By Senator Douglas Roche, O.C.
[CONTINUED]
13. NGO Statements: 14 Presentations
13.1 The PrepComm devoted the whole of Wednesday morning of the first
week to hearing 14 NGO Statements. The exercise was convened by Reaching Critical Will, a project of the Women's International League for Peace and Freedom, U.N. Office, and the NGO Committee for Disarmament. The following are brief excerpts from the speeches, which make up a 59-page document at www.reachingcriticalwill.org
13.2 Political Overview. Speaker, Emily Schroeder (WILPF).
"While we use, and feel deeply that it is necessary to use, the language of crisis we understand that in the comfortable surroundings of this UN conference room it is difficult to connect with the nuclear dangers that face us. This is a significant problem, as the daily reality that thousands of nuclear weapons remain a hair-trigger's length from global catastrophe is so immense that instinctively we refuse to confront it. You do not have the luxury of denying the reality of the threat, burying it under layers of diplomatic language. The failure to address the continued high political value given to nuclear weapons possession and the stimulus that provides to proliferation is perilous to us all in the long run. Is it responsible to remain silent knowing full well the extent of the dangers we face?...
Western Europe, for the first time ever, faces no external or internal military threats, and yet NATO clings, without coherent justification, to the security blanket of the US nuclear umbrella. Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, Italy, Greece and Turkey claim non-nuclear status while receiving nuclear weapons, and training in their use from the United States under NATO nuclear sharing policies. Such hypocrisy damages the NPT, and stimulates nations, and worse, sub-state actors, to ask why, if these countries that face no threats continue to cling to these weapons, must we foreswear them?...
Without modification, current US policies will destroy the basis of global trust in the NPT, and in arms control that is essential to their success."
13.3 Rule of Law, the NPT, and Global Security. Speaker, Nicole Deller, Lawyers' Committee for Nuclear Policy.
"This is an age fraught with the risk of use of nuclear weapons. It is a time when the world faces climate change whose consequences could range from severe to catastrophic. There is a global economy in which a few hundred of the world's richest people have combined wealth greater than the poorest two billion, and there are vast and growing differences between haves and have-nots within and between countries. Technology makes information about these gaps easily available, as it does data about weapons of mass destruction. To take on these and other problems, coordinated local, national, regional and global actions and cooperation are necessary.
Treaties like all other tools in this toolbox are imperfect instruments. But without a framework of multilateral agreements, the alternative is for states to decide for themselves when action is warranted in their own interests, and to proceed to act unilaterally against others when they feel aggrieved. This is a recipe for the powerful to be police, prosecutor, judge, jury, and executioner all rolled into one. It is a path that cannot but lead to the arbitrary application and enforcement of law. The consequences of such a course for security will be disastrous. To marginalize the system of treaty-based international law rather than build on its many strengths is not only unwise, it is extremely dangerous. It is urgent that the world's states, including the most powerful, reject this path and make global treaties crucial instruments in meeting the security challenges of the 21st century."
13.4 Inter-Religious Representatives' Statement. Speaker, Arun Elhance, World Conference of Religion for Peace.
"As representatives of religions and faiths, we are appalled at the spiritual and moral corruption and bankruptcy that are implied by and reflected in the efforts by some states to develop constituencies that would accept the use of nuclear weapons. We find it abhorring that while life on earth is already threatened with extinction by thousands of existing nuclear weapons and missiles, many on "hair trigger alert", new weapons are still being developed or are proposed to be developed and deployed. Such developments are particularly unacceptable in a world where billions of men, women and children have yet to taste any fruits of economic development and where a majority of the world's population struggles to survive day-by-day under inhumane conditions. We want to see all resources currently being wasted and planned to be spent on nuclear weapons to be diverted to address the urgent social, economic, environmental, and human security and human rights problems that we are confronted with as a world community..
From our side, we renew our commitment to devote the spiritual, moral, material and infrastructure resources of our organizations and communities to the service of NPT and the efforts of states and the United Nations to eliminate the threats posed by nuclear weapons, now and in the future. We commit ourselves to help materialize the positive powers of all religions and faiths to advocate for total nuclear disarmament at all levels, from local to global, at the earliest date. We pledge that through peace education and advocacy we will inform our constituencies of the dangers posed by nuclear weapons as well as the benefits to be derived humanity from their elimination. We urge the United Nations and all specialized agencies, the member states and all concerned world citizens to work with us and to call upon us for support in realizing the dream of a nuclear-free world."
13.5 Indigenous Perspective. Speaker, Richard Salvador, Pacific Islands Association of NGOs.
"While the NPT seeks to address the threat posed by nuclear weapons in the world while making provision for the peaceful uses of nuclear technology in Article IV, it fails to recognize or address the disproportionate impact of these activities on indigenous people and lands. The nuclear industry continues to perpetuate on-going and systematic invasion of Indigenous People's countries and the destruction of Indigenous lands and cultures. While the threat of use of nuclear weapons by the eight nations who hold these weapons of mass destruction serves to create a real fear in the world, in indigenous communities the existence of uranium mines, nuclear waste dumps and nuclear test sites are a daily threat to life and to the continued existence of culture.
All of these lead us to question the very notion of right to "peaceful use" described in Article IV of the NPT. Only a narrow reading, even a denial, of the real life, non-peaceful situation Indigenous communities face as they struggle to survive with the leftover poison of the Nuclear Age allows NPT States Parties to deliberate year after year about the proper "safeguarding" practices with little notice of the actual impacts of nuclear weapons production and technology on entire nations of peoples.
As previous Indigenous speakers have raised to your attention in this forum, the uses or applications or purposes or activities are only one segment within the cycle of the nuclear industry. The negotiation and decision-making processes that take place in the context of mineral exploration and commercial mining, the storage of nuclear waste, and the conducting of atomic tests which mostly take place on Indigenous lands are far from peaceful. Article IV's reference to the "peaceful" uses, development, research and production of nuclear energy which are considered to be an inalienable right of all Member States of the Treaty need to be considered in the context of a more fundamental God-given inalienable right of human beings to life, liberty, and security."
13.6 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Speaker, Dominique Lalanne, Stop-Essai/Abolition of Nuclear Weapons.
"Although the Nuclear Posture Review notes that the US supports continued observation of the testing moratorium, 'this may not be possible for the indefinite future' and 'objective judgments about capability in a non-testing environment will become more difficult.'
These disclosures underscore the link between nuclear testing and continued reliance on nuclear weapons for security. They also reveal an appalling disregard of the NPT commitment to stop nuclear testing permanently. NPT member states that support nuclear disarmament and a CTBT should use every opportunity and every means at their disposal to express their concern and demand adherence to a permanent, verifiable test ban..
The Democratic People's Republic of Korea, India, and Pakistan must sign and ratify the CTBT for the treaty to enter into force. Algeria, China, Colombia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, the United States, and Viet Nam must now ratify, without further procrastination. The longer these states wait to join the Treaty, the greater the chance that some nation may begin testing and set off a dangerous international action-reaction cycle of military and nuclear confrontation. It is vital to international security that the moratorium on nuclear testing be maintained."
13.7 Nuclear Arsenals, Missiles, and Missile Defense and Space Weaponization. Speaker, Regina Hagen, International Network of Engineers and Scientist against Proliferation.
"We propose the following steps:
. A declaration by all nuclear states of No First-Use against other nuclear weapons states and a commitment to No Use against non-nuclear weapons states.
. Ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, preserving and strengthening the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and completing START III negotiations as necessary measures for nuclear states to fulfill their nuclear disarmament obligations in accordance to the Non-Proliferation Treaty.
. Drastic reduction in nuclear weapons leading to their total elimination, including the prompt elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, an end to reliance on nuclear weapons in military planning and negotiations on a Nuclear Weapons Convention..
Instead of an expensive and futile arms race between missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons, the international community should start negotiating formal arrangements to prevent a missile race by controlling these weapons and creating an international norm against them. The negotiation process needs to identify the fundamental political and scientific issues involved in meeting the goals and provides a mechanism to tackle the problems in a systematic step-by-step manner. To resolve the problems before they become urgent, it is important to recognize the emerging dangers and risks by confidence-building measures and improved information exchange among key players. This would provide a basis for a comprehensive missile monitoring and verification system that could be extended for international control and common security in outer space.
To reduce the dangers we call for the following immediate steps:
1. Stop testing of missiles, missile defense systems and space weapons.
2. Initiate negotiations for an international treaty banning missiles and space weapons."
13.8 Consequences of Middle East Nuclear Weapons and Proliferation and Deployment. Speaker, Bahig Nassar, Arab Coordination Committee for NGOs.
"In the Middle East, Israel has acquired a nuclear arsenal of around 200 weapons, a fact which prompts other states of the region to seek weapons of mass destruction in order to counter the deadly threat of Israeli weapons. In addition, efforts are under way to equip the three Dolphin-class submarines provided to Israel by Germany with missiles which can carry nuclear weapons to undertake operations from the deep waters of the Mediterranean, the Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. Thus, a second strike nuclear capability will be available to Israel..
Middle East countries are facing at present two grave threats: Israeli nuclear threats and US nuclear threats and military operations with conventional and non-conventional weapons, while Israeli nuclear weapons are left intact. The impending US wars against Iraq and possibly Iran and the plans to target four Middle East countries testify to this fact. Therefore this PrepCom should resolve to establish a mechanism to monitor the implementation of the 1995 Resolution on the Middle East in the period leading to the 2005 Review Conference."
13.9 Challenges and Opportunities for Nuclear Disarmament in South Asia. Speaker, Admiral L. Ramdas, Former Chief of the Indian Navy.
"Nuclear deterrence is not likely to work in South Asia. In the case of the United States and Russia, the competition was mostly ideological and there existed ample geographic distance between the two nations. India and Pakistan, however, share a long but bitterly disputed border with a much longer and deeply seeded history of direct military confrontation with each other. In fact, recent events indicate that the possession of nuclear weapons has hardly taught caution to the two sides. The May 1999 war in the Kargil region and the massive mobilization of troops and continued clashes along the LOC early this year demonstrate that nuclear weapons have not deterred conflict between the two rivals.
In this situation, what can be done to help our world, and especially South Asia, become a safer place? This question can be divided into two sections - action at the national and regional levels and action at the local level. There are active platforms, forums and individuals in the region who continue to address these concerns within the regional and national contexts. However, the nature of the issues is such that, without continuous and active involvement with International elements, there is little hope of achieving concrete progress within any one country or region. It is within this context that we would suggest through this important organ of the United Nations the following set of actions for the international community:
. Apply appropriate pressure to de-escalate the current face-off
between India and Pakistan.
. Persuade India and Pakistan to withdraw their armies to their
normal peacetime locations.
. Ensure a ceasefire along the Line of Control.
. Pressurize the two nations to commence a dialogue.
. Facilitate the conclusion of a Nuclear Protocol to include risk
reduction measures.
. Implement the 'unequivocal' commitment made in 2000 to
convene an International Convention on Global Nuclear
Disarmament in accordance with Article VI of the NPT.
. Encourage India and Pakistan to sign the CTBT and also to
participate in FMCT.
. Prevail upon the USA to rescind from its policies with respect to
the ABM treaty, missile defense, and the Nuclear Posture Review
all of which run counter to the overall objective of nuclear
disarmament and non-proliferation."
13.10 Nuclear Proliferation Problems and Dangers in Northeast Asia. Speaker, Randall Caroline Forsberg, Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies. Opportunity for Arms Control and Nonproliferation.
"Never has there been a more clear-cut case for international arms control agreements to prevent the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction than there is in Northeast Asia today. By reinstating the ABM Treaty, or at least indefinitely postponing the planned deployment of interceptor missiles in Alaska, the United States could prevent a near-term build-up of China's nuclear forces. In the meantime, deeper cuts in US and Russian nuclear arms could create an environment in which that build up would never occur and in which all of the current Nuclear Weapons States could make a good faith effort to move toward zero, as they have repeatedly promised to do.
Equally important, by agreeing with North Korea to a nationally-verified ban on the testing and export of missiles with a range over 200 miles - which North Korea has already accepted - the United States could completely eliminate the most imminent threat of a new state with an ICBM, which is at least a decade off; and it could further delay the more distant prospect of acquisition of an ICBM by Iran or Iraq. In other words, a missile agreement with North Korea would completely eliminate the alleged reason for developing a national missile defense for a decade and possibly much longer.
Instead of working for such an agreement, the United States is rushing to abrogate the ABM Treaty and build a national missile defense, even though there is no near-future threat of a hostile state's ICBM; even though the country closest to posing such a threat has offered to end its missile program; and even though missile defense deployment is likely to lead to a new arms race and perhaps a new Cold War, with China replacing Russia as the designated enemy.
Rather than pursue diplomacy, confidence-building, and arms control measures to forestall potential threats and prevent proliferation, the Bush administration has thrown up new obstacles to progress in nonproliferation, first by antagonizing North Korea with the harsh rhetoric of "axis of evil" and then by releasing a "Nuclear Posture Review" which calls for further development of mini-nukes and threatens a preemptive use of such weapons against North Korea in any future outbreak of war. This threat is a truly alarming development and one which betrays the US commitments made under both the NPT and the 1994 Framework Agreement.
Recently CIA Director George Tenet testified in a Senate hearing that North Korea is in compliance under the 1994 Agreement. It is incumbent on the United States to do its best to reverse the harm done recently and to comply with the 1994 Agreement by giving "formal assurances to the DPRK, against the threat or use of nuclear weapons" in order to avoid another nuclear crisis on the Korean peninsula.
Surely the international community should not and will not sit by while the United States, piece by piece, dismantles all of the work of the global system of arms control and nonproliferation regimes built up with tremendous international effort over the past 30 years. Nowhere is the devastating impact on nonproliferation efforts likely to be greater than in Northeast Asia. We certainly cannot allow another nuclear holocaust in this region. The time has come for the international community to take a stand, to hold the United States accountable, and put its feet to the fire."
13.11 Reporting by States Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. Speaker, Carol Naughton, Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament.
"The content of reporting would be expected to incorporate two general kinds of information:
a) Statements of policy, descriptions of implementation-related activities, and updates on the progress of treaty negotiations and implementation.
b) Declarations concerning concrete data, such as data on nuclear weapons holdings, delivery vehicles holdings, special fissionable materials stocks and nuclear technology exports.
The fact that much of this is already available would not remove the value of having it formally reported by States parties in the NPT forum.
The greater level of detail likely to be provided by some states should encourage openness in all States. Therefore, those States willing to supply additional information should be accommodated and encouraged.
The format for NPT reporting should be standardised for all States parties and would need to be worked out by those States willing to take a lead. There are several international reporting models already in existence but the criteria must be that it is simple, clear and easy to use.
It could be broken down into topics related to each of the Treaty articles and into time periods, providing a backwards-looking component and a forwards-looking component, projecting planned future developments.
However the most important consideration is in getting the process effectively underway with flexibility to add subsequent items from future Review Conferences. To aid transparency the reports should be available as official conference documents. The UN Department for Disarmament Affairs (DDA) would be the most appropriate institution to receive and compile reports submitted by States, having the experience of servicing other international bodies on arms controls. This is consistent with the 2000 Final document request."
13.12 Irreversibility and Verification. Speaker, Jacqueline Cabasso, Western States Legal Foundation.
"According to Webster's Dictionary, a principle is "[a] fundamental truth, law, or postulate." Irreversible means, simply, "[i]mpossible to reverse." While the principle of irreversibility obviously applies to the dismantlement of warheads, the long-term disposition of fissile materials including those removed from dismantled warheads, and the physical destruction of delivery systems, it applies equally to retention of large "responsive" forces and expanding laboratory capabilities including research, development, testing and production of both new and improved warheads and delivery systems. More fundamentally, the principle of irreversibility is a commitment not to backtrack on the Article VI obligation itself. Are the nuclear weapon States adhering to the "fundamental truth" of irreversibility? Judge for yourselves. The January 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), amounts to an unequivocal rejection of most of the 13 steps agreed to just two years ago in this forum, as well as of nuclear disarmament itself. The NPR is virtually a blueprint to ensure that any and all nuclear and related arms control and reduction measures undertaken by the United States are fully reversible for the foreseeable future.
Nuclear disarmament, nuclear and other related arms control and reduction measures will only be effective if they can be adequately verified, both in political and technical terms. Verification policies that will assure early detection and interpretation of information necessary for preventing prohibited activities or permitting timely response must be put in place. It is essential, in this regard, that the closure and monitoring of the nuclear weapons infrastructure in all nuclear weapons states must begin early in the process of disarmament. Nuclear weapons research, testing, and component production should be halted while reductions are in progress, not after, with nuclear weapons production and research facilities subject to intrusive verification regimes at the earliest possible time. Fissile materials accounting, for example, already a challenging task, is rendered more so by the continued fabrication and testing of weapons components in classified facilities. Early cessation of both research and production activities also makes evasion of emerging verification regimes and covert production of components or manufacturing equipment substantially more difficult. The continued pursuit of increased nuclear weapons knowledge by one state - including everything from systematization of fissile materials understanding to more rapid, flexible, and easily scaled production techniques - will be matched to a greater or lesser degree by others. The longer such activity continues prior to achievement of an abolition regime, the greater and more widespread the technical capability for breakout and the concomitant proliferation of nuclear weapons is likely to be."
13.13 Tactical Nukes: Old and New. Speaker, Alistair Millar, Fourth Freedom Forum.
"Thousands of substrategic, or tactical, nuclear weapons remain in the US, some NATO nations and in Russia, unmonitored and uncontrolled by any existing treaties or codified agreements. Hundreds more are deployed in China, Israel and South Asia. Basic information about these weapons is shrouded in secrecy. Transparency and disarmament measures of all nations' tactical weapons have to be addressed in the context of future disarmament measures and codified treaties including the nonproliferation treaty. In this way, the need for further reaching U.S.-Russian initiatives to address the safeguarding of tactical nuclear weapons arsenals goes well beyond the U.S.-Russian context and should serve as a starting point for addressing multilateral reductions. U.S./Russian cooperation on arms control, especially with the NPT, will deeply affect the global strategic outlook in the post-cold war security environment by influencing the weapons policies of other nuclear states. To reduce risks within these states, and to prevent others from attaining these weapons, the U.S., Russia and all other relevant nations must actively reduce the political status they attach to possessing nuclear weapons.
Government officials in the United States and Russia are calling for the development of new models of "low-yield" and more robust nuclear weapons. In the US they are being pressured from nuclear weapons laboratories. The US Congress has now received multi-million dollar FY2003 federal budget requests to begin development of a "Robust Nuclear Earth Penetrator" and according to classified excerpts of the US Nuclear Posture Review leaked to the US media, there are demands for the development of comparatively low-yield battlefield weapons designed to increase the penetration capability of the B-61 Model ll nuclear bomb configured as earth-penetrating bombs or as missiles to target deeply buried or hardened underground targets, such as bunkers and bomb shelters. There is debate among proponents of these weapons about whether the efficacy of such new tactical nuclear weapons would have to be tested. If testing such weapons would result as part their development, this would clearly undermine the objectives of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) that the United States has signed but not ratified. Regardless, of whether the development of the weapons requires testing, deployment and plans to use these weapons will lower the threshold by making nuclear weapons usable military options. For obvious reasons, the development and intent to use such weapons run contrary to the core goals the NPT, by providing, rather than reducing, incentives to other countries to develop their own nuclear weapons, and by condoning the use of nuclear weapons."
13.14 Fissile Materials, Health and the Environment: The Hidden Costs of Military and Civilian Nuclear Programs. Speaker, Biplav Yadav, Physicians for Social Responsibility.
"A wide-ranging public discourse is needed within every nuclear-weapon state about the health and environmental harm that they have inflicted upon their own people. A global debate is needed about harm outside the borders of those states. Much of that harm was knowingly inflicted.
It is time for the United Nations General Assembly to establish an independent and open Truth Commission on the ravages that have been inflicted upon the world by nuclear weapons production and testing. That commission should not only examine the nature and extent of that harm, and whether and how deliberately it was inflicted; it should recommend ways in which the world's people can hold nuclear weapons establishments accountable. It should also examine whether and to what extent the security arguments that have been claimed for nuclear weapons have been constructed with the aim of keeping people ignorant and fearful so that the weapons bureaucracies might perpetuate themselves. Such an examination would be of some considerable relevance today, given that nuclear weapons establishments are still refusing to meet their nuclear disarmament commitments under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and that people are still getting ill and dying from the harm that nuclear weapons establishments have inflicted upon them."
13.15 NGO Recommendations to the 2002 Non-Proliferation Treaty Preparatory Committee. Speaker, Merav Datan, International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War/Physicians for Social Responsibility.
1) Negative Security Assurances should be made legally binding.
Negative security assurances - that is, pledges by nuclear weapon states not to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states - have featured prominently in the NPT review process and helped to secure the support of non-nuclear weapon states for the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. It is surprising and disturbing, therefore, that officials in the United States and the United Kingdom have recently cast doubt on the validity of their own negative security assurances by making statements that seem to undermine these assurances.
The way to resolve this ambiguity and secure the confidence of non-nuclear weapon states is by making negative security assurances legally binding. The way to deal with chemical and biological weapons is through joint Security Council commitment and action, building on Security Council Resolution 984 of 1995, which affirmed the nuclear weapon states' negative security assurances.
2) The Security Council should address nuclear disarmament.
The status and responsibility inherent in being a permanent member of the Security Council should work in favor of, not against, nuclear disarmament. China, France, Russia, the UK, and the US already enjoy political influence and prestige as a function of their Security Council membership. We call on them to put this political power to work by implementing their obligation under Article 26 and applying it to nuclear weapons. The Council is 57 years behind on a crucial element of its job description.
3) Establish a permanent secretariat for the NPT.
The NPT could be supported by a permanent secretariat based at the United Nations. At present there is no centralised mechanism where ongoing compliance with Treaty commitments can be monitored, grievances lodged, inquiries regarding compliance made, and guidance sought. As a result, progress on meeting the goals of the NPT is slowed, formal negotiations at the Review Conferences and PrepComs are delayed by disagreements over compliance issues, and efficiency in the important work of advancing the non-proliferation and disarmament commitments embodied in the NPT is hindered.
NPT states parties should consider the creation of a permanent secretariat that could serve as a repository of information and as a focal point to receive, review, verify for accuracy, and properly direct complaints about non-compliance and other difficulties States parties may have with the NPT process.
4) Implement "Global Zero Alert" of nuclear weapons.
At a time when there is talk of "usable" nuclear weapons it is imperative to remember that nuclear missiles on hair-trigger alert - poised to be launched in minutes - are the front line of usability. At the 2000 Review Conference, governments signed to the NPT agreed "concrete measures" were needed to "reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems." But the U.S. and Russia, despite being strategic partners, still keep thousands of weapons in a quick "launch-on-warning" mode. We are still one false alarm away from accidental nuclear war. And current nuclear reductions discussed by the U.S. and Russia will do little to change this dangerous situation.
What needs to be done to move us back from the brink of nuclear war? By most accounts, the U.S and Russia are the only two nuclear powers who keep missiles primed for immediate launch. Presidents Bush and Putin should follow through on their declarations of friendship by ordering their respective militaries to abandon launch-on-warning policy - to take their nuclear weapons off line - to extend decision making time for both Presidents. This will create a critical margin of safety and set a standard for every nuclear nation: No nuclear weapons should be on high alert.
5) Explore concepts of security without nuclear weapons.
Why are nuclear weapons still with us? What alternative security concepts could persuade the Nuclear Weapons States to depart from their reliance on nuclear weapons? These questions are the subject of fourteen reports from Peace Research Institutes world-wide who met recently in Moscow at the invitation of IPPNW Sweden. The main conclusions are available in a report being distributed at this meeting. (See also .)
The report concluded that although the Cold War is over, the nuclear weapon states still cling to their nuclear weapons, and that this addiction must be overcome. Alternative security programmes introduced in this report can facilitate such a process. In this regard the report recommends the following:
. The establishment of new defence doctrines that do not rely on nuclear weapons for deterrence or for actual warfighting.
. New co-operative and comprehensive security measures that focus primarily on the security of human beings rather than on the security of states.
. The creation of arrangements and policies that promote trust and confidence rather than fear, transparency rather than secrecy, and security "together with" rather than security "against."
. The consideration of unilateral disarmament. Any nuclear weapon state, given the political impetus, can disarm its nuclear arsenal unilaterally. The argument demanding "balanced nuclear weapons disarmament" must be challenged.
6) Use the goal of a nuclear weapons convention to further nuclear disarmament now.
Despite the current hostile political environment regarding treaties and verification-based regimes, it is important to maintain the knowledge, expertise, and training relevant to disarmament, and to continue to develop these as well. It is also important to continue to develop and voice arguments in support of co-operative, verifiable, and irreversible approaches to security, with a view to the goal of complete nuclear disarmament despite current obstacles.
A model nuclear weapons convention was released in April 1997 as a tool to encourage debate on the political, legal, and technical requirements for complete nuclear disarmament. This debate has been followed through the Nuclear Weapons Convention Monitor, the latest issue of which contains a summary of the discussion that took place in January of this year during a Track II roundtable in Ottawa on the legal and technical aspects of complete nuclear disarmament. We encourage governments to explore the ideas presented there as a way to think past the current situation, which is characterized by acute failure of imagination.
7) Improve gender balance to further nuclear disarmament.
The gender of power and decision-making, when contrasted to the gender of poverty and the experience of violence is evidence of an unhealthy, undemocratic and unnecessarily exclusionary world. The exclusion of women from policy discourse and decision-making is almost total. The gender imbalance in this room, and the division of decision-making labour in the weaponised security environment on the intergovernmental and national levels speak volumes. Numerous consensus documents, as well as Security Council Resolution 1325, binding on all states, urge all member states to increase the representation of women in all decision-making levels in national, regional and international institutions. We suggest it is time for bodies like the NPT to comply.
8) Consider collective sanctions by non-nuclear weapon states.
Together, the non-nuclear weapons states are a super power. NGOs believe that to some extent the power of NNWS solidarity has been untested beyond words on paper. As NGOs we are not required to be diplomatic, that is one of our strengths and luxuries, so if we offend when we say it is clear that a handful of nuclear weapon states have compromised the sovereignty of a great many non-nuclear weapon states, please forgive us. Threats of economic or political consequences would inevitably come from the nuclear weapon states were the non-nuclear weapon states to unite in a concrete action that would increase pressure for compliance with Article VI. Still we continue to hope for a world in which democracy, the will of the majority of people and states, can prevail. The fact that so many governments self-censor due to fear of political reprisals or are inhibited due to economic dependence, in this forum and others, is a sorry comment on the state of the world, and also on democracy and sovereignty. We salute the courage of some states who stand up and say no, despite the potential risks. We wish more of you would simultaneously demonstrate such courage, and believe that if all non-nuclear weapon states imposed an informal sanctions regime against nuclear weapon states, or perhaps a focused campaign of simply refusing to cooperate on trade, transport or visa issuance, whatever the action, the unity would provide safety and could generate that rare substance, political will."
13.16 Though the above statements were praised by several delegates, the participatory role of NGOs in the PrepComm process is still below the role of NGOs in other U.N. fora. Whereas NGOs attending meetings of the Sustainable Development Commission and various human rights meetings have access to the ongoing processes, NGOs at the PrepComm are limited to attending only the plenary meetings and not the detailed discussions. The 2000 Review did regularize a time in the program for NGOs to make presentations, but the ability of the representatives of the 62 organizations accredited to speak to delegates or even to hear them on the specific points was severely constrained.
13.17 Thus Canada urged that the "current arrangements be built upon." In a formal statement, Dr. Jennifer Simons, President of the Simons Foundation and, with Ernie Regehr, attached to the Canadian delegation as an NGO representative, called for more access by NGOs. She favoured "spontaneous exchanges" with NGOs to permit a wider engagement on issues. While a number of states supported the proposal, the U.S. and France threw cold water on it, announcing that they were "quite satisfied with present arrangements."
[CONTINUED]
|
