the CTBT. States parties called upon both States to sign the CTBT. States parties noted the willingness expressed by both States to participate in negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices. Pending the conclusion of a legal instrument, States parties urged both States to commit to a moratorium on the production of such fissile material. The importance of the full implementation by both States of Security Council resolution 1172 (1998) was emphasized.
The importance of full compliance by all States parties with the provisions of the NPT was stressed. States parties remained concerned that the IAEA continues to be unable to verify the correctness and completeness of the initial declaration of nuclear material made by the DPRK. The DPRK was urged to come into full compliance with its safeguards agreement with the IAEA. States parties expressed concern over the lack of implementation of the 1994 Agreed Framework.
States parties noted that since the cessation of the IAEA inspections in Iraq in December 1998, the Agency has not been in a position to provide any assurance of Iraq's compliance with its obligations under Security Council Resolution 687 (1991). Many States parties expressed grave concern and called for the full implementation of relevant Security Council resolutions, including UNSC resolution 1284, and for the re-establishment of an effective disarmament, ongoing monitoring and verification regime in Iraq, and hoped that UN inspectors will be able as soon as possible to resume their work in Iraq. Iraq reiterated that it is in full compliance with its Treaty obligations and maintained that the IAEA successfully carried out inspections in 2000, 2001 and 2002 pursuant to Iraq's safeguards agreement with the IAEA.
It was recalled that both the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference and the 2000 NPT Review Conference underscored the importance of security assurances. It was emphasized that negative security assurances, a key basis of the 1995 extension decision, remained essential and should be reaffirmed. Many States parties reaffirmed that non-nuclear-weapon States parties should be effectively assured by nuclear-weapon States against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons. Reaffirmations were expressed of commitments under UNSC resolution 984 (1995). Many States parties stressed that efforts to conclude a universal, unconditional and legally-binding instrument on security assurances to non-nuclear-weapon States should be pursued as a matter of priority. Some States parties were of the view that this could take the form of an additional protocol to the Treaty, without prejudice to the legally-binding security assurances already given by the five nuclear-weapon States in the framework of the treaties regarding nuclear-weapon-free zones. Pending the conclusion of such negotiations, the nuclear-weapon States were called upon to honour their commitments under the respective UNSC resolutions. Concern was expressed that recent developments might undermine commitments taken under the respective UNSC resolutions. A view was held that the issue of security assurances was linked with fulfillment of the Treaty obligations. Several States parties, including one nuclear-weapon State, emphasized the importance of a no-first use policy.
Education on disarmament and non-proliferation was considered important to strengthening disarmament and non-proliferation for future generations. In this connection, the ongoing work of the group of governmental experts which is expected to submit its report for consideration by the 57th session of the General Assembly later this fall was commended.
States parties recognized that IAEA safeguards are a fundamental pillar of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and commended the important work of the IAEA in implementing the safeguards system to verify compliance with the non-proliferation obligations of the Treaty.
States parties welcomed the efforts of the IAEA in strengthening safeguards and the Agency's completion of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. The importance of the Model Additional Protocol was underlined. Some drew attention to the fact that States parties must have both a comprehensive safeguards agreement and an additional protocol in place for the IAEA to be able to provide an assurance of both non-diversion of declared material and the absence of undeclared activities or material. The goal of universality was stressed. States that have not yet concluded comprehensive safeguards agreements with the IAEA were called upon to do so without delay. Many States parties called on those who have not yet signed or ratified the Additional Protocol to do so as soon as possible.
It was reiterated that export controls are a key element of the non-proliferation regime under the NPT. The important work of the existing export control regimes was noted, in particular their function in guiding States parties in setting up their national export control policies. The importance of transparency in export controls was widely recognized. It was reaffirmed that nothing in the Treaty should be interpreted as affecting the inalienable right of all parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
Many States parties noted both the importance of combating nuclear terrorism and the many instruments available for doing this, including the physical protection of nuclear material and export controls. The IAEA's action plan on the prevention of nuclear terrorism was widely noted and supported. The Agency's work in support of States' efforts to prevent illicit trafficking of nuclear and other radioactive material was also commended.
States parties called for the strengthening of the physical protection of nuclear material, inter alia through a well-defined amendment of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Many States parties called on States, that have not yet done so, to accede to the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material. Support was expressed for the IAEA's International Physical Protection Service (IPPAS).
The importance of strengthening nuclear safety, radiation protection, safety of radioactive waste management and the safe transport of radioactive materials was stressed. The IAEA's efforts in the promotion of safety in all its aspects were welcomed. States parties that have not yet acceded to the Convention on Nuclear Safety, as well as the Joint Convention of Spent Fuel Management and the Safety of the Radioactive Waste Management, were encouraged to do so.
States parties emphasized that transportation of radioactive material, including maritime transportation, should be carried out in a safe and secure manner in strict conformity with international standards established by the relevant international organizations such as the IAEA and the IMO. Some States parties called for effective liability arrangements, prior notification and consultation. Some States parties noted the conclusions on safety in the IAEA General Conference resolution GC (45) RES/10. The holding of an IAEA conference on safe transport of radioactive materials in July 2003 was welcomed by many.
States parties reiterated their strong support for Article IV of the Treaty, which provides a framework for cooperation and confidence for the peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In this context, States parties expressed wide support for the Technical Cooperation activities of the IAEA. It was underlined that Technical Cooperation plays an important role in further developing the application of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes, including human health, pest eradication, food and agriculture, and the environment. The importance of aligning Technical Cooperation programs with development goals and needs of the country concerned was emphasized. Several States parties stressed the importance of providing the Agency with adequate resources for these activities."
16. U.S. Objections to Summary
16.1 Among the States which took the floor following the adoption of the PrepComm Report, all five NWS entered reservations. Ambassador Norman Wulf of the United States offered the most incisive critique. A transcript of his comments follows.
16.2 "Amb. Norman Wulf: Thank you, Mr. Chairman. At the outset let me express
the appreciation of my delegation to you for the many contributions you have made to our work as Chairman of this first session of the Preparatory Committee. We applaud the energy, patience and good humor that you have brought to this task.
Prior to next year's meeting I am sure that all nations will reflect on our experience at this session of the Preparatory Committee. We have tried a new approach, different from that taken in the run up to the last Review Conference. We think it deserves a fair opportunity to succeed. We believe that PrepComs 1 and 2 can serve a more useful purpose than debating consensus recommendations. We also think that the content of the factual summary and the process for producing it should be consistent with the two PrepComs to be more harmonious and less controversial. We are not sure that the approach taken at this PrepCom adequately addresses these concerns nor are we convinced that the proposal put forward in the last couple of days with respect to the organization of the second PrepCom will contribute towards this goal.
Mr. Chairman, on procedural matters we have a time and location for the second and third sessions and now for the review conference itself. We extend our congratulations to Ambassador Molnar (of Hungary, who will chair the second PrepCom) and pledge to him our complete cooperation. And we understand that the leadership of the third session and the Review Conference itself will come from the nations of the Non Aligned Movement.
Also there was a thorough discussion and exchange of views on a full range of substantive issues. The meetings were well attended, and delegations heard various perspectives on matters related to the implementation of the NPT and to its universality. The IAEA provided a useful and detailed briefing on its safeguards systems and many parties submitted reports to the Chairman related to the Middle East and shared information on all aspects of the Treaty, including Article VI.
Mr. Chairman, we thank you for the factual summary of these proceedings and for making clear that this is YOUR summary and not the product of negotiations among the participants. You have made a genuine effort to summarize factually what has transpired here. Understandably, like other delegations, there are several areas where we are not satisfied. This is to be expected, since the document is your personal effort to summarize the divergent views of many parties. Only the passage of time and careful reflection will allow each of us to evaluate thoroughly your factual summary. Meanwhile, Mr. Chairman, we offer the following preliminary comments. I stress these comments are illustrative, not exhaustive.
First, we are pleased that your summary recognizes the significance for our work that many delegates attach to the events of September 11. Second, the themes of universal adherence and compliance with the Treaty, support for IAEA safeguards, the additional protocol, nuclear export controls, the Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty, the physical protection convention and peaceful nuclear cooperation were recognized in the summary. We would have preferred more attention to the general topic of IAEA safeguards, which received only slightly more emphasis than education on disarmament and non-proliferation. While we recognize the latter issue is important, we do not believe that it is on the same par as the role of the IAEA. Moreover, peaceful nuclear cooperation, stressed in Article IV, received far too little attention, in our view.
We also would have preferred a fairer treatment of the balance between non-proliferation and disarmament. The two are mutually reinforcing. Nuclear disarmament is not, in our view, the main criteria by which to evaluate the treaty's operation.
We, as with our French colleague, were troubled by your use of the term "States Parties" in several paragraphs. Clearly it cannot be read as "All States Parties." For example, any inference in the factual summary that all States Parties at this PrepCom supported implementation of all the conclusions of the 2000 NPT Final Document is incorrect. I refer delegations to our statements both during the general debate and the special time on Article VI.
With regard to the 1995 decision on the indefinite extension, it is not correct to suggest that the legal effect of that decision is linked to political commitments on security assurances in the Middle East.
We are disappointed at the nature of the reference to the ABM Treaty. We think that many delegations now recognize that there is nothing destabilizing about the US decision to withdraw from that treaty and that the momentum towards further nuclear reductions is continuing. President Bush is determined to transform our relationship with Russia and to replace Mutual Assured Destruction with Mutual Cooperation. Success in missile defenses can indeed lead to reduced reliance on nuclear weapons, as can other measures.
Clearly some US policies related to Article VI differ from the conclusions of the 2000 Final Document. The Administration, for example, has no plans to seek ratification of the CTBT but continues to observe the moratorium on nuclear explosive testing. We ask that you not confuse media reports with US policies. During the first week of our session we offered a detailed information paper on Article VI. We again commend it to all delegates' attention.
On the issue of reporting I can only reinforce my earlier comments. The United States has a strong record of providing information throughout the review process. However, each Party should be able to decide for itself what information to provide, and how and when to do so. Increased transparency could improve the strengthened review process but only through a voluntary approach, and not with check lists and tables.
With regard to the proposal for consultations leading up to the 2003 PrepCom we have made clear for many years our strong opposition to expanding the NPT Review process beyond the PrepComs to include intercessional activities. We believe the 1995 decision on strengthening the review only contemplates establishing subsidiary bodies at review conferences, not for intercessional work. This position of ours holds regardless of the topic that is being addressed, whether that be reporting, security assurances or IAEA safeguards.
On regional issues, we think the identification of specific nations in the factual summary is not necessary. The United States has named countries in its statement, but believes the Chairman's factual summary should have been as non controversial as possible. We do not believe that all states thought it useful to name Israel in the context of the Middle East. In consultations prior to the PrepCom we consistently urged that no country should be named. We regret, specifically, the inclusion of Iraq's assertion that it is in compliance with its NPT obligations when it is so blatantly violating its obligation to permit IAEA inspections, as required by UN Security Council resolutions.
We reaffirm our strong opposition to the use of the NPT Review process to undertake negotiations on issues that should be addressed elsewhere. And our strong opposition to establishing new mechanisms such as that mentioned in the paragraph on the Middle East resolution.
Finally, on security assurances, Mr. Chairman, I want to reaffirm our opposition to the negotiation of a legally binding global assurances treaty, either as a separate treaty, or as a protocol to the NPT.
You may not think, after that statement, that I again wish to thank you for your efforts during this conference. You have conducted your task with great skill, great dedication and a sense of fair play, and we are very grateful to you for that. Thank you, Mr. Chairman."
* * *
17. Assessment: A Challenging Moment
17.1 To say that the Non-Proliferation Treaty is in crisis is an understatement.
Thirty-two years after the Treaty came into force, there are still 31,000 nuclear weapons in existence. The reductions in operationally deployed strategic weapons mask the fact that there are thousands of remaining nuclear weapons in various forms. They remain central to the military doctrines of the NWS. The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review foresees a war-fighting role for nuclear weapons.
The promises made by the NWS at the 1995 Indefinite Extension of the NPT ("systematic and progressive efforts") have been abandoned. The Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice, calling for the conclusion of negotiations to eliminate nuclear weapons, has been ignored. The "unequivocal undertaking" toward total elimination, given by the NWS at the NPT 2000 Review, has been pushed aside.
The entry-into-force of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, a cornerstone of the non-proliferation regime, is blocked. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty is about to be abandoned. The development of a National Missile Defence (NMD) system is proceeding. Space weapons are on the horizon. The U.S. Space Command has presented its 21st century vision: "dominating the space dimension of military operations to protect U.S. interests and investment; integrating Space Forces into warfighting capabilities across the full spectrum of conflict."
U.S. planning has stated clearly:
"The proliferation of missiles and weapons of mass destruction (WMD) requires an NMD. NMD will evolve into a mix of ground and space sensors and weapons.
Existing land, sea, and air missions will be enhanced by space systems. Current sea and air strategic attack missions will be augmented by the deployment of space force application systems. Likewise, surface and air surveillance systems (e.g. AWACS and JSTARS) will be augmented by space-based surveillance systems."
While the Outer Space Treaty, which prohibits the placing of nuclear weapons in space, has not been directly challenged, the intention to weaponize space, with a military system which integrates nuclear and non-nuclear offensive systems, augers ill for the NPT. Nuclear weapons are a declared component of U.S. plans for full-spectrum dominance. The Nuclear Posture Review states:
"Nuclear weapons play a critical role in the defense capabilities of the United States, its allies and friends. They provide credible military options to deter a wide range of threats, including WMD and large-scale conventional military force. These nuclear capabilities possess unique properties that give the United States options to hold at risk classes of targets [that are] important to achieve strategic and political objectives."
There is now abundant evidence that the U.S. is proceeding in the NPT review process in bad faith, contrary to the "good faith" negotiations required by Article VI. The morality, legality and pragmatics of this situation require world attention. Yet little is being said. The U.S. has even been able to reject the demands of the New Agenda countries, which have emerged in recent years as the strongest voice for nuclear disarmament. The NATO countries and associated States (e.g., Australia, Japan) are virtually silent at the wreckage of the arms control and disarmament agreements carefully built up over the past three decades.
Faced with a constantly modernized U.S. nuclear arsenal and new high tech systems of which missile defences are only one part, existing nuclear weapons states are likely to retain their nuclear stocks. And more states, seeing that nuclear weapons are the currency of power, may follow India, Pakistan and Israel's recourse to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The danger of a nuclear catastrophe grows.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 did bring more change than was realized at the time. The resulting "war against terrorism" has catalyzed military machinery everywhere. Political momentum is escalating the preparation for, and involvement in, wars. Immediately after September 11, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan said efforts to implement fully the relevant treaties to stop the spread of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction should be "redoubled." In the case of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, it is not multiplication of effort we are witnessing, but subtraction.
How can the NPT be saved from further erosion and eventual collapse? Under-Secretary-General Dhanapala has put the answer squarely: "The disarmament community must . rekindle the public campaign for nuclear disarmament."
As the NGO presentations to the PrepComm, quoted in this report, show clearly, the advanced sections of civil society are highly informed and strongly motivated. Their presentations put to shame the government speeches. But the obstacles to "rekindling" are enormous. The general media ignore the issue, the public is uninformed, and the foundations that funded nuclear disarmament work for the past several years are cutting back their interest and funding in this area. Even other elements of the civil society movements (e.g. development, environment, human rights) seem oblivious to the nuclear danger (and its impact on their own work); thus there is little amalgamation of the totality of civil society strength to make a dramatic effect on the NWS.
The "culture of war" mentality of governments does not, of course, paralyze those who continue to work valiantly for a "culture of peace." Resistance to war and escalating military budgets is beginning to surface, and may gradually rise if there are no more terrorist attacks on the U.S. or its allies.
The original rationale for strengthening middle-power governments to press the NWS to fulfil their commitments is now more apparent than ever. The NWS, including the U.S., are not impervious to the opinion of important governments. Even though these middle power governments themselves are not feeling any heat from their electorates, they understand what is happening to the non-proliferation regime and several are, in fact, deeply concerned. The New Agenda statements have demonstrated this. Middle-power governments need to hear, at this challenging moment, from informed civil society leaders who have the ability to bring forward strong arguments for specific actions to save the NPT. Most importantly, these civil society groups can encourage and buttress the efforts of like-minded governments.
Such civil society action does not require (although it would be helped by) large amounts of money, media headlines, or street marches. But it does require immense will power and strategic planning.
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