An MPI Briefing Paper
August 2002
View the PDF version of this MPI Briefing Paper. RECOMMENDATIONS
The Middle Powers Initiative urges countries to work together on the following priority steps in fulfillment of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation objectives under the NPT:
1. Strategic arms reductions: Implement the May 2002 U.S.-Russian strategic nuclear arms treaty in accordance with NPT principles so that reduced warheads and their delivery systems are irreversibly dismantled in a transparent and verifiable manner; dealert remaining deployed U.S. and Russian nuclear forces in accordance with the NPT commitment to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems.
2. Control of missile defenses and non-proliferation of missiles: Negotiate regarding plans for missile defenses to avoid obstruction of the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and to promote international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all; prevent missile proliferation, through ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, and through developing proposals for a missile flight test moratorium and missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives.
3. Tactical arms reductions: Unilaterally remove U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe; create a wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons, including through a) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives; b) formalizing those initiatives, including verification; c) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocally exchanging information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and d) commencing U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
4. Non-use of nuclear weapons: Reverse trends toward expansion of options for use of nuclear weapons, including against non-nuclear weapon countries, exemplified by the U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; establish the absolute refusal of middle power countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States to participate in or support first use of nuclear weapons or to prepare for such use.
5. Ban on nuclear testing: Observe the moratorium on nuclear testing; achieve entry into force of the CTBT; close the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya; renounce development of new or modified nuclear weapons as contrary to the 2000 commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.
6. Control of fissile materials: Building on heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear devices and materials, a) create a process of accounting for and control of fissile materials holdings on a worldwide basis in accordance with NPT principles of transparency, irreversibility and verification, with the objective of establishing a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons; b) commence negotiations on a fissile materials ban; and c) mandate and increase funding of the IAEA eight-point plan to improve protection of nuclear materials and facilities against acts of terrorism.
INTRODUCTION
A new strategic context has emerged that is profoundly disturbing and demonstrates the imperative of renewed and intensified efforts to achieve nuclear disarmament and to reinforce non-proliferation. It is formed by several developments: 1) U.S. abandonment of the START process and the signing of the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty in May 2002; 2) U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty, effective June 2002; 3) the 2002 U.S. Nuclear Posture Review; 4) heightened awareness of the threat of terrorist use of nuclear explosives and materials; 5) the India-Pakistan confrontation; and 6) erosion of the NPT through disregard of commitments made in 1995 and 2000. These commitments include: the unequivocal undertaking to eliminate nuclear arsenals, preservation of the ABM Treaty, making nuclear disarmament steps irreversible, negotiation of a fissile materials ban, and ratification of the CTBT.
The first four developments are discussed in the body of this briefing paper. Regarding the present crisis in South Asia, it underlines the urgency of near-term measures of nuclear restraint in that region, among them verified non-deployment of nuclear weapons; limits on missile development and deployment, including through a flight test ban; and commitments to refrain from testing nuclear weapons and producing fissile materials for weapons. It further demonstrates the dangers inherent in the spread of nuclear weapons, which undermine rather than enhance the security of any country. Reliance on nuclear "deterrence" by the declared nuclear weapon states, their failure over the more than three decades since the NPT entered into force to meet their disarmament obligation, and the consequent discriminatory nature of the non-proliferation regime have formed an environment in which India and Pakistan, and potentially other states, can reason, erroneously, that nuclear arsenals bolster their security. It must be forcefully emphasized to the declared nuclear weapon states that the crisis in South Asia again demonstrates that the non-proliferation regime must be revitalized through far-reaching disarmament measures. India and Pakistan should be pressed to commence the elimination of their nuclear arsenals, and as a means to this end, to participate in processes related to nuclear disarmament such as development of verification capabilities.
Erosion of the NPT was evident at the first meeting of the April 2002 meeting at the UN of the Preparatory Committee for the 2005 Review Conference, an exercise in frustration. Not only did the nuclear weapon states, and the United States in particular, step back from commitments made in 2000, the states parties to the treaty could not even agree on how implementation reports will be made. Nonetheless, the 1995 and 2000 commitments by and large remain valid as guidelines for the implementation of the Article VI disarmament obligation. Based upon those commitments, this paper sets out priorities for nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation in the new context.
1. U.S.-RUSSIAN STRATEGIC ARMS REDUCTIONS
In its Nuclear Posture Review released in early 2002, the United States announced that it will reduce "operational" strategic deployed nuclear weapons to 3800 by 2007, and to 1700-2200 by 2012. Russia in recent years had indicated a willingness to go to 1000-1500 strategic weapons. Although there is no recent Russian document similar to the U.S. NPR, it is clear that Russia intends long term continued reliance on a substantial nuclear arsenal.
Reflecting the U.S. plan, the short and starkly simple Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty signed on May 24, 2002 in Moscow requires only that the United States and Russia limit "strategic nuclear warheads" to 1700-2200 by the year 2012. Unlike START II, signed but never entered into force, the treaty places no restrictions on multiple warhead land-based missiles or any category of delivery system whatever, providing instead that each party "shall determine for itself the composition and structure of its strategic offensive arms".
The extent to which reductions will be transparent and verified remains to be determined. A non-binding Joint Declaration setting forth political commitments made in connection with the treaty states that START I provisions "will provide the foundation for providing confidence, transparency and predictability in further strategic offensive reductions, along with other supplementary measures, including transparency measures, to be agreed". Verification is not addressed in the treaty or declaration. Transparency issues may be dealt with in a Consultative Group for Strategic Security established by the declaration, a Bilateral Implementation Commission established by the treaty, or START I consultative bodies.
The treaty will expire in 2012 unless renewed. It is subject to termination on three months notice based only on the exercise of "national sovereignty". The typical security treaty provision for withdrawal in case of "extraordinary events" jeopardizing a state? "supreme interests" has been dropped.
The treaty fails in several respects to meet criteria set forth by the 2000 NPT 13 Steps for practical implementation of the Article VI disarmament obligation, discussed below. Viewed pessimistically, it spells the end, or at least the suspension, of arms control, rather confirming in the barest outlines existing U.S. plans for rationalization of nuclear forces, and requiring only that at a single point in time, the year 2012, deployed strategic warheads not exceed a certain number, 2200. If good faith in implementation of NPT obligations is to be assumed, then the treaty can be regarded as a framework capable of being filled in with measures that do conform to the 13 Steps. The following analysis proceeds from that assumption.
Irreversibility: A key principle agreed as part of the 13 Steps (Step 5) is that of irreversible arms control and disarmament. As now configured, the treaty and the Nuclear Posture Review do not conform to this principle, indeed are expressly intended to preserve flexibility contrary to the principle.
The U.S. plan in general does not call for destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. 50 MX missiles are to be deactivated, but their silos will be retained, as will missile stages and the warheads. Four of 18 U.S. Trident submarines will be withdrawn from the strategic nuclear force, but will then be converted to carry conventional cruise missiles. Beyond these measures, no additional strategic delivery platforms are scheduled to be eliminated from nuclear forces. In contrast, START I required, and START II would have required, the destruction of delivery systems, and the 1997 Helsinki commitment to START III additionally envisaged accounting for and dismantling of warheads. In addition, the United States is planning for a new ICBM to be operational in 2020, a new SLBM and SSBN in 2030, and a new heavy bomber in 2040, as well as new warheads for all of them.
Beyond the operational deployed strategic forces, and based in part on the retention of reduced delivery systems and warheads, the United States plans to retain large numbers of warheads in a "responsive force" capable of redeployment within weeks or months. According to one report, current U.S. plans are to have 2,200 deployed strategic warheads in 2012 plus 2,400 in the responsive force. The responsive force is flatly contradictory to the commitment to irreversible disarmament.
The United States and Russia should, in implementing the new treaty or in additional agreements, return to the premise of the START process: delivery systems and warheads are to be irreversibly destroyed and dismantled in an accountable manner. Ideally, this could present an opportunity for multilateralization of disarmament; other countries, the IAEA or another international agency could participate in overseeing the process.
Transparency and verification: Russia and the United States have no common understanding of the meaning of the term "strategic nuclear warheads", having failed to agree on a definition during negotiations. Thus work regarding transparency of reductions has very far to go. Moreover, it is unclear how transparency will be achieved absent destruction of delivery systems or dismantlement of warheads. Destruction of delivery systems is the primary method of verification under START I, referred to by the Joint Declaration as a basis for confidence, predictability and transparency.
The best path towards fulfillment of NPT commitments to transparency and verification (Step 9(b), Step 13; see also Step 7 referring to the START process) would be also to meet the commitment to irreversible disarmament. Absent irreversible measures, transparency and verification with respect to the planned reductions and maintenance of a "responsive force" amount to monitoring of dealerting. Certainly it is important that this be done as vigorously and effectively as possible. There is room here also for multilateral involvement.
Dealerting: Neither the United States nor Russia have indicated plans to reduce the readiness level of the operationally deployed strategic arms. Today both have about 2,000 warheads on high alert, ready for delivery within minutes of an order to do so. Projecting present practices forward, it has been estimated that at the 2012 level of 1700 ?2200 operationally deployed warheads, the United States would have about 900 on high alert. One could see this as a sort of slow-motion dealerting process, all the more so given that the "responsive force" planned by the United States essentially is in a dealerted status. But there is no reason the reductions in operationally deployed forces have to be spread out over so many years. Nor should they be maintained in a high alert status whatever their numbers.
The NPT commitments to "concrete agreed measures to further reduce the operational status of nuclear weapons systems" (Step 9(d)) and "a diminishing role for nuclear weapons in security policies" (Step 9(e)) should be applied to deployed as well as stored warheads.
2. CONTROL OF MISSILE DEFENSES AND NON-PROLIFERATION OF MISSILES
The U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty is effective June 13, 2002, and the United States continues to stress the role of missile defenses in overall military strategy. According to the Nuclear Posture Review, missile defenses, advanced offensive nuclear and conventional strategic forces, and a "responsive defense infrastructure" capable of developing and producing nuclear weapons and resuming nuclear testing, form a "new triad," replacing the triad of nuclear-armed land-based missiles, submarine-based missiles, and heavy bombers. The NPR anticipates limited deployment of strategic missile defenses by 2008. The May 2002 Joint Declaration seeks to assuage Russian concerns regarding missile defenses by providing for information exchange, study of possible areas for cooperation on defenses, etc. However, there is no evidence that the Bush administration is prepared to make concrete practical commitments to restrict missile defenses.
In the U.S.-Russian context, this may drastically impede dealerting measures and reductions below the levels outlined in the May 2002 treaty, or indeed reductions approaching those levels in the years prior to 2012 or after then, when it expires. Russia may decide to maintain existing multiple warhead land-based missiles, and may also decide to deploy new ones, because this is a cost-effective way of fielding large numbers of deliverable warheads capable of overwhelming missile defenses. Russia may also experience pressure from deployment of missile defenses, especially in combination with increased U.S. capabilities to mount conventional precision strikes against Russian nuclear forces, to continue to maintain portions of its forces on high alert. Both of these factors in turn can cause U.S. reluctance to proceed with reductions beyond those required by the May 2002 treaty or to pursue dealerting. U.S. development and deployment of missile defenses will also stimulate a further Chinese build-up of its arsenal and a consequent arms race in Asia.
All of the above makes grappling with missile defenses and missile proliferation in the NPT context of the highest urgency if the 13 Steps are to be carried out. Disarmament of missiles was always understood to be part of the nuclear disarmament process, as is reflected in the NPT preamble, which calls for "the elimination from national arsenals of nuclear weapons and the means of their delivery" (emphasis added). In 2000, Step 7 called for "preserving and strengthening the ABM Treaty" and described it as a "cornerstone of strategic stability and as a basis for further reductions of strategic offensive weapons." That step is now out of date, given U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty.
Attention must now be focused on principles to govern the new situation, and on measures for missile non-proliferation and control. In general, the development and deployment of missile defenses must not obstruct the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament and the total elimination of nuclear arsenals, and must be consistent with international stability and the principle of undiminished security for all (Step 9). Plans for missile defenses should be subjected to transparency and negotiation to achieve these ends. It is also urgent to prevent missile proliferation, especially of intermediate and long-range systems. Ad hoc arrangements, as with North Korea, can be pursued here. Proposals for missile control regimes combining disarmament and non-proliferation objectives should also be developed, as middle power countries like Canada and Germany have already indicated. A missile flight test moratorium would be a good first step.
3. U.S.-RUSSIAN TACTICAL ARMS REDUCTIONS
Step 9(c) calls for "further reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons, based on unilateral initiatives and as an integral part of the nuclear arms reduction and disarmament process." There has been no publicly reported progress in this regard since 2000. Indeed, the 1991 Bush-Gorbachev parallel unilateral withdrawals of non-strategic arms from deployment have yet to be subjected to the requirements of the "reduction and disarmament process," that is, they are not transparent, they are not irreversible, they have not been verified, and they have not been codified in legally binding form. No official figures are available on tactical arsenals of the United States and Russia. One estimate is that as of 2001 the United States had 1,670 operational tactical weapons, and Russia 3,590; however, a high degree of uncertainty attaches to estimates of Russian stocks. According to one estimate, approximately 150 U.S. bombs for delivery by aircraft are deployed under NATO auspices at 10 air bases in seven European NATO countries (Belgium, Germany, Greece, Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, and the United Kingdom). The U.S. Nuclear Posture Review refers to a NATO review of U.S. and allied dual capable aircraft in Europe with recommendations presented to defense ministers in summer of 2002. It states: "Dual capable aircraft and deployed weapons are important to the continued viability of NATO's nuclear deterrent strategy and any changes need to be discussed within the alliance." The NPR also contains plans for further development of earth-penetrating, low yield nuclear warheads that could be deployed on tactical systems.
There is widespread interest in pursuing control of tactical warheads, including among U.S. arms control groups and in the U.S. Senate, as a next step after the new strategic arms treaty, in conjunction with the hoped for process of developing dismantlement and verification mechanisms regarding reduced strategic arms. The new NATO-Russian partnership arrangement may make measures regarding tactical weapons more feasible.
Reduction and elimination of tactical warheads should be promoted vigorously. The U.S. bombs deployed under NATO auspices in Europe ?the only nuclear weapons deployed on non-nuclear weapon state territory ?should be removed unilaterally. A wider process of control of U.S. and Russian tactical weapons should also be created. A German working paper for the NPT PrepCom provides a useful checklist, including:
1) reporting on the 1991-1992 Presidential initiatives;
2) formalization of those initiatives, including verification;
3) in accordance with NATO proposals, reciprocal exchange of information regarding readiness, safety, and sub-strategic forces; and
4) commencement of U.S.-Russian negotiations on reduction of non-strategic nuclear weapons.
4. NON-USE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS
In the post-Cold War years the two largest nuclear powers, the United States and Russia, have integrated nuclear forces into their military strategies and expanded their role. In 1993, Russia abandoned its declared policy of no first use of nuclear weapons, and its January 2000 Security Concept stated that nuclear weapons could be used to "repulse armed aggression, if all other means of resolving the crisis have been exhausted." The United States continues to plan for a massive retaliation or preemptive counterforce attack in response to an actual or imminent nuclear attack, and for first use of nuclear weapons against an overwhelming conventional attack. The Nuclear Posture Review also reveals some new trends. It states that nuclear weapons will be "integrated with new nonnuclear strategic capabilities" including advanced conventional precision-guided munitions, and contemplates enlarging the range of circumstances under which nuclear weapons could be used. It calls for contingency planning for use of nuclear weapons against Russia, China, North Korea, Iraq, Iran, Syria, and Libya; identifies possible "immediate contingencies" requiring U.S. nuclear use as "an Iraqi attack on Israel or its neighbors, a North Korean attack on South Korea, or a military confrontation over the status of Taiwan"; and states that nuclear weapons "could be employed against targets able to withstand nonnuclear attack," or in retaliation for use of nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons, or "in the event of surprising military developments." The new NPR options for use of nuclear weapons have not, so far as is known, been codified in a presidential directive (the last publicly known directive was that of President Clinton in 1997), and top U.S. officials have sought to downplay their significance. However, the NPR was signed by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, and certainly indicates at the very least a strong trend in U.S. nuclear planning.
Thus, far from diminishing the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, as called for by Step 9(e), the United States is expanding options for nuclear use, and Russia is maintaining first use options. In addition, the U.S. plans in particular undermine assurances of non-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states parties to the NPT. Those assurances are at minimum political commitments essential to the bargain underlying the NPT, and arguably have become legally binding, notably because they were reiterated in connection with the indefinite extension of the NPT in 1995. Regarding nuclear use in response to a chemical or biological attack, the use of nuclear weapons, or any weapon, including in reprisal, must always meet fundamental requirements of necessity, proportionality, and discrimination. Thus the International Court of Justice affirmed that states must "never use weapons that are incapable of distinguishing between civilian and military targets." Given that the radioactive effects of nuclear explosions are, as the ICJ observed, uncontainable in space and time, there are no realistic situations in which nuclear weapons could meet those requirements. Moreover, regardless of whatever hypothetical scenarios of retaliatory nuclear use with limited "collateral damage" can be conjured up, in general making nuclear weapons more usable as a matter of policy and operation undermines the non-proliferation regime and risks unleashing nuclear chaos in the world.
There should be insistence upon diminishing, not expanding, the role of nuclear weapons in security policies, in accordance with the NPT commitment, and upon respect for the NPT negative security assurances. Countries in multilateral or bilateral security alliances with the United States should absolutely refuse any participation in or support of first use of nuclear weapons or preparation for such use, as a matter of policy or operation.
5. BAN ON NUCLEAR TESTING
Of the five NPT nuclear weapon states, the United States and China have yet to ratify the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, as called for by Step 1; India and Pakistan have yet to sign it. All five NPT nuclear weapon states, including the United States, continue to affirm the moratorium on testing (Step 2). A troubling sign, though, is that the Nuclear Posture Review calls for reduction of the lead-time to prepare for and conduct an underground nuclear test, currently at 24-36 months of a decision to do so. To date Congress has not approved such a reduction. The Bush administration has cut back on financial support of development of the verification capabilities of the CTBT Organization. There are also reports that some U.S. officials favor "unsigning" the CTBT. Additionally, the NPR cites the need to improve earth-penetrating nuclear weapons; however, a budget request for development of one such weapon has met with resistance in the U.S. Congress. Development of such weapons, depending on the device in question, could increase pressure for a U.S. resumption of testing.
It should be made clear that abiding by the moratorium is imperative. There should be a continued push for funding of the CTBT Organization and ratification of the CTBT, and a call for the closure of the test sites in Nevada and Novaya Zemlya. There should also be strong opposition to development of new or modified nuclear weapons, which is contrary, inter alia, to the commitment to a diminishing role of nuclear weapons in security policies (Step 9(e)) and the Article VI obligation of cessation of the nuclear arms race.
6. CONTROL OF FISSILE MATERIALS
The 1995 and 2000 commitments (Step 3) to commence formal negotiation of a fissile materials treaty have not been met. U.S.-Russian plans to place some "surplus" military fissile material holdings under IAEA monitoring are proceeding slowly. The United States has released information regarding its plutonium holdings and is still working on a report regarding HEU. The size of Russian fissile material holdings is uncertain. Russia is working on an inventory of civil plutonium; an inventory of HEU is far in the future. France and Britain have released information regarding their holdings. Fissile materials holdings as well as warhead inventories of China and of the non-NPT nuclear weapon possessing states are opaque. The IAEA maintains information regarding non-nuclear weapon state holdings of civil, but weapons-usable, fissile materials; however, it is available only in summary form. The IAEA has an eight-point plan to improve protection against acts of terrorism involving nuclear and other radioactive material, including in the areas of physical protection, detection of trafficking, and assessment of vulnerabilities at nuclear facilities. The plan costs $12 million annually, and is funded through voluntary measures.
The September 2001 attacks, and subsequent reports of Al Qaeda interest in acquiring weapons of mass destruction, have raised the specter of terrorist use of nuclear explosive devices and radiological bombs. Consequently, the imperative of accounting for and controlling fissile materials, including non-military stocks of weapon-usable plutonium, as well as warheads, is now widely understood. In a 2002 NPT working paper, Germany noted that existing stockpiles of weapon-usable fissile materials amount to more than 3,000 metric tons, enough for more than 200,000 nuclear weapons, and called for the establishment of a reliable inventory of all nuclear weapons and stocks of fissile material usable for military purposes. U.S. arms control groups and members of the U.S. Congress have increasingly emphasized the need for control of fissile materials, especially but not only in Russia, and legislation in this area is pending in Congress.
There should be insistence upon implementation of the principles of transparency and irreversibility with respect to fissile material holdings and their control and disposition by the nuclear weapon states (Steps 5, 8, 9(b) and 10), and on commencement of negotiations on a fissile material treaty (Step 3). Russia and the United States should be pressed to accelerate their efforts to inventory fissile materials, both military and civilian. IAEA information on holdings of weapon-usable fissile materials should be made available in detailed form (consistent with security concerns). A process should be initiated to create a global inventory of all weapon-usable fissile materials and nuclear weapons. The IAEA plan to improve protection against acts of terrorism should be better funded and not rely on voluntary contributions. In this connection, relevant measures set forth in the 2000 Final Document in addition to the 13 Steps must be fully implemented, including strengthening of IAEA safeguards (Pt.I, Art. III), further adherence to and possible revision of the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material (Art. III, para. 56), improving national standards of security and physical protection of nuclear material (para. 42), establishing stronger regulatory control over radioactive sources (para. 43), and enhancing international cooperation against illicit trafficking in nuclear material (para. 43).
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